Title : Geopolitical Transformations in the Sahel: The Decline of French Influence and the Rise of New Foreign Powers

INTRODUCTION

1. Problems and issues of the study

One of the most disputed and strategically important areas in world geopolitics today is the Sahel. It has drawn the attention of both regional and global players, driven by a mix of economic interests, security challenges, and international rivalries. As traditional powers—especially France—have stepped back, new opportunities have opened up for rising global and regional actors. gainst this backdrop, Morocco is working to redefine its role by strengthening diplomatic ties, increasing economic investments, and expanding security cooperation.

Why Has the Sahel Become a Key Strategic Focus?

The Sahel’s importance on the world stage arises from a complex mix of geography, economic interests, and security challenges. The latter have raised its profile in recent years.

Positioned between North Africa, West Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahel serves as a vital crossroads. Its location makes it a key corridor for trade, migration, and, unfortunately, illicit trafficking—issues that have significant consequences for surrounding regions, particularly Europe. For nations like Morocco and Algeria, who view the Sahel as an extension of their economic and security spheres of influence, the region’s significance has increased due to its proximity to North Africa.

The Sahel is rich in natural resources, especially gold, uranium, and oil. Countries like Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso hold some of the largest uranium reserves in the world, making them essential players in global energy security. In recent years, competition for access to these resources has grown fiercer, with new powers like China and Russia pushing to lock in long-term investments in mining and infrastructure.

But it’s not just natural wealth that has drawn global attention. The region has become a focal point for security concerns as well. Ongoing instability has fueled the rise of armed groups linked to the Islamic State and Al-Qaeda. Insurgent violence, arms trafficking, and cross-border terrorism have created a security vacuum that neither regional governments nor international forces have been able to fully address. These challenges have caught the interest of various countries, including Morocco, France, and the United States, all seeking ways to engage in the region’s complex security landscape.

Furthermore, preexisting vulnerabilities have been made worse by the climate crisis. Social and political instability has increased because of food shortages and internal displacement exacerbated by desertification, water scarcity, and population growth. Growing unrest, military takeovers, and a general governance crisis have resulted from the region’s governments’ inability to handle these interrelated issues, many of which are delicate.

What are the factors behind the decline of French influence?

France, once the dominant external power in the Sahel, has seen its influence decline sharply in recent years. This shift has been driven by the emergence of new international partners, changing public sentiment in the region, and a series of military setbacks.

A key blow to France’s standing came from the shortcomings of its military interventions, particularly Operation Serval in 2013 and Operation Barkhane, which followed in 2014. Barkhane was unable to stop the return of terrorist activities, which extended beyond Mali into Burkina Faso and Niger, although Serval was originally successful in driving jihadist groups out of Mali. The extended military presence did not stabilize the area; rather, it grew more unpopular with Sahelian citizens, who saw France as an invading force rather than a security partner.

A growing sense of neocolonialism has fueled this perception. Many in the Sahel—both ordinary citizens and political leaders—have criticized France’s unbalanced economic and security relationships, which often appeared to prioritize French interests over the region’s stability. Anti-French sentiment deepened amid accusations that France propped up political elites widely viewed as corrupt or disconnected from the realities faced by local populations. This discontent eventually culminated in widespread protests, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso, demanding the withdrawal of French troops. The official pullout of Operation Barkhane forces in 2023 marked the end of an era.

At the same time, Sahelian countries have actively worked to reduce their dependence on France by broadening their international partnerships. The rising presence of China, Turkey, Russia—especially through the Wagner Group—and Gulf states has offered alternative sources of military and economic support. Russia has gained a foothold by providing weapons and paramilitary assistance in exchange for mining concessions, positioning itself as a key security partner. China, meanwhile, has focused on large-scale investments in resource extraction and infrastructure. These new partnerships have given Sahelian governments greater flexibility and allowed them to shift their foreign policy away from traditional Western alliances.

Finally, France’s standing has been further weakened by the growing fragmentation of the European Union’s approach to the Sahel. While France initially sought to steer European engagement in the region, internal political divisions within the EU—over issues like migration, development aid, and security commitments—have eroded any unified strategy. Meanwhile, countries like China, Russia, and Morocco have taken advantage of this disunity by offering more targeted, strategic partnerships tailored to the specific needs of Sahelian states.

How is Morocco reshaping its role in the Sahel?

In response to these shifting dynamics, Morocco has adopted a proactive and multifaceted strategy to strengthen its presence in the Sahel. This shift is driven by both political ambitions and economic interests, as the Kingdom works to deepen diplomatic relationships, protect key economic stakes, and expand its regional influence.

Economic engagement has become one of the cornerstones of Morocco’s foreign policy in the Sahel. The Kingdom has emerged as a major economic force in the region, significantly expanding its investments across banking, telecommunications, agriculture, and infrastructure. Moroccan companies have steadily increased their presence in countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—particularly in the banking and insurance sectors—where they provide essential financial services and help foster deeper economic integration.

At the same time, Morocco has leveraged religious diplomacy as a key element of its soft power. By training Sahelian imams at the Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams in Rabat, Morocco promotes a moderate, state-supported interpretation of Islam aimed at countering extremist ideologies in the region. This effort, combined with growing security cooperation and stronger cultural and religious ties with Sahelian governments, supports the Kingdom’s broader counterterrorism strategy.

Morocco has worked to deepen its diplomatic relationships with regional bodies, particularly the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Its current observer status in ECOWAS—and its continuing push for full membership—signals Morocco’s desire to become more integrated into West Africa’s political and economic landscape. Strengthening ties with Sahelian nations also serves another key objective: building diplomatic backing for Morocco’s position on Western Sahara, an issue that remains at the heart of its foreign policy.

On the security front, Morocco has positioned itself as a valuable partner by offering military training, sharing intelligence, and collaborating on counterterrorism efforts. While the Kingdom has not deployed troops to the Sahel, it has supported regional stabilization by providing technical assistance and capacity-building programs. This approach has distinguished Morocco from other external powers and reinforced its image as a reliable partner in resolving regional security challenges.

2. Justification of the study and scientific contribution

Studying the geopolitical shifts in the Sahel is crucial, given the region’s growing influence on global security, economic competition, and diplomatic realignment. The Sahel is not only a focal point for natural resource extraction and international rivalries but also a testing ground for new models of governance and regional cooperation. Grasping the impact of shifting alliances, the decline of traditional powers like France, and the rise of new actors such as Morocco, Russia, China, and Turkey is essential to understanding this rapidly evolving landscape.

This research makes an academic contribution by providing a comprehensive, structured analysis of the geopolitical changes unfolding in the Sahel. It weaves together historical background, economic drivers, security concerns, and diplomatic strategies. By exploring how different players are repositioning themselves in the region, the study sheds light on broader changes in regional stability, economic growth, and political sovereignty within a fast-changing global order.

The Need for a Comprehensive Geopolitical Analysis of the Sahel

Amid sweeping changes in the region’s geopolitical landscape, the Sahel has become a vital case study for understanding power struggles in Africa, the consequences of foreign intervention, regional dynamics, and economic interconnections. The growing number of actors and competing interests—from former colonial powers to rising economies—highlights the importance of a systematic, multidisciplinary approach to uncover the deeper causes and impacts of these shifts.

From a security perspective, the Sahel has emerged as a global hotspot for counterterrorism, driven by the spread of armed insurgent groups, weapons trafficking, and transnational crime. Any attempt to assess the region’s future security framework must consider how both regional and international players are responding to these threats—whether through direct military intervention, capacity-building efforts, or diplomatic initiatives.

From an economic perspective, the extraction of valuable resources like oil, uranium, and gold has intensified competition among global powers. Countries such as China and Russia, with their assertive moves into Sahelian markets, have challenged Western dominance by offering alternative trade partnerships, infrastructure projects, and security support. Understanding how Sahelian states navigate these competing interests is crucial for assessing both their economic sovereignty and their prospects for sustainable development.

On the diplomatic and governance front, the region’s repeated political crises—including military coups, fragile institutions, and disputed elections—have exposed the vulnerabilities of Western-backed democratic models. This situation raises important questions about what kinds of governance might emerge in the future, whether military-led administrations, hybrid regimes, or stronger regional alliances. The influence of organizations like ECOWAS and the African Union (AU) in guiding political transitions will play a decisive role in shaping the Sahel’s stability going forward.

Given these overlapping dynamics, a thorough and well-researched geopolitical analysis is essential to grasp the wider consequences of these changes—not only for the Sahel but for Africa as a whole and the broader global landscape.

The Impact of Shifting Influence on Regional Stability

The region’s stability has been directly affected by the steady decline of French influence, the rise of new international actors, and the broadening of diplomatic alliances. As France has scaled back its military presence, the Sahel has become more fragmented and multipolar. Competition for influence has intensified, yet responses to security challenges remain uneven and poorly coordinated.

One of the most immediate consequences of these shifts has been the growing reliance on non-traditional security partners. Russia, working through the Wagner Group, has signed military agreements with Mali, Burkina Faso, and the Central African Republic, offering direct security support in exchange for financial concessions. This privatization of military force has raised serious concerns about accountability, human rights abuses, and the prospects for long-term security sector reform. Unlike Western military missions, which operated under international legal frameworks, Russia’s paramilitary involvement bypasses formal diplomatic channels, complicating efforts to resolve conflicts.

At the same time, China’s expanding economic presence in the Sahel—though largely centered on infrastructure development—carries strategic security implications. By locking in mining and energy deals, China is becoming a major economic player in the region, gradually reducing the sway of traditional Western financial institutions. Yet Beijing’s policy of non-intervention means it remains largely absent from direct conflict resolution, creating a gap where security and development should ideally intersect.

The effectiveness of regional organizations like ECOWAS and the African Union has also come under strain. Their inability to prevent military takeovers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—and the limited impact of sanctions—highlights the shortcomings of existing regional governance structures. Many now view ECOWAS as serving Western interests rather than promoting genuinely African-led solutions to conflicts, further eroding its credibility.

In contrast, Morocco’s strategic shift in the Sahel offers a different regional approach to fostering stability. By promoting economic integration, religious diplomacy, and security cooperation, Morocco aims to present an alternative to both Eastern geopolitical dominance and continued reliance on Western powers, advocating instead for a model grounded in South-South cooperation.

This shift in geopolitical influence presents a double-edged sword. On one hand, it gives Sahelian governments the chance to broaden their alliances and assert greater sovereignty. On the other, it risks creating new forms of dependency, deepening regional divisions, and weakening collective responses to instability.

