THE IMPACT OF MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES FROM MIGRANTS ON POVERTY : THE CASE OF EGYPT

 

ABSTRACT

 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

 

INTRODUCTION

 

1. The international migrant remittances and their role in development: A literature review

 

Introduction of the first part

 

I.A. Review of theoretical work

I.A.1. Concepts

I.A.1.1. Poverty

I.A.1.2. Migration

I.A.1.3. Poverty, Migration and mobility

– Formal remittances

– Informal remittances

I.A.2. Migration: solution to avoid poverty

I.A.2.1. Evolution of migration

I.A.2.2. Migration and development: researches

 

I.A.3. Determinants of remittances sent by working migrants

I.A.4. Effects of remittances

 

I.B. Empirical illustration

I.B.1. External migration and remittances

I.B.2. Impact of remittances on poverty in developing countries

I.B.3. Remittances and governance

I.B.4. Importance of remittances on the home economy

 

Conclusion of the first part

 

1. Econometric modeling

 

Introduction of the second part

II.A. Empirical study of the correlation between poverty and migration

II.A.1. Methodology using regression analysis

II.A.2. Methodology using instrumental variables

II.B. Case studies: Egypt

II.B.1. Economic situation

II.B.1.a. Egypt and Poverty: Statistical Data

II.B.1.b. Historical background and General Trends of Migration

II.B.2. Internal and Regional Migration

II.B.3. Labor Migration

II.B.4. Illegal Migration: data and comments

II.B.5. Impact of Migration on Poverty

1. Data used
   b. Modeling and hypotheses
   c. Conclusion
   d. Comparison between the reality and the hypothesis

III. Migration and development tendencies in migration policy

 

Introduction of the third part

 

III.A. Links between migration policies and development policies

III.A.1. Migration management and development

III.A.2. Economic migration and development

III.B. Management of migration and development policies: maximizing the benefits of migration

III.C. Issues around migration in the coming decades

III.D. Conclusion and ecommendations

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

REFERENCES

 

LIST OF TABLES

 

LIST OF FIGURES

 

LIST OF CHARTS

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

INTRODUCTION

 

In a context of globalization, human migration has transformed into a dynamic process driven by multiple factors that contribute to the movement of an unprecedented number of migrants’ huge geographical trajectories. All throughout its history, Africa has witnessed significant migration both voluntary and forced, that have shaped its demographic landscape today. In many parts of the continent, communities are spread over the territory of two or three nation-states, as it is true that the movements are rarely limited to the borders policies. Cross-border migration in Africa is an important strategy survival and resistance to environmental hazards and economic downturns, it it constitutes a barometer to understand and predict the onset and the evolution of humanitarian disasters. In recent decades, deteriorating political, economic and ecological as well as armed conflict, insecurity, environmental degradation and poverty, were all root causes of mass migration and forced displacement in Africa. The globalization process also facilitates the movement of people across different parts of Africa (in favor of regional integration) and to other regions outside the continent. In view of the increase in the number of migrants, migration will, without doubt, a major issue in the 21st century and will pose challenges social, economic and political decision-makers that will have to support the future management of migration with a view to improving African societies.

Interactions between migration and poverty, as the place of origin and place of destination of migrants is one of the least studied and most misunderstood of the economy. This is somewhat surprising if one takes into account the fact that most global migration from rural areas which also focus the majority of the world’s poor. The impact of the migration of people from rural areas to those who are not only important from the point of view of social welfare, but it may also be given to the integration of markets, a profound impact on the economic growth in rural areas outside (e.g., in terms of food production, agricultural exports of rural demand of finished products, as well as for future agricultural surpluses could be invested in other sectors of the economy). On the other hand, the economic welfare of non-migrants certainly plays a role in future trends in migration. At the place of destination of migrants, migrant workers integrate with local production activities, complementing sometimes other factors, or by competing with them (including certain categories of non-migrants). This has consequences both on the level and distribution of income in savings receptions. Potential effects of migration on poverty are classified according to two opposing perspectives can be described as vision “optimistic” vision or “pessimistic”. Migration effects are probably midway between these two extremes. Embryonic literature on migration suggests that interactions between migration and some key economic variables, both in the areas of origin and destination of migrants, are multifaceted and complex cause a range of effects such as “optimistic” and “pessimistic”. Recent studies have determined that such migration has a negative impact both in terms of “lost labor” and positive from the point of view of remittances in the economies of origin. United States, new studies highlight the complex nature of the impact of immigration, which spread through indirect channels often ignored in previous studies. New research methods are needed to determine the interactions between migration and economic transformations in the areas of origin and destination of migrants.