The Importance of Intra-African Cooperation for Sustainable Development

As external influence in the Sahel evolves, intra-African cooperation is becoming an essential pathway toward sustainable development. Regional initiatives, trade agreements, and economic partnerships are increasingly replacing the old model of dependence on Western aid and military intervention.

Morocco’s role in promoting intra-African cooperation stands out as particularly significant. Under King Mohammed VI’s South-South cooperation strategy, the country has deepened its economic, diplomatic, and security partnerships with Sahelian nations, focusing on shared development objectives rather than top-down aid models.

This approach includes major investments in regional infrastructure, such as transport corridors, renewable energy initiatives, and agricultural development projects designed to reduce economic vulnerability. Morocco has also advanced religious cooperation by training Sahelian imams in its institutions, promoting a moderate interpretation of Islam to counter extremist ideologies. On the financial front, Moroccan banks have expanded their presence in West African markets, boosting capital mobility, trade, and access to credit.

Alongside Morocco, other regional powers—including Algeria, Nigeria, and South Africa—are also working to strengthen their economic ties with the Sahel, aiming to promote African-led solutions to African challenges. Initiatives like the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) provide a framework for reducing dependence on external actors while encouraging local manufacturing, investment, and economic cooperation across the continent.

Still, significant obstacles remain. Efforts toward regional economic integration are hindered by weak institutions, persistent governance challenges, and ongoing security threats. The effectiveness of intra-African diplomacy is further complicated by divisions among African political blocs, with competing interests often creating friction between governments in West, North, and Central Africa.

Despite these hurdles, intra-African cooperation remains the most promising long-term path for addressing the region’s challenges. African-led initiatives are better positioned to respond to local needs and realities, offering an alternative to both Western and Eastern interventions, which often reflect the strategic priorities of outside powers.

3. General context : the Sahel, a region under tension

1. 1. Definition and geographical framework of the Sahel

Between the more fertile tropical savannas to the south and the vast Sahara Desert to the north, the semi-arid Sahel region serves as a transitional belt. The word “Sahel” comes from the Arabic word “sāḥil,” which means “shore” or “coast,” signifying its function as a physical boundary between the desert and the sub-Saharan region¹. From the Atlantic Ocean in the west to the Red Sea in the east, this region spans roughly 5,400 kilometers across the African continent. It includes parts of several countries, including Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Sudan, though some definitions also include other states like Senegal, Nigeria, and Eritrea².

The Sahel is characterized by vast plains, plateaus, and arid landscapes, with sparse vegetation made up mostly of grasslands and scattered shrubs. Water scarcity is a constant challenge, driven by a harsh climate marked by short, unpredictable rainy seasons and long dry spells. Annual rainfall ranges from 150 to 600 millimeters, with most of it concentrated between June and September³. This variability contributes to desertification and soil degradation, which, in turn, worsen economic vulnerability, food insecurity, and population displacement.

Despite these environmental hardships, the Sahel has long served as a vital link between sub-Saharan Africa and North Africa. Historically, it played a key role in trans-Saharan trade, connecting powerful West African empires like Ghana, Mali, and Songhai to Mediterranean economies. Today, the region remains strategically significant as a corridor for migration, trade, and, unfortunately, illicit activities such as arms smuggling and human trafficking. Its geographic position has made it a focal point of international interest⁴, as global powers compete for influence over its governance, security, and natural resources.

The legacy of colonial borders imposed by European powers (especially France and Britain, which frequently ignored linguistic; cultural and ethnic distinctions) defines the political geography of the Sahel. Because of this, modern Sahelian states have internal strife, governance issues, and brittle institutions. Insurgencies, armed conflicts, and violent extremism have dramatically increased in the region since the early 2000s, with Al-Qaeda and Islamic State (ISIS)-affiliated groups establishing bases in ungoverned areas⁵.

1. 2. A Region of coveted strategic resources (gold, uranium, etc.)

The Sahel is a hotly contested geopolitical region because of its abundance of natural resources, despite its harsh climate and frequent humanitarian crises.

Gold: The Sahelian states’ economic lifeline

In the Sahel, gold is one of the most precious and often exploited minerals. Among Africa’s top producers of gold are nations like Mali; Burkina Faso and Niger, whose national incomes are greatly boosted by the gold industry⁶. In example, Mali is Africa’s fourth-largest producer of gold, and the mining sector contributes close to 10% of the nation’s GDP⁷.

Over the past 20 years, artisanal and industrial mining have grown significantly. They drew both informal mining networks and large international mining companies. But this industry is still not well regulated. That situation contributes to armed group funding; unlawful smuggling and environmental damage. Armed militias and jihadist groups usually use illegal gold trading networks which evade government regulation to profit from gold mines⁸. As a result, in many Sahelian republics, gold mining is now a source of bloodshed and insurrection rather than a source of economic stability.

Uranium : global energy and security resource

Some of the most important uranium reserves in the world are found in the Sahel, mostly in Niger. It provides around 5% of the world’s uranium⁹. As a reflection of France’s long-standing interests in the area, French multinational corporations like Orano (formerly Areva) have historically controlled Niger’s uranium mines, especially in Arlit and Imouraren¹⁰.

France (which produces about 70% of its electricity through nuclear power¹¹), has long relied on Niger for supply of uranium. But this domination has been under growing threat from resource nationalism; anti-French sentiment and geopolitical problems. France’s advantageous position is being undermined by China and Russia’s incursions into Niger’s mining industry: that situation causes Paris to reevaluate its strategic alliances. As new players like China’s CGN and Russia’s Rosatom aim to expand their energy sources and gain more clout in Africa, the future of Niger’s uranium sector is still unclear¹².

1. 3. A region of chronic instability (Coups d’État, armed conflicts, food insecurity)

A recurring cycle of political unrest, military wars, and humanitarian catastrophes makes the Sahel one of the world’s most unstable and vulnerable regions. The region has been a focal point for regional and global security concerns due to a combination of political instability, food hunger, ethnic conflicts, terrorist insurgencies, and weak state institutions that have solidified a condition of chronic instability.

Frequent coups d’État and political instability

Since 2020, the Sahel has witnessed an unprecedented wave of military coups, altering the political landscape of several states. Countries such as Mali (2020, 2021); Chad (2021); Guinea (2021) and Burkina Faso (2022) have experienced unconstitutional regime changes; disrupting governance and democratic transitions¹³. The inability of elected leaders to reduce insecurity; enhance governance and resolve socioeconomic complaints was frequently used as justification by the military regimes that took the place of civilian administrations.

This pattern shows a legitimacy dilemma in Sahelian political systems. Corruption; electoral fraud and a lack of public confidence in political institutions are problems in many of the region’s states. Ruling elites and sections of the populace have opposed democratic governance models: these models are pushed by Western nations and regional organizations like the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States), because they believe that these models are imposed and inefficient.

Additionally, diplomatic difficulties have arisen because of the successive coups (especially with former colonial powers like France). A divide between Sahelian nations and their longstanding Western allies is reflected in the expulsion of French military personnel and diplomats from Mali and Burkina Faso¹⁴. These regimes are more susceptible to outside influence; extremist groups and economic exploitation because of the power vacuum caused by the lack of stable governance.

The growth of terrorist insurgencies and armed conflicts

The spread of terrorist organizations (especially those connected to the Islamic State (IS) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)) is one of the Sahel’s greatest security issues. The rise of insurgent factions (such as Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS)) has transformed the region into a battlefield of asymmetric warfare, where terrorist networks exploit porous borders; weak law enforcement and ungoverned spaces¹⁵.

Complex intercommunal violence, involving cycles of retaliatory killings and military offensives by ethnic militias, jihadist organizations, and state security forces, is a defining feature of the armed conflicts in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Competition for natural resources has also made these disputes worse, especially in areas where access to mining opportunities, water, and grazing land is disputed.

Several international actors have stepped in to support counterterrorism efforts in reaction to the increasing violence, notably the United States (via Africom), France (through Operation Barkhane), and the United Nations (through MINUSMA)¹⁶. The perceived inefficiency of these interventions, their lack of collaboration with local administrations, and the unexpected civilian casualties brought on by military operations, however, have drawn harsh condemnation. As a result, some Sahelian nations have looked for military support outside of the conventional Western framework by turning to alternative security suppliers like Russia’s Wagner Group¹⁷.

Pervasive food insecurity and aid emergencies

In addition to its political and security issues, the Sahel is among the world’s most food insecure regions. Over 38 million people in the Sahel region experience severe food insecurity¹⁸, and the situation is getting worse because of economic upheavals, displacement brought on by conflict, and climate change.

Armed conflict-induced insecurity has had a major impact on trade networks and agricultural output, making it challenging for local populations to survive. Hunger and malnutrition are made worse by armed militias and terrorist organizations that frequently target food convoys, destroy farmlands, and impose unlawful taxes on rural populations. Furthermore, the millions of people who have been displaced—especially from conflict areas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—have put tremendous strain on humanitarian agencies, making it difficult for them to deliver sufficient aid.

1. 4. Climatic and demographic challenges (desertification, population Growth)

The stability and economic growth of the Sahel are further complicated by its environmental circumstances. The region’s agriculture-based economies, natural resources, and food systems are under tremendous strain due to desertification, droughts, unpredictable rainfall, and a fast-expanding population.

Degradation of the environment and desertification

In the Sahel, climate change and unsustainable land use practices have accelerated desertification, the process by which fertile land turns into desert. Millions of livelihoods reliant on farming and cattle have been impacted by the southward extension of the Sahara Desert, which has resulted in land degradation, the loss of arable soil, and a reduction in water availability. Among the elements causing desertification are overgrazing and deforestation lower soil fertility; erratic and decreasing rainfall, which causes protracted droughts; erosion of the soil brought on by wind and water loss. International and regional projects like the Great Green Wall project, a bold attempt to stop desertification by planting trees throughout the Sahel, have been started in response to these issues¹⁹. Nevertheless, financial limitations, security threats, and inadequate local administration continue to hinder the efficacy of such initiatives.

The stress of increasing populations

One of the world’s fastest rates of population expansion is occurring in the Sahel. By 2050, the population is expected to triple due to an average fertility rate of more than five children per woman, severely taxing already limited resources²⁰. There are important socioeconomic and security ramifications to this quick growth, including conflicts between communities and ethnic groups result from increased competition for food, water, and land; an increase in the demand for jobs in economies that are underdeveloped and experiencing high unemployment and a growing number of young people are at risk of radicalization as a result of inadequate prospects, which drive many of them to join extremist organizations or migrate.

4. The colonial heritage and historical influence of France

1. 1. The construction of Sahelian states in the postcolonial context

The history of European colonial control, especially under French and British imperial administrations, has greatly influenced the modern governments in the Sahel region. These recently independent states faced the burden of nation-building after decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, frequently in challenging conditions. Fragile state formations resulted from colonial powers’ arbitrary border-drawing, a lack of institutional continuity, and economic reliance on former metropoles. These factors still affect political stability and governance institutions in the area today.

The difficulties of state formation and colonial legacies

European nations, chiefly France and Britain, used economic exploitation, compulsory labor laws, and indirect government to control their various colonies during the colonial era. Ethnic, cultural, and geographic factors were not considered while drawing the borders of the contemporary Sahelian nations²¹.

Ethnic division and artificial borders

With scant consideration for pre-existing racial, linguistic, or tribal characteristics, the Berlin Conference (1884–1885) established colonial frontiers throughout Africa²². Because of this, the Sahel developed a patchwork of several ethnic groups, including as the Fulani, Hausa, Songhai, Mandé, and Tuareg, who were frequently split up among several governments. Ethnic tensions and national cohesion were undermined by this division, which still fuels political unrest and armed conflicts.

Weak institutions and colonial administrative structures

French West Africa (Afrique Occidentale Française, AOF), which was governed from Dakar, Senegal, included Sahelian regions. Resource exploitation, taxation, and military rule were given precedence by the colonial government over the establishment of strong local governance structures. As a result, the majority of Sahelian governments lacked the governance frameworks, skilled labor, and bureaucratic capacity necessary for successful state-building now of independence. In the postcolonial era, political instability, corruption, and governance crises have resulted from the ensuing institutional inadequacies²³.

Reliance on the former colonial powers for economic support

Sahelian economies were shaped by colonial economic policies to benefit European interests. Instead of helping local economies, colonial capitals benefited from the development of cash crop production, extractive industries, and trading routes. Following their independence, these economies continued to rely significantly on commerce, financial support, and foreign aid from France and other Western nations. Anti-French feeling in the area was fueled by the CFA franc’s prolonged usage, a currency that is based on the French treasury and further reinforced economic dependency and limited monetary sovereignty²⁴.

Political developments following independence

The majority of Sahelian governments that gained independence between 1958 and 1962 embraced military or one-party systems, frequently supported by France through the Françafrique policy, which guaranteed political allegiance in return for financial and military assistance. Many leaders who tried to enact independent development policies—like Hamani Diori in Niger, Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso, and Modibo Keïta in Mali—were overthrown by internal opposition, military takeovers, or international interventions²⁵.

1. 2. French Military and Economic Presence Since Independence

Through military incursions, defense pacts, and economic control mechanisms, France has maintained its dominance in Sahelian politics, security, and the economy despite nominal decolonization. As rival international actors and local communities have begun to question France’s position in the region, its long-standing presence has proved both controversial and stabilizing.

The presence of French troops in the Sahel

Since the 1960s, France has had a significant military presence in the Sahel, sending troops there as part of international security projects, counterterrorism operations, and bilateral defense agreements²⁶. To defend French interests, counter terrorist threats, and maintain regional peace, this interventionist strategy has also drawn criticism and hostility.

In the Sahel, especially in Niger, Chad, and Mali, France runs several military installations and forward operating stations. Following independence, France was able to train local armies, station soldiers, and, when needed, participate in internal disputes thanks to defense accords. France’s largest military post in Central Africa is in N’Djamena, Chad, and it acts as a vital center for military activities in the region²⁷.

France has repeatedly intervened in Sahelian conflicts, sometimes supporting government forces against rebellions, and at other times, mediating political transitions. Notable interventions include:

• Operation Manta (1983): French troops intervened in Chad to protect President Hissène Habré against Libyan-backed rebels.

• Operation Serval (2013): Launched in Mali to stop jihadist groups from advancing toward Bamako.

• Operation Barkhane (2014–2022): A broader counterterrorism mission across the Sahel, headquartered in N’Djamena²⁸.

Despite its military presence, France has struggled to win the hearts and minds of Sahelian populations, many of whom view its actions as neo-colonial interference. The failure of Operation Barkhane to decisively defeat jihadist groups, coupled with accusations of supporting unpopular regimes, led to protests, particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. The rise of alternative security partnerships, such as those with Russia’s Wagner Group, signals a declining acceptance of French military influence²⁹.

Beyond military affairs, France has maintained deep economic ties with its former colonies in the Sahel, particularly through trade, investments, and monetary policies. Monetary sovereignty is restricted by the CFA franc (Communauté Financière Africaine franc), which is used in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Chad. It is still fixed to the French treasury. Although it offers stability, the system has come under fire for being used as an instrument of economic control that stops Sahelian nations from implementing their own financial policies³⁰.

1. 3. France’s Policy of Intervention and Cooperation

France has pursued two strategies in the region since the Sahelian states gained their independence in the 1960s: a framework of cooperation aimed at preserving diplomatic and economic clout, and a policy of political and military interventionism to safeguard its strategic interests. Originally seen as stabilizing measures, these policies have now come under fire for escalating economic inequality, political reliance, and governance issues.

Military and political interventionism

France has long maintained a long-standing record of military intervention in times of domestic crises, coups d’état, or insurgencies, positioning itself as the principal security provider in the Sahel³¹. Direct military actions, political mediation, and assistance for ally regimes are just a few of the various ways that this interventionism has manifested. Frequently justified under the guise of preserving regional security, combating terrorism, or safeguarding French nationals and interests, France has carried out several military operations in Sahelian affairs³².

These initiatives exposed France to charges of political favoritism and neo-colonialism, even though they were frequently carried out in collaboration with local administrations. Instead of promoting democratic administration, France’s military presence was frequently perceived as strengthening authoritarian or unpopular regimes.

Defense pacts and long-term military installations

France is authorized to place troops, provide military training, and step in to resolve internal disputes as needed thanks to bilateral defense accords it has inked with several Sahelian nations³³. France was able to keep up permanent military outposts thanks to these accords, especially in:

• French military headquarters in Central Africa are located in N’Djamena, Chad.

• A vital operations center, especially for intelligence and counterterrorism activities, is Niamey, Niger.

• A crucial base for French forces during Operation Barkhane was Gao, Mali.

These bases have been perceived as tools of French military domination, which has fueled anti-French sentiments throughout the region, despite their initial purpose of supporting counterterrorism and stabilization operations.

The monetary dependency and CFA Franc

The CFA franc, which is based on the euro and is controlled by the French Treasury, is one way that France maintains financial control over its former colonies. Although this system maintains monetary stability, it has come under fire for restricting the Sahelian republics’ financial independence and strengthening their economic reliance on France³⁴. With nations like Mali and Burkina Faso pushing for monetary sovereignty more and more, the continuous discussions surrounding the reform or elimination of the CFA franc have stoked larger anti-French stereotypes.

Conditional assistance and development aid

France continues to be one of the biggest bilateral donors to the Sahel, providing funds for initiatives related to governance change, agriculture, education, and infrastructure³⁵. But this assistance is frequently subject to economic and political changes that support France’s strategic goals ; implemented by French businesses or groups, strengthening economic reliance; criticized for being ineffective since a large portion of the help does not reach local communities or deal with systemic issues like food insecurity, unemployment, and poverty.

1. 4. The evolution of local perceptions of French influence

Local views of France’s involvement have changed dramatically over the past few decades, despite the country’s historical positioning as a partner and protector of Sahelian governments. France is increasingly seen as a self-interested nation seeking geopolitical and economic gains rather than as a stabilizing factor.

Increasing anti-French attitude

Instead of seeing France’s ongoing presence as a sincere commitment to regional security and prosperity, many Sahelian inhabitants see it as an extension of colonial-era dominance.French economic policies are perceived as exploitative rather than beneficial, especially the control over trade agreements and monetary systems. This view has been strengthened by the public discourse of Sahelian leaders, especially in Mali and Burkina Faso, who have characterized France as an impediment to national sovereignty³⁶.

Disenchantment with military actions

Despite counterterrorism measures spearheaded by France for almost ten years, Islamist bloodshed has increased rather than decreased. Many locals feel that French military operations have failed to bring lasting security, leading to a loss of trust in France’s ability to protect its allies. Reports of civilian casualties, particularly due to airstrikes and counterterror operations, have fueled resentment and distrust³⁷.

French forces’ expulsion and diplomatic crises

French troops left the country in 2022–2023 when Mali and Burkina Faso ended their defense agreements with France. A rift in diplomatic ties was indicated by the expulsion of French diplomats and military personnel from Bamako and Ouagadougou³⁸. Increased collaboration with alternative security providers, especially Russia’s Wagner Group, which has aggressively worked to displace France as the leading foreign player in Sahelian security issues, coincided with these efforts.

The increase in Russian power

Russia has established itself as a military ally of Mali and Burkina Faso by means of Wagner Group operations, providing direct security aid free from governance requirements. Local residents are becoming even more estranged from Paris as a result of Russian disinformation tactics on social media that have heightened anti-French narratives³⁹.

China’s expanding role in economic development

Unlike France, which maintains political and financial conditions on aid, China provides infrastructure investment without political interference. The success of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Africa has shifted public perception in favor of alternative partnerships⁴⁰.

5. The collapse of the French model and the recomposition of foreign influences

1. 1. The failures of French military interventions (Serval, Barkhane)

The original goal of France’s military deployments in the Sahel, especially Operation Serval (2013) and Operation Barkhane (2014–2022), was to stop Islamist organizations from spreading and bring security back to the area. But in the end, despite large military interventions, these efforts were unable to establish enduring peace, and the Sahelian security situation continued to worsen⁴¹. These interventions’ alleged ineffectiveness fueled growing anti-French sentiment and ultimately resulted in France’s military pullout from many important Sahelian nations.

Operation Serval (2013): A strategic failure despite a tactical success

As jihadist organizations such as Ansar Dine, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) rapidly advanced on the Malian capital, Bamako, Operation Serval was initiated in January 2013. The following were the operation’s main goals:

• To stop the Malian state’s total collapse and the jihadists’ advance.

• To expel armed groups from northern Mali in order to reestablish territorial integrity.

• To aid the military and government of Mali in retaking territory that has been occupied by rebels.

The French involvement dealt a severe blow to jihadist insurgents when it first succeeded in retaking important cities like Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal. Serval did not, however, address the underlying causes of the conflict despite its military successes:

• Jihadist organizations changed their methods, moving into the countryside and using guerilla warfare.