In view of the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development, held in September 2006 in conjunction with the 61st session of the General Assembly, the Economic and Financial Committee (Second Committee) examined today in As part of its debate on globalization and interdependence, the impact of international migration on development. In a world where nearly one billion people are unemployed, the phenomenon of migration is one of the characteristics inherent in globalization, noted the representative of the International Labour Organization, adding that the challenge was not to stop migration but to the structure, among others, to strengthen the protection of migrant workers and fight against trafficking in human beings.

In the space of thirty years, the number of migrants increased from 82 million in 1970 to 200 million today, the delegate from Pakistan, which held that the High-level Dialogue 2006 on international migration should primarily serve to demystify this phenomenon and provide a framework for thinking about human approach this multidimensional issue. Responsibility for the management of migration should be shared between countries of emigration and immigration countries, for its part considered the representative of Ecuador, arguing that migrants contribute to the economic growth of companies host and insisting that migrant workers who leave their country and meet the demands of the labor market in another country must be protected, a decent wage and jobs commensurate with their level of training and competence. We believe that migration has an impact on reducing poverty in the country of origin of workers, said the representative of the Philippines. Taking the example of his own country, with nearly 7 million migrant workers, the Philippine delegate stated that migrant remittances amounted annually to nearly $ 8 billion. The High-level Dialogue 2006 will examine the issue of remittances, considered by many delegations, including that of Cape Verde, which indicated that these transfers of funds accounted for 15% of the GDP of the country and financed the education of the majority of children in Cape Verde and it supported the creation of many small businesses. The representative of Fiji for its part considered useful to channel these funds, noting that in 2004, expatriate Fijians had officially sent 450 million in the country, while 150 million were channeled through informal channels.

However, while recognizing that migrants contributed by remittances to the well-being of their families, delegations, such as Peru and Ecuador, felt that the international community must recognize both the merits reducing the costs of remittances, and the fact that these resources belong to the families and cannot therefore be directed force by States to the financing of development. Remittances of migrants will never replace official development assistance, they stressed. The representative of Peru has also questioned the concept of “migration management” in the hope that this is not there to define a strategy to impose further restrictions on the movement of people across the planet.

Concerned about the flows of illegal immigration which his country has suffered in recent months, the delegation of Malta said that Malta had reached the limits of its capacity to absorb and hoped that, in the High-level Dialogue 2006, international cooperation should be strengthened in the fight against illegal immigration involving countries of origin, countries of transit and countries of destination. Switzerland and Norway believed that the recommendations contained in the report of the Global Commission on International Migration provided a basis for interesting work from the perspective of the High Level Dialogue in 2006, Norway in this regard based on the principle of creating a facility for international migration but suggesting that more time be given to stakeholders so they can better examine the proposal.

In Third World countries, international remittances, the money and goods transmitted to households back home by migrant workers away from their origin community, can have a great impact on poverty, income distribution, and development in rural areas. This study analyses the impacts of international remittances on rural Egypt, where international migration has been widespread in recent years. Several people with low income and mainly those are from poor rural areas seek to improve their living by practicing migration looking for work and income, more and more migrating across national boundaries and farther afield. In recent years, the remittances the migrants earned have come to significantly impact the economies of several developing countries, having a great effect on poverty, income distribution, and rural economy development in their villages of origin.

The results of the researches in that have been made in this study complement the discoveries of other studies on poverty lessening, income sources, and rural development. To implement the study, household data from a small area of rural Egypt were used innovatively to deal with the following vital questions: who migrates, how remittances affect poverty and income inequality in the receiving communities, and how payments from returning migrants make local development easy. The study’s discovery that the poor people in rural areas, who dynamically take part in international migration, have the tendency to invest their remittance earnings instead of spending them on their own or family consumption is broadly implicated in policy planning of countries that send many migrants abroad.

This work, which is ours, focuses on the impact of migration on poverty in Egypt. To do this, the study is divided into three main parts. The first part is devoted to define the different concepts around poverty and migration, as well as any relationships that bind one to another, and an empirical study on existing literature regarding the econometric studies made on the study of this impact. The second part tries to identify the truly Egyptian environment, the history of migration, and the bulk of our study establishes the econometric equations in connection with our subject, the occurrence the impact of migration on poverty Egypt, which we can bring results. Finally, the last section discusses the migration policies and recommendations to ensure that migration can actually go in the direction of national economic development.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. The international migrant remittances and their role in development: A literature review

 

 

Introduction of first part     

 

Remittances from migrant workers seemed to be an important source of external finances for developing countries during the recent global financial crisis, according to the Compendium of statistics of 2011 the World Bank Migration and Remittances. The amounts reported in this capacity are expected to reach $ 325 billion by the end of the year, against $ 307 billion in 2009. Globally, remittances are expected to reach $ 440 billion by the end of 2010.