• There were still ethnic conflicts between the central Malian government and Tuareg insurgents.

• Without a long-term plan for political stabilization, Mali was at risk of reoccurring insurgencies⁴².

Even though Operation Serval concluded in July 2014, its short-term strategy and narrow scope made a longer-term, more comprehensive military intervention necessary, which is why Operation Barkhane was launched.

Operation Barkhane: An extended and ineffective counterterrorism initiative (2014–2022)

Operation Barkhane, a larger military operation designed to fight terrorism throughout the Sahel, took the role of Serval in August 2014. In contrast to Serval, Barkhane’s mission involved more than 5,100 French soldiers spread over several military locations in Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad in addition to Mali⁴³.

The key objectives of Barkhane were:

• To contain and eliminate terrorist threats in the Sahel.

• To train and support local Sahelian armed forces (particularly in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger).

• To enhance regional cooperation by working with the G5 Sahel (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad).

Barkhane did not, however, result in significant security advancements. Rather, terrorist attacks increased and expanded from northern Mali into Burkina Faso, western Niger, and central Mali. The region saw a sharp rise in terrorist assaults that targeted both civilians and security personnel. The procedure failed for several reasons:

• Inadequate counterinsurgency plan: Barkhane mostly used special forces raids and bombings, which disrupted but did not completely dismantle Islamist networks; militants changed their tactics to asymmetric warfare and blended in with the civilian population.

• Insufficient cooperation with local authorities: local populace was alienated by France’s alliances with unpopular or corrupt regimes, such those in Burkina Faso and Mali; there was a lack of local legitimacy as a result of France’s military efforts not being supported by significant government improvements.

• Growing resentment and civilian casualties: public indignation was stoked by reports of civilian deaths brought on by French airstrikes and counterterrorism operations; France was accused by local communities of failing to protect rural residents while favoring elite political classes.

• Strategic Rivalry with Other Performers: ceclining French influence was shown by the rise of Turkish military cooperation in Niger and the expanding Russian involvement in Mali through the Wagner Group⁴⁴; France became even more isolated because of its inability to interact with regional groups like the African Union and ECOWAS.

The End of Barkhane and the French Troops’ Withdrawal

By 2021–2022, anti-French military regimes had emerged in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, calling for France to leave the region. Public dissatisfaction with growing insecurity and perceived French inefficiency served as the impetus for this change. French President Emmanuel Macron formally declared the end of Operation Barkhane in August 2022, and France withdrew from Mali in 2023, followed by Burkina Faso and Niger⁴⁵.

1. 2. The rise of anti-French narratives and popular contestations

Anti-French sentiment grew throughout the Sahel as France’s political and military clout waned. Social media campaigns, political rhetoric, and widespread public protests all contributed to the framing of France as a neo-colonial power whose presence was more concerned with protecting strategic interests than maintaining regional stability.

Sahelian sovereignty was thought to be constrained by France’s ongoing economic domination, especially through the CFA franc and control over natural resources. The notion that France was supporting elite political leaders rather than empowering the people reinforced suspicions of neo-colonial exploitation.

The expansion of terrorist violence, despite nearly a decade of French military intervention, led many to question France’s true motives. The claim that France had failed as a security partner was further strengthened by the emergence of coup-led regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger⁴⁶.

Russian-affiliated social media accounts, especially those connected to the Wagner Group, actively propagated anti-French propaganda. Pro-Russian, anti-Western propaganda depicted France as a declining imperial power, while presenting Russia as a reliable and non-interventionist alternative⁴⁷.

Furthermore, youth-led movements advocating African autonomy (such as Yerewolo Débout in Mali) gained significant traction⁴⁸. Protests demanding France’s withdrawal from the Sahel became commonplace in Bamako, Ouagadougou, and Niamey.

In 2022, Mali expelled the French ambassador and formally ended defense agreements with France. Niger and Burkina Faso followed suit in 2023, calling for the French soldiers to leave the country.

1. 3. The diversification of Sahelian alliances: the search for new strategic partners

A distinct trend of diversification is becoming apparent as the Sahelian republics reevaluate their foreign partnerships. Sahelian governments are looking for new geopolitical and economic allies because of the French influence’s slow collapse and their discontent with long-standing Western alliances. A deeper strategic recalibration aimed at lowering reliance on a single power, boosting bargaining leverage, and securing alternate sources of military, economic, and diplomatic support is reflected in this change, which is not just reactive.

France’s decline as a principal partner

Due to a combination of military setbacks, economic annoyances, and public unhappiness, France’s historical supremacy in the area—which was founded on colonial ties and post-independence cooperation—has diminished. In important Sahelian nations like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, political and public backlash has resulted from Operation Barkhane’s failure to eradicate terrorist threats and from views of French neocolonialism⁴⁹.

The military juntas in these nations are actively looking for new partnerships that suit their interests as a nation, and the rejection of France as a privileged partner has sped up diplomatic realignments. The magnitude of the breakup is demonstrated by the removal of French troops, the termination of military cooperation agreements, and the removal of the French ambassador from Mali, and later from Burkina Faso and Niger.

Alternative security partnerships’ ascent

Because of the ongoing insecurity in the Sahel, regional administrations continue to prioritize security. As French military assistance has decreased, Sahelian nations have resorted to other security suppliers, chief among them being:

• Russia and the Wagner Group: In the wake of France’s military withdrawal, Russia has stepped in as a strategic security partner, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso. Russian paramilitary group The Wagner Group has positioned itself as a direct opponent of military incursions by the West and France. Its practical approach, which provides direct military support without political preconditions, is what makes it appealing. Wagner has received lucrative mining and resource extraction concessions from host governments in exchange, especially in regions that are rich in gold⁵⁰.

• Turkey: Although it has a smaller involvement in Sahelian security than Russia, Ankara has cooperated militarily with a few nations, giving nations like Niger tactical weaponry and combat drones. Sahelian governments looking for affordable military solutions have found Turkey’s drone technology especially appealing, as seen by its use in Libya and Azerbaijan⁵¹.

• China : China has not directly participated in military interventions, in contrast to Turkey and Russia. Nonetheless, China has emerged as an indirect security partner in the area through military training initiatives and technology surveillance arrangements⁵².

These changes show how Sahelian governments are becoming less reliant on France and Western nations in favor of a multipolar security environment where they can use a variety of alliances to meet their defense requirements.

1. 4. Morocco – a secondary, South-South partner in the Sahel

Morocco plays a supporting, rather than leading, role in the Sahelian security complex. Its economic footprint is visible mainly through a handful of West-African branches of Attijariwafa Bank and Banque Populaire, plus a few flagship solar projects that replicate the Noor Ouarzazate model. These initiatives ease trade along the Maghreb–West Africa corridor but remain modest when compared with Chinese infrastructure loans or Russian mining concessions.

Rabat’s principal asset is religious soft power. Since 2015 the Mohammed VI Institute has trained several hundred Sahelian imams in a Maliki, state-centred interpretation of Islam designed to undercut salafist and jihadist narratives. This symbolic leadership bolsters Morocco’s image as a moderate Muslim power, yet its scale is limited and competes with Gulf-funded networks.

Finally, Morocco leverages selective security cooperation and intelligence sharing to secure diplomatic recognition for its claim over Western Sahara. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger have publicly endorsed Rabat’s position, but the Kingdom deploys no troops in the Sahel, and its financial resources are constrained by domestic priorities and Algerian rivalry.

1. 5. The intensifying competition among foreign powers for control over the Sahel

Global powers are competing more fiercely for influence in the Sahelian region as Sahelian states broaden their alliances. The Sahel is a battlefield for geopolitical conflicts between Russia, China, Turkey, the Gulf States, and Western powers because of its natural riches, geographic location, and security relevance.

Strategic rivalry in the military domain

The security sector, where outside actors are fighting for control, is where the Sahelian power struggle is most noticeable.

• Russia vs. France : The Russian-French competition now primarily takes place in the Sahel. French military power has been weakened by Russia’s expanding military presence, especially through the Wagner Group. Russia has taken advantage of anti-French sentiment to portray itself as a more dependable and practical partner, even though France had long controlled the Sahelian security environment⁵³.

• The US and counterterrorism initiatives: through its Africom operations and intelligence-sharing initiatives, the United States continues to play a major role in Sahelian security, albeit being less involved than France⁵⁴. But as Chinese and Russian influence grows, Washington is growing more concerned, which could result in changes to policy in the years to come.

• Turkey’s developing role: Turkey’s increasing drone exports and strategic military agreements show a long-term desire to increase its influence in the region⁵⁵, even though it does not yet have a military footprint comparable to that of France or Russia.

Resource exploitation and economic rivalry

Due to its abundance of natural resources, such as oil, uranium, and gold, the Sahel is a great location for economic exploitation by powerful international players. Competition for the rights to extract resources has increased because to the growing involvement of Gulf states, China, and Russia.

China’s investments in Sahelian infrastructure have given it preferential access to raw materials. The Chinese model of loan-based development financing has enabled Beijing to secure long-term contracts for mineral extraction, particularly in Niger’s uranium industry. Russia, particularly through Wagner Group deals, has leveraged military assistance to gain control over gold mining operations in Mali and the Central African Republic. This strategy strengthens Russia’s economic footprint in the Sahel while simultaneously funding its paramilitary operations. Afterwards, establishing themselves as major players in agribusiness and food security, the UAE and Qatar have made a growing number of investments in Sahelian agriculture and land acquisition⁵⁶.

Soft power competition and diplomatic maneuvers

Foreign nations are vying for political and cultural influence in the Sahel in addition to military and economic competition. Turkey has pursued a soft power strategy by building mosques, funding Islamic schools, and promoting cultural exchanges in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger⁵⁷. This effort positions Turkey as a leader of Sunni Islam in the Sahel, challenging the historical dominance of French and Saudi-sponsored Islamic institutions. Through a mix of diplomatic summits, trade agreements, and non-interventionist policies, China has sought to position itself as an alternative global leader that offers development without political interference.

6. A new changing geopolitical chessboard

   1. The rise of Russia and the Wagner Group in the Sahel

Russia now has a chance to increase its influence in the Sahel, especially through military cooperation and security aid, because to the region’s geopolitical restructuring. Russia has capitalized on the region’s rising discontent with Western-led deployments by positioning itself as a crucial security partner for some Sahelian states as France’s military presence has been progressively diminished. A key player in this growth has been the Wagner Group, a private Russian paramilitary group that serves as the Russian state’s military force and geopolitical instrument⁵⁸.

Russia’s strategy in the Sahel is transactional and practical, providing military and security assistance in return for political allegiance and economic concessions. Russia is a desirable alternative for military governments in Mali and Burkina Faso because, in contrast to Western powers, it does not impose governance or human rights requirements on its cooperation. Russia has been able to establish itself as a reliable security supplier in the area due to this strategy.

Russia’s geopolitical interest (gaining access to important natural resources while also opposing Western dominance) is one of the reasons for its participation in the area. The Wagner Group filled the security void in Mali (where French forces were withdrawn due to escalating anti-French sentiment) by offering combat operations against jihadist insurgents; logistical support and training. In return, Russian organizations have obtained mining concessions, especially in regions with abundant gold reserves⁵⁹.

Nonetheless, there has been debates around Russia’s involvement in the area. International human rights organizations are concerned about the Wagner Group’s alleged extrajudicial killings, human rights violations and exploitative business practices. Sahelian governments have strengthened their ties with Russia despite these accusations because they see it as a trustworthy and non-interfering substitute for more established Western allies.

Furthermore, Russia’s expanding power goes beyond collaboration in the military and economy. Russia has attempted to change perceptions of Western involvement in the Sahel by using diplomatic initiatives, media influence, and disinformation campaigns to present France and the US as neo-colonial actors and to establish itself as a partner that respects the sovereignty and self-determination of Sahelian states. Anti-Western and anti-French sentiment has been further stoked as a result, creating a political climate that supports Russian expansion.

1. 2. China’s economic and diplomatic expansion in the Sahel

China has taken a different but no less significant strategy, focusing on infrastructure development, economic investment, and diplomatic engagement, whereas Russia’s influence in the Sahel is largely military and security oriented. Through its BRI and partnerships with Sahelian states, China became a dominant player in the region’s economic transformation: it prioritized long-term investment over short-term military intervention⁶⁰.

China’s interest in the Sahel is driven by its need for natural resources and market expansion. The region’s vast reserves of gold; uranium and oil are strategic to Beijing’s global energy and industrial supply chains. As a result, China has increased its financial presence in the region; securing mining; infrastructure and energy contracts through state-owned enterprises and investment agreements⁶¹.

Infrastructure development projects (ranging from telecommunications and industrial zones to energy facilities and transportation networks) are among the manifestations of China’s influence in the Sahel. More regional connectivity and economic integration have been made possible by Chinese companies which build roads; railroads and hydroelectric dams throughout Mali; Niger and Chad. In addition to expanding China’s economic influence, these initiatives also fortify relations with regional administrations and enhance China’s reputation as a development partner rather than a geopolitical aggressor.

China’s non-interference stance stands in contrast to Western-led engagements that frequently impose governance; democratic and human rights requirements. China has become a desirable partner for Sahelian governments which seeks economic progress free from outside political pressures. China has avoided direct military engagement and concentrated on economic diplomacy: thus, it preserved good relations with both military-led and democratic regimes.

China has extended its soft power efforts in the region beyond infrastructure through technical collaborations, cultural exchanges, and educational exchanges. In Sahelian capitals, Chinese-funded universities, language schools, and career training programs have sprung up in large numbers, enhancing cultural relations and producing a new generation of professionals with a focus on China⁶². Furthermore, the development of digital infrastructure has been greatly aided by Chinese telecom firms like Huawei (which have integrated the area into China’s technological sphere of influence).

Despite that influence, according to some observers, Sahelian economies are subjected to excessive financial strain by China’s debt-driven investment strategy. It also increased their reliance on Beijing. Furthermore, issues with labor rights abuses and environmental deterioration have come to light, especially in mining and industrial projects run by Chinese companies. China’s long-term economic plan in the Sahel is still strong despite these obstacles.

1. 3. Turkey and the Gulf States’ strategic engagement in the Sahel

Turkey and the Gulf states have been more interested in the changing geopolitical environment of the Sahel, attempting to establish their influence through a combination of security, religious, and economic contacts. Unlike Russia’s militarized approach or China’s development-driven strategy, Turkey and Gulf nations, particularly the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, have leveraged soft power, trade, and religious diplomacy to expand their presence in the region.

Turkey’s growing engagement in the Sahel is largely driven by its broader African strategy, which seeks to strengthen Ankara’s ties with Muslim-majority nations while counterbalancing the influence of Western powers⁶³. Turkey’s approach is multidimensional, combining economic investments, military cooperation, and cultural diplomacy. One of Turkey’s most notable contributions to the region is its construction of educational and religious institutions, including Turkish-funded schools and mosques, which have helped to spread Ankara’s model of moderate Sunni Islam⁶⁴. Additionally, as a sign of their dedication to long-term commercial relationships, Turkish companies have been investing more in infrastructure projects including roads, hospitals, and energy facilities.

In addition to its religious and commercial endeavors, Turkey has increased its military presence and security cooperation in the Sahel. Particularly, Turkish drones have become well-known as vital resources for counterterrorism activities. To fight Islamist insurgencies and protect borders, Ankara has provided Bayraktar TB2 drones to several African nations, including Niger⁶⁵. Training initiatives for Sahelian forces are another aspect of Turkey’s military involvement that strengthens its position as a regional security force.

Gulf nations including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have attempted to influence the Sahel in parallel to Turkey’s involvement, albeit more subtly. These nations have prioritized security alliances, financial aid, and religious influence, with a focus on backing administrations who share their strategic objectives.

Through its defense contracts and counterterrorism measures, the UAE has established itself as a crucial financial and security partner for several Sahelian countries. Along with funding infrastructure projects that complement its larger African economic agenda, the UAE has provided Sahelian regimes with military training programs and arms purchases.

Conversely, Saudi Arabia and Qatar have made religious and educational diplomacy a top priority, supporting Islamic establishments and providing funds for regional religious education initiatives. As a result, interpretations of Islam supported by the Gulf have proliferated, occasionally competing with Moroccan and local religious influences. Nonetheless, the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Qatar has produced complicated and perhaps contradictory effects on Sahelian societies, especially in their divergent stances toward regional Islamist groups.

1. 4. The Role of the United States and the Limits of Its Involvement

The United States has taken a more measured approach in the Sahel than Russia, China, or Turkey, concentrating mostly on intelligence and counterterrorism activities rather than extensive military or economic commitments. Security concerns, especially the danger posed by jihadist organizations connected to Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, have played a significant role in shaping US involvement in the region.

AFRICOM (United States Africa Command), which offers logistical, intelligence, and operational support to Sahelian governments and regional security coalitions, has been the main coordinator of the US military presence in the Sahel⁶⁶. The deployment of drone bases in Niger, especially Air Base 201 in Agadez, which acts as a center for surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeted attacks against terrorist organizations, has been one of the most important facets of US involvement in the conflict⁶⁷.

The US has, however, mostly refrained from direct involvement in the political or economic concerns of the region, despite its sophisticated military prowess and knowledge in counterterrorism. The United States has stayed far away from the governance and development issues facing the Sahel, in contrast to China, which has made significant economic investments, and France, which has historically maintained a strong presence in the region.

There are benefits and cons to this restricted involvement. On one hand, the US has avoided entanglement in the region’s political crises, thus reducing anti-American sentiment that has affected other Western powers such as France. On the other hand, this low-profile strategy has weakened Washington’s ability to shape the broader geopolitical dynamics of the Sahel, leaving a power vacuum that has been filled by Russia, China, and regional actors like Turkey and the Gulf states.

The US’s reliance on regional and European allies to carry out security initiatives is another significant drawback of its engagement in the Sahel. The United States has given Sahelian security forces training and intelligence-sharing programs, but it has mostly left counterinsurgency operations to France and regional alliances like the G5 Sahel Joint Force. However, as France’s influence wanes and regional governments seek alternative security arrangements, Washington faces increasing challenges in maintaining its counterterrorism partnerships.

Moreover, US foreign policy priorities have shifted toward other global challenges, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region and Eastern Europe. Washington’s capacity to allocate substantial resources to the Sahel has been hampered by the strategic rivalry with China and Russia, as well as events like the conflict in Ukraine, which have diverted US focus from Africa.

The US has attempted to keep a presence in the area through economic alliances, humanitarian assistance, and diplomatic involvement despite these limitations. Washington still backs development initiatives that tackle issues like poverty, poor governance, and a lack of economic opportunities—the main drivers of extremism. However, its primary focus on security and counterterrorism continues to take precedence over these efforts.

1. 5. The Challenges of Regional Organizations (ECOWAS, African Union)

As the Sahel struggles with political unrest, terrorism, economic hardship, and shifting geopolitical alliances, the role of regional organizations—especially the African Union (AU) and ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)—has grown more complicated. Even though these institutions were founded to further political stability, economic integration, and security cooperation, they have substantial operational and structural obstacles when it comes to dealing with the Sahelian crisis.

Between sanctions and mediation in ECOWAS

The 15 West African nations that make up ECOWAS have long seen themselves as important regional mediators. However, the wave of coups d’état in the Sahel—Mali (2020, 2021), Guinea (2021), Burkina Faso (2022), and Niger (2023)—has exposed its limited capacity to enforce democratic norms and manage security challenges effectively⁶⁸.

One of ECOWAS’s primary mechanisms for addressing unconstitutional changes in government has been the imposition of sanctions, including economic embargoes and the suspension of member states. For example, ECOWAS enforced severe economic sanctions, limiting trade and suspending bank activities, in response to military takeovers in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger. These actions, however, have frequently backfired, worsening residents’ economic plight while doing nothing to persuade military commanders to return civilian governance. The power of ECOWAS has been further diminished in certain instances by these sanctions, which have even driven these nations closer to other friends like Russia and Turkey.

In addition to political conflicts, ECOWAS has had difficulty handling issues related to regional security, especially the threat posed by Islamist insurgencies. Despite its commitment to create a regional security force, ECOWAS’s efforts are still hindered by a lack of funding, difficulties coordinating, and some member nations’ reluctance to send soldiers. The dependence on outside military assistance from the United States, France, and the UN has further brought attention to ECOWAS’s inability to handle security concerns on its own.

A poor continental reaction from the African Union

The African Union’s (AU) response to the Sahelian crisis has likewise been fraught with difficulties at the continental level. Although the African Union’s Peace and Security Council is charged with averting wars and maintaining peace throughout Africa, its influence in the Sahel is mostly symbolic⁶⁹.