According to the World Bank, recorded remittances for developing countries have recovered after this year and continue to increase in 2011 and 2012 until exceeding $ 370 billion in two years. “Remittances are a crucial financial support that directly increases the income of migrant families”, said Hans Timmer, Director of Development Prospects Group of the World Bank. “Remittances lead to increased investments in health, education and small businesses. Through better monitoring of the evolution of migration and remittances, officials of public action can act knowingly to protect these capital inflows, the amount of which is three times higher than the public support, and multiply their impact”. In 2009, the main origin countries of remittances were the United States, Saudi Arabia, Switzerland, Russia and Germany. In 2010, at the global level, the main recipient countries are India, China, Mexico, the Philippines and France. However, these remittances have a greater impact in small countries, where they are sometimes more than 25% of GDP (Gross Domestic Product).

While the high-income countries remain the main source of remittances, migration between developing countries are more important than migration between these countries and high-income countries members of the Organization and Development (OECD)[1].

International migration and their apparent links with poor developing countries are now at the heart of development debates at the international level. This is due to the fact that they have strong economic, demographic and policies, not only in sending countries but also in the receiving country.  For a better understanding of this complex phenomenon, we must first analyze the migration in general within a historical perspective and draw a picture of the current situation. In addition, it is necessary to examine the latest theories in order to develop an analytical framework for migration. In this report, migration is understood as all population flows that move permanently or for a period of time to live and work in a country other than their country of origin.

Before going further in this reflection, let us make a review of the literature on the concepts of poverty and migration and relationships that may exist between them.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

I.A. Review of theoretical work

 

Remittances of migrants have become increasingly important for many developing countries. Sometimes regarded as a new “windfall” for the financial development[2], remittances from migrants seem to be less volatile than other types of remittances[3]. Some works are also clearly countercyclical behavior trend. Thus, migrants increase their remittances in response to a decline in GDP of their country of origin (Frankel, 2009), for example following a crisis.

The global financial crisis that broke out in the United States in 2007 is not limited to financial markets and developed countries. Indeed, the crisis seems to affect also emerging

(Contrary to the theory of decoupling[4]) and have repercussions on many markets (excluding real estate). Extending into the real economy, the financial crisis has sometimes political and social consequences. If in the case of asymmetrical crises remittances of migrants can present cyclical behavior in the current crisis also affects the country-Home. To support this hypothesis, we use a set of correlations between variables economic data on both the host and origin.

Remittances of migrants, as most international financial flows, have a complex impact on the economy receiving. This effect can be understood by observing variables at macro. The main variables are observed and tested national income or its rate of growth, investment (through case studies), the level of poverty and inequality. The effects of the crisis on the real concern the level of income, an increase in the rate of unemployment and a rise in the level of poverty. However, these variables are also affected by remittances from migrants. They are both early indicators of the impact of the crisis and the first variables affected by remittances from migrants.

From a macroeconomic perspective, remittances of migrants are credited to the balance of payments, which allows them to participate in the national accounts balance, and increase GDP. Thus, remittances of migrants will impact on the sustainability of debt, most receiving countries have contracted. Studies impact of remittances migrants are few Naiditch as noted, both case studies of international comparisons. However, despite the low number of studies, the recurrence of certain variables allows us to draw some conclusions. Indeed, this work will show a significant impact of migrant remittances on GDP or GDP / capita[5], or the growth rate.

Increasing domestic income, remittances of migrants can increase short-term consumption. The long-term impact is determined by the quality of spending. The results of studies on the subject will therefore depend on the time horizon considered.

Remittances of migrants also appear to have a positive impact on the investment (in physical capital, but also public or abroad), although this hypothesis is controversial[6]. Indeed, most studies on the subject for return migration, and are therefore not representative of the population of migrants. Lucas (1987) shows that remittances from migrants have a positive impact on rural productivity, observation supported by the results of Paris et al. (2009) who show that remittances from migrants play a role compensating the loss of labor-related migration in the rural sector to Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam. Ledesma and Piracha (2004)[7] also talk about sample of 11 countries in Eastern Europe as migrant remittances have a positive impact on labor productivity, investment but also highlighting the importance of remittances that is not spent on immediate consumption. Finally, Drinkwater et al. (2006)[8] study a panel of 20 countries between 1970 and 2000 and emphasize the positive impact of remittances migrants on investment, which will release the constraint credit by studying the gross fixed capital formation. Other studies such as Woodruff and Zeneto[9] several sectors of Mexico show that remittances from migrants can play a role in the creation and funding for small businesses up to 20%, and thus positively impact the unemployment rate and investment.