The absence of enforcement tools is one of the AU’s main shortcomings. In contrast to ECOWAS, the AU has had difficulty acting decisively against military governments, frequently depending more on diplomatic declarations and attempts at mediation than on actual sanctions. The AU has also come under fire for its ineffective bureaucracy, which slows down quick reactions to emergencies.

Financial constraints also hinder the AU’s ability to deploy effective peacekeeping missions in the Sahel. While the G5 Sahel Joint Force—a regional security initiative involving Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad, and Mauritania—was initially supported by the AU, funding shortfalls and logistical difficulties have rendered it largely ineffective. With France scaling back its military presence and external donors hesitant to finance long-term operations, the AU’s role in Sahelian security has diminished further.

7. The emerging role of Morocco in the Sahel

1. 1. Morocco’s Approach to South-South Cooperation

Through an aggressive South-South cooperation plan, Morocco has deliberately positioned itself as a strategic partner, in contrast to the conventional Western countries’ waning influence in the Sahel. To strengthen its position in the region, Morocco has created a multifaceted strategy under the direction of King Mohammed VI that incorporates financial investment, religious diplomacy, security cooperation, and humanitarian aid⁷⁰. Morocco’s role as a bridge between North and sub-Saharan Africa is strengthened by its promotion of a partnership model based on shared African identity and mutual development, in contrast to former colonial powers.

Infrastructure and dconomic investments

Trade agreements, financial investments, and extensive infrastructure projects that support regional integration have been the main focuses of Morocco’s economic involvement in the Sahel. The Kingdom has established itself as a major economic force in West Africa by giving priority to important industries like banking, telecommunications, energy, and agriculture⁷¹.

Morocco’s participation in renewable energy projects is among the most noteworthy initiatives, especially in nations like Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso where access to electricity is still a significant obstacle. Morocco’s expertise in solar and wind energy, developed through projects like the Noor Ouarzazate Solar Complex, is being leveraged to support energy expansion in Sahelian nations⁷².

Moroccan banks, such as Attijariwafa Bank and Banque Populaire, have also expanded across West Africa, providing financial infrastructure and investment opportunities that contribute to regional economic stability.

Diplomacy in religion and culture

Morocco has made significant investments in religious diplomacy in addition to economic collaboration because it understands how crucial spiritual influence is to regional stability. By advocating for a moderate view of Islam that is consistent with the teachings of the Maliki school of Sunni Islam, which has historically dominated both Morocco and the Sahel, the Kingdom has attempted to halt the development of extremist beliefs⁷³.

Training Sahelian imams at the Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams in Rabat is a key component of this approach. The goal of this project is to develop local religious leaders that support tolerance, coexistence, and opposition to extreme narratives. It involves religious academics from Mali, Niger, Chad, and other Sahelian countries.

Through educational initiatives and scholarships, Morocco has also increased its cultural engagement, allowing Sahelian students to attend Moroccan colleges for further education. By developing pro-Moroccan elites in the area, these programs not only improve bilateral relations but also promote long-term impact.

Counterterrorism and security cooperation

Morocco has played a significant role in security cooperation and intelligence sharing with Sahelian states, albeit not directly intervening militarily. To improve border security and combat radicalization activities, Morocco has shared its counterterrorism experience with its regional partners, which it developed through effective domestic operations against extremist networks.

The exchange of intelligence and security coordination between Morocco and Sahelian states has become particularly relevant as traditional security frameworks—such as the French-led Barkhane operation—have weakened. Morocco has positioned itself as a reliable counterterrorism partner, working closely with regional security services to mitigate the risk of terrorist infiltration and cross-border crime.

Regional power and strategic diplomatic positioning

Finally, Morocco’s Sahelian involvement is closely related to its larger foreign policy goals, especially with reference to its sovereignty over Western Sahara⁷⁴. Morocco aims to gain diplomatic backing for its stance on Western Sahara in international fora like the African Union and the UN by fortifying its economic, political, and security connections with Sahelian nations.

The Kingdom has actively lobbied for the backing of Sahelian governments, many of which have expressed public support for Morocco’s territorial claims. This strategy underscores Morocco’s dual ambition—on the one hand, to assert itself as a leading African power, and on the other, to consolidate international legitimacy for its Western Sahara policy.

1. 2. Religious influence as a diplomatic tool

As a key component of its foreign policy, Morocco has strategically used religious diplomacy, especially in the Sahel. The Kingdom has aimed to strengthen its soft power in the area, fight extreme doctrines, and forge political and cultural ties by promoting moderate Islam. This strategy is based on Morocco’s spiritual and historical leadership as a country with a preponderance of the Maliki school of Sunni Islam, a tradition that is similarly ingrained in Sahelian and West African communities.

Education of religious leaders and Imams in the Sahelian region

Training Sahelian imams at the Mohammed VI Institute for the Training of Imams, Morchidines, and Morchidates in Rabat has been one of Morocco’s most well-known religious endeavors. Hundreds of religious scholars from Mali, Niger, Chad, Burkina Faso, and Senegal have been housed by the institute since its founding in 2015, where they have received instruction in Islamic theology, jurisprudence, and counter-extremist narratives⁷⁵. In contrast to Salafist and Wahhabi influences that have aided in the propagation of jihadist ideas in the Sahel, the goal is to advance a moderate and tolerant understanding of Islam.

The Kingdom makes sure that its interpretation of Islam—a non-political, state-centered, and tolerant doctrine—resonates throughout the region by educating religious leaders who go on to become influential figures in their own countries who support Morocco. This tactic works especially well against the ideological underpinnings of organizations that use religious narratives to defend their operations, such as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Restoring the historical connections between Morocco and the Sahel

Reviving the spiritual and historical ties that bind the Kingdom to the Sahel is another goal of Morocco’s religious diplomacy. West African religious rituals have been greatly influenced by Moroccan Sufi organizations like the Tijaniyya and Qadiriyya since the Middle Ages⁷⁶. These Sufi brotherhoods, which emphasize mysticism, spiritual discipline, and peaceful coexistence, continue to have a strong influence in Mali, Senegal, and Niger, where millions of followers still revere Moroccan spiritual leaders.

By reinforcing these ties, Morocco presents itself as a natural religious authority and an alternative to Gulf-state-backed Wahhabism, which has historically fueled radicalization. To strengthen its cultural and religious influence in the Sahel, the Kingdom has contributed to the reconstruction of mosques and religious schools there.

Political partnerships and religious diplomacy

Outside of the religious sphere, Morocco uses religious diplomacy as a political tactic to fortify ties with Sahelian nations. The promotion of moderate Islam aligns with state-led deradicalization efforts in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, where governments seek to contain the influence of extremist groups while maintaining state control over religious institutions.

In exchange for Morocco’s religious support, Sahelian states have increasingly aligned with Moroccan diplomatic positions, particularly regarding the Western Sahara dispute. Countries like Mali, Niger, and Chad have expressed support for Morocco’s territorial claims, reinforcing the Kingdom’s strategic interests in the African Union and other multilateral forums⁷⁷.

By positioning itself as a guardian of religious moderation, Morocco not only contributes to the stability of the Sahel but also strengthens its political leverage and regional influence. This approach differentiates Morocco from other external factors, such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey, whose religious engagements in Africa are often perceived as having sectarian or ideological motives.

1. 3. Investment in infrastructure and economic development

Morocco’s engagement in the Sahel extends beyond religion and diplomacy; economic cooperation and infrastructure development are central to its regional strategy. The Kingdom has invested in transportation networks, renewable energy projects, banking, telecommunications, and agriculture, reinforcing its position as an economic gateway between North and sub-Saharan Africa.

Expanding Moroccan business and banking sectors

Moroccan banks have aggressively expanded into West African markets, facilitating trade, investment, and financial integration. Leading financial institutions such as Attijariwafa Bank, Banque Populaire, and Bank of Africa have established branches across Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, providing credit, trade financing, and investment capital to support local economies⁷⁸.

A larger paradigm of South-South economic cooperation is shown in the growth of Moroccan banks, which lessens dependency on Western financial institutions and promotes regional self-sufficiency. The Kingdom solidifies its long-term economic dominance in the region by incorporating Sahelian economies into Moroccan banking networks.

Development of infrastructure and regional interconnectedness

Morocco has made investments in energy and transportation projects that increase regional connection because it understands that inadequate infrastructure is a significant obstacle to economic progress in the Sahel. To facilitate trade routes connecting North and West Africa, the Kingdom has taken the lead in efforts to build highways, railroads, and logistical hubs.

The Trans-African Highway, which intends to establish an effective road network between Morocco, Mauritania, and Senegal, is among the most ambitious projects⁷⁹. This program promotes economic integration between the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa, strengthens trade corridors, and increases cross-border trade.

Morocco is pushing renewable energy options in addition to transportation to assist Sahelian nations in overcoming their electricity scarcity. The Noor Ouarzazate Solar Complex, which demonstrates the Kingdom’s proficiency in solar and wind energy, has established it as a pioneer in sustainable energy solutions. To provide rural areas with dependable electricity sources, Morocco has teamed with Mali and Niger to create solar power facilities.

Initiatives for agriculture and food security

A region dealing with climate change, desertification, and frequent droughts, Morocco’s economic initiatives in the Sahel also include agricultural and food security. To boost agricultural output and encourage sustainable farming methods, the Kingdom has been instrumental in providing fertilizers to Sahelian farmers through its Office Chérifien des Phosphates (OCP)⁸⁰.

Morocco is contributing to the modernization of agriculture, the reduction of reliance on food imports, and the strengthening of Sahelian economies through agro-industrial investments by collaborating with local governments and agribusinesses. Additionally, these initiatives help alleviate rural poverty, which frequently serves as a catalyst for migration and radicalization in the area.

1. 4. The Integration of the Sahel in Moroccan Foreign Policy

Morocco’s involvement in the Sahel is a fundamental tenet of its foreign policy, not only a question of religious diplomacy or economic cooperation. The Kingdom has methodically integrated the Sahel into its broader continental strategy, which seeks to reinforce its influence across Africa through multidimensional engagement. This approach aligns with Morocco’s geopolitical ambitions, economic interests, and diplomatic priorities, particularly its efforts to gain regional support for its sovereignty over Western Sahara.

An intentional extension of Moroccan power in Africa

Morocco has gradually shifted its foreign policy away from its historical diplomatic emphasis on Europe and the Arab world and toward Africa since the early 2000s⁸¹. This shift has been marked by more diplomatic contacts, cultural projects, and commercial alliances under King Mohammed VI’s direction. As a gateway to sub-Saharan Africa and a test region for Morocco’s South-South cooperation paradigm, the Sahel is essential to this reconfiguration.

Morocco’s strategy in the Sahel is framed within its broader continental ambition, as reflected in its return to the African Union (AU) in 2017 and its observer status in the ECOWAS. The Kingdom has demonstrated its dedication to regional integration and economic growth by vigorously pursuing full membership in ECOWAS. Morocco wants to establish itself as a major political and economic mediator in African matters by fortifying its relations with Sahelian nations.

Cooperation in counterterrorism and security

Morocco’s increased participation in regional security initiatives has also been fueled by the Sahelian security concerns, such as transnational crime, insurgency, and terrorism. In addition to their immediate neighbors, Morocco and the whole of North Africa are at risk due to the instability of Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.

Morocco has positioned itself as a security partner for Sahelian governments, offering training programs, intelligence-sharing, and counterterrorism expertise. The Kingdom’s security cooperation extends to border control and counter-radicalization efforts, with Moroccan intelligence agencies working closely with their Malian and Nigerien counterparts to combat jihadist networks.

Additionally, Morocco has joined regional and global structures that seek to stabilize the Sahel, such as the G5 Sahel alliance and larger African Union security programs. In addition to promoting regional peace, Morocco shows its dedication to African-led solutions to African issues by bolstering security cooperation⁸².

Integration of infrastructure and economy

A key component of Morocco’s Sahelian strategy continues to be economic participation. Morocco is growing its economic footprint and incorporating the Sahel into its economic networks by investing in energy, banking, infrastructure, and agriculture initiatives.

One of the most symbolic projects illustrating Morocco’s commitment to the Sahel is its efforts to develop trade corridors linking North and West Africa. Morocco has promoted the construction of transportation networks, including roads and railways, facilitating greater trade between Morocco, Mauritania, Mali, and Senegal. These programs are essential for promoting cross-border trade, regional integration, and the region’s economic potential.

Diplomatic aspects: the problem of Western Sahara

Morocco’s involvement in the Sahel region serves a strategic diplomatic purpose in addition to its economic and security objectives, especially in relation to its territorial claims over Western Sahara⁸³. By fostering strong bilateral ties with Sahelian states, Morocco has sought to secure their diplomatic support in international forums.

Several Sahelian nations, including Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, have expressed explicit support for Morocco’s position on Western Sahara, recognizing its sovereignty over the region. In exchange, Morocco has strengthened its investment, development assistance, and diplomatic support for these nations in regional and global discussions.

In the African Union (AU), where Morocco is aggressively attempting to undermine the influence of Algeria and the Polisario Front, who want Sahrawi independence, this diplomatic ploy is especially important. Morocco increases its influence in AU decision-making bodies and ensures that the balance of power moves in its favor by fortifying its Sahelian relationships.

8. Work structure

To guide the reader through this inquiry, the study is organised in four substantive chapters that move from theory to practice and from the domestic to the international plane.

Chapter 1 lays the conceptual foundations. Drawing first on Securitisation Theory, then on Regional Security Complex Theory, it develops the categories through which Sahelian security narratives and threat interdependencies can be observed. A synthetic dialogue between the two frameworks yields an analytical grid that is tested on three emblematic discourses (French, Sahelian junta and Russian).

Chapter 2 turns to the region’s political economy. It revisits colonial path-dependencies, unpacks the mechanisms that once underwrote French pre-eminence, and explains why the Serval and Barkhane campaigns ultimately accelerated France’s loss of legitimacy. The chapter then traces how successive coups and mounting popular discontent have prompted Sahelian regimes to diversify their diplomatic portfolios while exposing the limits of ECOWAS and the African Union.

Chapter 3 shifts the focus to security realities on the ground. It maps the layered threats (jihadist insurgency, criminal trafficking, climate stress) and scrutinises both local coping strategies and the heterogeneous engagements of external security providers. Particular attention is paid to the governance and human-rights trade-offs that flow from the outsourcing of violence to non-state actors.

Chapter 4 widens the lens to the global stage. It dissects the distinct toolkits deployed by Russia, China, Turkey, the Gulf States, the United States and Morocco, and shows how their overlapping agendas are re-engineering the Sahel into a fully multipolar arena. By comparing these competing models of influence, the chapter identifies the strategic bargains that Sahelian governments must now navigate.

Taken together, these chapters demonstrate that the Sahel’s current turbulence is not simply the by-product of local fragilities; it is the outcome of a profound geopolitical re-calibration in which declining French hegemony, resurgent non-Western powers and Africa-led initiatives collide. The concluding section distils the main findings, reassesses the initial hypotheses through the twin lenses of Securitisation and Regional Security Complex Theory, and proposes avenues for future research—both within the Sahel and across other African security complexes where multipolar competition is rapidly unfolding.

PLAN PROPOSITION (OPTION 1)

1. Introduction

Chapter 1 – Theoretical Frameworks and Strategic Positioning

1. Securitisation Theory (Copenhagen School)

1. 1. Speech Acts and Referent Objects

1. 2. Sectoral Typology

2. Regional Security Complex Theory (Buzan & Wæver)

1. 1. Interdependence of Threats

1. 2. Sahelian Security Configuration

3. Interface ST – RSCT

4. Strategic Positioning Case Studies

1. 1. France (Serval/Barkhane)

1. 2. Mali & Burkina Faso Juntas

1. 3. Russia/Wagner

Chapter 2 – Political Dynamics and Shifts in Alliances

1. Post-Colonial State Formation and Françafrique

2. Decline of French Influence

1. 1. Economic Levers (CFA, Trade)

1. 2. Military Interventions and Backlash

3. Coup Cycles and Domestic Realignments (2020-23)

4. Regional Organisations under Pressure

1. 1. ECOWAS

1. 2. African Union

1. 3. G5 Sahel

Chapter 3 – Security Threats and External Engagement

1. Constellation of Threats

1. 1. Jihadist Expansion

1. 2. Transnational Crime

1. 3. Climate and Demography

2. National and Local Security Responses

3. External Security Providers

1. 1. French Draw-down

1. 2. Russian Surge (Wagner)

1. 3. U.S. Drone Architecture

1. 4. Turkish and Emirati Packages

4. Governance and Human-Rights Externalities

Chapter 4 – External Actors and Multipolar Contestation

1. Russia: Mercenarism and Media Warfare

2. China: Infrastructure Soft Power and Debt

3. Turkey and Gulf States: Religious Diplomacy and Trade

4. United States: Low-Profile Counter-terror Presence

5. Morocco: South-South Engagement and Soft Power

6. Toward a Multipolar Sahel: Scenarios and Trajectories

Conclusion

1. Synthesis of Findings

1. 1. Summary of the decline in French influence and the diversification of alliances

1. 2. Relevance of SRST and securitization theory to interpret power reconfigurations

2. Answers to Research Questions and Hypotheses

Confirmation or refinement of the initial hypotheses

3. Outlook

1. 1. Possible evolutions in alliances and foreign interventions

1. 2. Role of regional organizations (ECOWAS, AU) in a context of intensified rivalry

1. 3. Challenges for Sahelian stability and governance (institutional reforms, sustainable development)

4. Openings

Suggestion for further research (e.g., comparing the Sahel to North Africa or other African conflict zones)

Bibliography

Aliyev, Anar. « A New Battleground Between The West Alliance And Russia? In The Context Of Niger ». Journal of Namibian Studies: History Politics Culture 36 (2023): 337‑66.

Antil, Alain, François Giovalucchi, et Thierry Vircoulon. « Anti-French discourse in Francophone Africa ». Etudes, n^o 9 (2023): 7‑18.

Baldaro, Edoardo. « The Sahel as an unintended region: Competing regionalisms and insecurity dynamics ». In The Unintended Consequences of Interregionalism, 147‑64. Routledge, 2020. https://www.taylorfrancis.com/chapters/edit/10.4324/9781003093749-8/sahel-unintended-region-edoardo-baldaro.

Bava, Sophie, Farid El Asri, et Yousra Hamdaoui. « Voix et voies d’islam africains. Enjeux et pratiques de la formation aux métiers du culte au Maroc ». Revue des mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée, n^o 150 (30 décembre 2021): 209‑28. https://doi.org/10.4000/remmm.17268.

Benabdallah, Lina, et Daniel Large. « China’s Development-Security in Practice: The Case of Mali ». Working Paper, 2020. https://www.econstor.eu/handle/10419/248168.

Beusekom, Monica M. van. « Colonisation Indigène: French Rural Development Ideology at the Office du Niger, 1920-1940 ». The International Journal of African Historical Studies 30, n^o 2 (1997): 299‑323. https://doi.org/10.2307/221230.

Bhattacharya, Samir. « China’s Great Game in the Sahel ». Citováno z: https://China’s Great Game in the Sahel| Vivekananda International Foundation (vifindia. org), 2022. https://www.vifindia.org/article/2022/china-s-great-game-in-the-sahel.

Blundo, Giorgio, et Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan. « La corruption quotidienne en Afrique de l’Ouest ». Politique africaine 83, n^o 3 (2001): 8‑37. https://doi.org/10.3917/polaf.083.0008.

Boeke, Sergei, et Bart Schuurman. « Operation ‘Serval’: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014 ». Journal of Strategic Studies 38, n^o 6 (19 septembre 2015): 801‑25. https://doi.org/10.1080/01402390.2015.1045494.

Boukhars, Anouar. « Reassessing the power of regional security providers: the case of Algeria and Morocco ». Middle Eastern Studies 55, n^o 2 (4 mars 2019): 242‑60. https://doi.org/10.1080/00263206.2018.1538968.

Cabestan, Jean-Pierre. « Beijing’s ‘Going Out’ Strategy and Belt and Road Initiative in the Sahel: The Case of China’s Growing Presence in Niger ». In China’s Global Reach. Routledge, 2020.

Charbonneau, Bruno. « De Serval à Barkhane : les problèmes de la guerre contre le terrorisme au Sahel ». Les Temps Modernes 693694, n^o 2 (15 juin 2017): 322‑40. https://doi.org/10.3917/ltm.693.0322.

Châtaigner, Jean-Marc. « Sahel et France, enjeux d’une relation particulière ». Hérodote N° 172, n^o 1 (2019): 123‑36. https://doi.org/10.3917/her.172.0123.

Daemers, Julien. « Maghreb-Sahel Security Cooperation: From Mirage to Reality? » Re-mapping the Sahel: Transnational Security Challenges and International Responses, ISS Issue Report, n^o 19 (2014). https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep07094.9.pdf.