There is a relative consensus on the impact of migrant remittances on poverty. Many studies, including work of Adams show that remittances have a positive impact on poverty because they help to reduce the severity significantly increasing the budget of the poorest.

However, remittances from migrants can reinforce inequality (Adams, 1991) to the extent that there is a bias self-selection of migrants. In fact, the poorest households are not able to finance the emigration of a family member. Therefore, they do not receive remittances unlike richer households.

Remittances of migrants can therefore have a positive impact on investment and growth, while reducing poverty, although they also have a tendency to reinforce structural inequalities. However, the main consequences of the current crisis feared by the Tajik government concern lower remittances from migrants. The direct impact of the crisis, however, is less feared by the authorities because of low degree of trade openness of the country. Therefore, remittances from migrants could be a channel transmission of the crisis. It is shown that several analyzes are examining the behavior of remittances from migrant crisis in the country. The observation of inverse variations remittances from migrants and these variables led to the construction of the hypothesis countercyclicality.

The idea that remittances from migrants may depend on economic conditions in the countries of destination and origin derived from a theoretical interpretation of the motives of migrants. Indeed, the motivation to remittance pattern varies from purely altruistic motive purely selfish[10]. For example, if the migrant is powered by an altruistic motive, well-being depends on his family in the country of origin. Therefore, if the economic situation of the country of origin worsens, it will increase its remittances. Conversely, if the migrant’s motivations are selfish, it is whether well-being depends only on maximizing his income, he will remit to his country of origin less if the profitability of the investment decreases.

The altruistic motive and therefore the effect of countercyclical remittances should in theory allow amortizing effects of a crisis on the country: the migrant remittances should evolve countercyclicality over the economic cycle of the recipient country. Remittances of migrants should increase when the economy receiver suffers from a slowdown in activity or due to a macroeconomic shock natural disaster[11] or in a post-conflict situation[12], but also due to economic crisis[13]. The remittances of migrants should and improve fuel economy and contribute to the stability of economies receptor[14].

The human capital theory owes its development to the pioneering work of Schultz[15], Mincer[16] and Becker[17]. These authors analyzed the role of capital in the process of human growth and more specifically in the training and earnings distribution. This theory assumes that individuals can improve their productivity through investment in education or health, or even the migration.

Indeed, recent data show that international migration plays an important role in reducing poverty and improving the living standards of the poor in developing countries. In particular, remittances from migrants represent a significant flow of foreign exchange for many countries, and help increasing the household consumption and domestic investment. It is suggested that remittances are a source of funding immediate needs of families in countries of origin, particularly in the fields of education and health. Remittances may also play an important role in reducing poverty and stimulating growth in the development.

Several cross-sectional studies highlight the positive impact of remittances on education and health in developing countries, thus promoting the economic development[18]. However, some researchers argue that migration has little impact on the welfare of households, and remittances are only small-scale additional income that does not lead to any acceleration of the economic development.

The most commonly used argument against is that international migration deprives poor countries from a part of their human resources. Thus the structuralism theorists and those of the theory of resource dependence emphasized that international migration, especially the one qualified, can undermine, rather than boost development in countries of origin, and reinforce inequalities rather than alleviating the world. In recent years, these assumptions on international migration general skilled migration in particular have been strongly challenged, thus leading to a new image much more nuanced.

Indeed, according to the social, economic and political country of origin, departure of skilled and / or unskilled may have beneficial effects as against a tide of remittances, investments, trade relations, circulation of skills or a deepened information and knowledge. Migrants play an important role in innovative and transnational operations.

They are entrepreneurs and investors in countries like India, China, Republic of Korea and Taiwan. Their contribution to development is not subject to return: many migrants are transnational, combining country activities of origin and country of destination. This corroborates the potential sustainability of remitting funds and refutes the pessimistic views that equate the integration of migrants as an inevitable “loss” for developing countries. Instead, migrants seem to have an increased capacity to contribute to the development of their country of origin. However, the extent to which they do it depends crucially on the economic terms and conditions policies in these countries.

 

The past 30 years have seen a steady growth of the workers’ remittances which represents, over the last decade, an average annual rate of over 7% in nominal terms. In opposite to net official flows, including aid and debt, that remained static if not declined, remittances knew some increase and have recently become the second largest net financial flows source for developing countries.