Delestre, Sheelah. « Thème: L’énergie nucléaire en France ». Statista, 13 décembre 2023. https://fr.statista.com/themes/2752/l-energie-nucleaire-en-france/.

Gadzama, Njidda Mamadu. « Attenuation of the Effects of Desertification through Sustainable Development of Great Green Wall in the Sahel of Africa ». World Journal of Science, Technology and Sustainable Development 14, n^o 4 (2 octobre 2017): 279‑89. https://doi.org/10.1108/WJSTSD-02-2016-0021.

Gillespie, Richard. « European Union responses to conflict in the western Mediterranean ». The Journal of North African Studies 15, n^o 1 (1 mars 2010): 85‑103. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629380902920545.

Gwatiwa, Tshepo, et Justin van der Merwe. « Introducing US AFRICOM expansion in Africa ». In Expanding US Military Command in Africa. Routledge, 2020.

Hamdaoui, Yousra. « La sécuritisation de la guerre contre le terrorisme au Sahel ». Afrique(s) en mouvement N° 3, n^o 2 (2020): 31‑36. https://doi.org/10.3917/aem.003.0031.

Issa Abdourhamane, Boubacar. « Retour à l’ordre constitutionnel : développements récents sur les transitions au Mali, au Tchad en Guinée et au Burkina Faso ». Afrique contemporaine N° 276, n^o 2 (2023): 245‑61. https://doi.org/10.3917/afco1.276.0245.

Jamasmie, Cecilia. « Barrick to Halt Mali Mine amid Fresh Export Restrictions ». MINING.COM (blog), 6 janvier 2025. https://www.mining.com/barrick-to-halt-mali-mine-amid-fresh-export-restrictions/.

Jenkins, R. G. « The Evolution of Religious Brotherhoods in North and Northwest Africa 1523-1900 ». Studies in West African Islamic History 1 (1979): 40‑77.

Keenan, Jeremy. « Terrorism, Chaos and Conflagration in the Sahara and Sahel (2003–2021) ». In Routledge Handbook on the Modern Maghrib. Routledge, 2023.

Laanani, Kawsar, Sara Gianesello, Sophie Desmidt, et Aksana Ismailbekova. « Understanding Islamic activism in Central Asia and West Africa and the Sahel », 2023. https://ecdpm.org/application/files/7316/9503/1102/Understanding-Islamic-Activism-Central-Asia-West-Africa-Sahel-ECDPM-Discussion-Paper-356-2023.pdf.

Lorin, Amaury. « La conférence de Berlin (1884-1885) : quel héritage pour l’Afrique ? », Paris: La Documentation française, 2021. Cairn.info. https://doi.org/10.3917/quin.107.0163.

Lugan, Bernard. Histoire de l’Afrique – Des Origines à Nos Jours – 2e Édition. Editions Ellipses, 2020.

Mamane Mamadou, Marah, Michel Cathelineau, Etienne Deloule, Laurie Reisberg, Olivier Cardon, Jean Vallance, et Marc Brouand. « The Tim Mersoï Basin uranium deposits (Northern Niger): Geochronology and genetic model ». Ore Geology Reviews 145 (1 juin 2022): 104905. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.oregeorev.2022.104905.

Meyer, Teva. « De l’abondance à la naissance d’espaces convoités : extraire l’uranium ». Géopolitique de…, 20 avril 2023, 23‑32.

Michael, Fakayode Folusho, S. I. Ajayi, F. O. Aladenika, et Afolabi Kumavo. « FRANCE MILITARY PRESENCE IN AFRICA DURING THE POST-COLONIAL PERIOD (1960-2023): A HISTORICAL SURVEY ». UNIZIK JOURNAL OF RELIGION AND HUMAN RELATIONS 15, n^o 1 (2024). https://acjol.org/index.php/jorahr/article/view/5369.

Miller, Michelle Angeline. « G5 Sahel External Influence Comparison: The European Union, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia ». Master’s Thesis, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2019. https://search.proquest.com/openview/bce50489f3be6f67845df294fce3f602/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=y.

Mohamedou, Kemal. « The Wagner Group, Russia’s Foreign Policy and Sub-Saharan Africa ». Geneva Centre for Security Policy. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Policy [consultado el 18 de mayo de 2024], 2024. https://www.gcsp.ch/sites/default/files/2024-12/geneva-paper-32-2024.pdf.

Nagar, Dawn. « The United Nations Role in the G5-Sahel, West, and Southern Africa: The Case of Angola ». In Challenging the United Nations Peace and Security Agenda in Africa, édité par Dawn Nagar, 277‑317. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83523-1_7.

Ndjerareou, Deborah. « African Youth Activism and the Disruption of French Foreign Policy in the Sahel Region ». Journal of Peace and Diplomacy 5, n^o 1 (1 juillet 2024): 49‑66. https://doi.org/10.59111/JPD.005.01.052.

Nicholson, Sharon E. « The West African Sahel: A Review of Recent Studies on the Rainfall Regime and Its Interannual Variability ». International Scholarly Research Notices 2013, n^o 1 (2013): 453521. https://doi.org/10.1155/2013/453521.

Nsaibia, Héni, et Caleb Weiss. « The end of the Sahelian Anomaly: how the global conflict between the Islamic State and al-Qaida finally came to West Africa ». CTC Sentinel 13, n^o 7 (2020): 1‑14.

Okpanachi, Eyene, Terhemba Ambe-Uva, et Anas Fassih. « Energy regime reconfiguration and just transitions in the Global South: Lessons for West Africa from Morocco’s comparative experience ». Futures 139 (1 mai 2022): 102934. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.futures.2022.102934.

Pathé Duarte, Felipe. « Information Disorder and Civil Unrest Russian Weaponization of Social Media Platforms in Mali and Burkina Faso – 2020–2022 ». African Security 17, n^o 3‑4 (1 octobre 2024): 205‑23. https://doi.org/10.1080/19392206.2024.2423139.

Peltier, Elian, Eric Schmitt, et Carmen Abd Ali. « After Niger Coup, US Scrambles to Keep a Vital Air Base. » International New York Times, 2024, NA-NA.

Pokalova, Elena. « The Wagner Group in Africa: Russia’s Quasi-State Agent of Influence ». Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 0, n^o 0 (s. d.): 1‑23. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2023.2231642.

Potts, Malcolm, Courtney Henderson, et Martha Campbell. « The Sahel: A Malthusian Challenge? » Environmental and Resource Economics 55, n^o 4 (1 août 2013): 501‑12. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10640-013-9679-2.

Pratt, Sean E. Review of Review of Roots in the African Dust: Sustaining the Drylands, par Michael Mortimore. Cambridge Anthropology 22, n^o 2 (2000): 90‑94.

Rizk, Joelle. « Exploring the Nexus between Armed Groups and the Trafficking and Smuggling of Human Beings in the Central Sahel and Libya ». Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 47, n^o 7 (2 juillet 2024): 771‑91. https://doi.org/10.1080/1057610X.2021.2002687.

Rodembourg, Noëlle. « Sahel Alliance Members’ Priority: Resilience to Shocks Through Food Security ». Alliance Sahel, 3 juillet 2024. https://www.alliance-sahel.org/en/news/agriculture-rural-development-and-food-security/priority-food-security/.

Rossiter, Ash, et Brendon J. Cannon. « Turkey’s rise as a drone power: trial by fire ». Defense & Security Analysis 38, n^o2 (3 avril 2022): 210‑29. https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2022.2068562.

Roussy, Caroline. « Afrique/s. L’Afrique au carrefour des bascules ». In L’Année stratégique 2024, 188‑247. Hors collection. Paris: Armand Colin, 2023. https://doi.org/10.3917/arco.bonif.2023.03.0190.

Sidi Mohamed Ben Abdellah University, Morocco, et Mohammed Lazrak. « Moroccan-African Religious Diplomacy: Prospects and Challenges ». International Journal of Religious and Cultural Studies 5, n^o 2 (31 octobre 2023): 75‑86. https://doi.org/10.34199/ijracs.2023.10.01.

Sour, Lofti. « FRENCH INTERVENTIONISM IN THE SAHEL: A FLAWED STRATEGY, IMPERFECT GEOPOLITICS ». Przegląd Geopolityczny, n^o 48 (2024): 91‑112.

Spearin, Christopher. « Russia’s Wagner Group/Africa Corps: an authoritarian conflict management examination ». Conflict, Security & Development 24, n^o 5 (2 septembre 2024): 479‑99. https://doi.org/10.1080/14678802.2024.2415659.

Sylla, Ndongo Samba, Romane Lucq, et Marc Verzeroli. « Le franc CFA est une arme invisible que la France peut toujours utiliser pour mettre au pas les dirigeants dissidents ». La Revue internationale et stratégique, n^o 1 (2024): 131‑41.

Tanchum, Michaël. « Turkey’s Maghreb–West Africa Economic Architecture: Challenges and Opportunities for the European Union ». The Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS), 2021. https://www.cats-network.eu/publications/products/arbeitspapiere/CATS_Working_Paper_Nr_3_Michael_Tanchum_Turkeys_Maghreb_West_Africa_Economic_Architecture.pdf.

Toumi, Abdennour. « How Algeria-Turkey Ambitious Strategic Rapprochement Will Affect France’s Sahel Policy? » Insight Turkey 23, n^o 4 (2021): 39‑50.

Vermeren, Pierre. « Chapitre VII. L’État, bien patrimonial ». Hors collection, 2015, 121‑36.

Villalón, Leonardo A. The Oxford Handbook of the African Sahel. Oxford University Press, 2021.

Walther, Olivier, et Christian Leuprecht. « Mapping and Deterring Violent Extremist Networks in North-West Africa ». SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, 8 avril 2015. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2593020.

White, Natasha. « Conflict Stalemate in Morocco and Western Sahara: Natural Resources, Legitimacy and Political Recognition ». British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 42, n^o 3 (3 juillet 2015): 339‑57. https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2014.949220.

Williams, Canile DD, et Emile Sunjo. « Evaluating the Effectiveness of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance in Preventing the Resurgence of Military Coups in West Africa ». International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science 8, n^o 1 (2024): 255‑64.

Willis, Michael, et Nizar Messari. « Analyzing Moroccan Foreign Policy and Relations with Europe ». The Review of International Affairs 3, n^o 2 (1 décembre 2003): 152‑72. https://doi.org/10.1080/1475355032000240658.

World Nuclear Association. « Uranium in Niger – World Nuclear Association », 23 juillet 2024. https://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/countries-g-n/niger.