In 2001, remittance flows were already ten times net over remittances from private sources and double those from official sources[19]. In 2003, the estimated global remittance amounted to 91 billion USD while equaling the DGP of the developing countries of 1.6% of half of total inward FDI which exceeds all other private capital inflows. A report from The World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects 2006 emphasized mostly on migration and remittances. The report shows an official figure exceeding $232 billion of money sent home by migrant workers worldwide in 2005, $167 billion of which goes to developing countries, over the twice of the level of development aid from all sources. According to the author, at least 50% could be added to the official estimate from remittances sent through informal channels, and that make remittances the leading source of external capital in several developing countries.

Over the last years, the remittances of the workers have thus gained more and more interest from researchers and policy makers. They are considered to be a key element for the development in emerging economies, this fact impelled policy makers to boost progress on understanding and facilitating remittances through formal financial systems, as well as on directing a more important remittance share to investment. EU Neighbouring Region (ENR) is mainly an area whose remittances flows are particularly high; the region had five countries (Morocco, Egypt, Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan) among the ten chief beneficiaries of global remittance flows in 2001 and euro area remittances to non-EU countries topped EUR 13 billion in 2003. Remittances are significant as well for the local economy; they represent a huge local GDP share reaching 20% in Bosnia and Herzegovina and 23% in Jordan. Moreover, the remittances flows for most of the ENR countries are substantially superior to FDI, reaching up to five times FDI inflows in Albania, or even 12 times in Egypt. Flows to the Maghreb, Turkey, as well as Southern and Eastern Europe come particularly from euro area. According to national data, 82% of Morocco’s remittances come from the euro area, representing nearly two-thirds of the country’s trade deficit. It has been showed by the data from the central bank that 85% of the remittance inflows of Romania and Tunisia are remittances from the euro area. At the same time, it has been discovered that EU countries underwent huge remittance outflows over the last decade, aided partly by strong migration from ENR countries.

Particularly, in Egypt, migration influenced strongly poverty, improper socioeconomic policies and economic difficulties. Until the mid-1950s, people from around the world migrate to Egypt but it is seldom that Egyptians went abroad. Admittedly, Egyptian emigration was the proof of the oil boom in the Arab Gulf countries and the necessity to employ manpower in neighboring countries but it also reflects the economic issues and the high demographic increase in Egypt. Internal migration seemed to be a natural reply to poverty and the rough dispersal of economic activities; it played a main part as balancing mechanism since Egyptian migration movement to the Gulf and elsewhere started. Internal migration still plays a key role in supporting many families’ livelihood in rural Egypt. In the second part of our work, we will study in details the case of Egypt, especially the impact of migration.

 

I.A.1. Concepts

 

In this part, we will talk about the main concepts in relation with our theme, which is the impact of migration on poverty.

 

I.A.1.1. Poverty

 

The seemingly simple concept of poverty is not provided. Literature on poverty is extremely abundant and is characterized by a high level of ambiguity. For Daniel Verger[20], the first difficulty encountered by the study of poverty is as surprising as it may seem to have no real definition: either sociologists or economists do not provide a precise definition for quantification of poverty. This lack of definition is indicative of the several underlying problems, both conceptually and in terms of measure, which affects any approach to poverty. It appears that there is some difficulty in identifying poor people.

 

• Definition

However, according to the United Nations (UN), poverty can be defined as “the condition in which a human being who is deprived of sustained or chronic resources, capabilities, choices, security and authority to an adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, political and social”. Nevertheless, the consensus in the definition of poverty is far from certain. It is noted in the literature various concepts of poverty: “poverty, poverty in terms of human capital, social exclusion poverty and subjective poverty”. Therefore, two approaches are commonly used, namely: the monetary approach and non-monetary approach. If, since the early 90s, a great attention has been given to the phenomenon of household poverty, there is less regard to child poverty.

Poverty is a concept that has evolved considerably over time, as its complexity and multiples dimensions appear. Thus, for many years the approach to poverty was mainly monetary. Like the Bretton Woods institutions, discourse and literature on this subject were based primarily on the income criterion. Was poor, who had an income of less than one U.S. dollar per day (1985 value). If this approximation may have some utility, especially for international comparisons, it proved to be too simplistic to capture the reality of the lives of human beings in question. With the “World Report on Human Development” by UNDP, in 1990, the concept of human development has rapidly affected the approach to poverty: it is characterized not only by low level of income and consumption, but also by a low level of education, poor health and a premature aging. The 1997 edition of this report introduces the concept of “human poverty”, while stating that the human poverty index (HPI), which is also developed by UNDP, does not capture all aspects of this concept: poverty is “the denial of opportunities and choices most basic to human development – longevity, health, creativity, as well as living conditions, dignity, respect for oneself and others, access to everything gives value to life”.

Among the thinkers who have strongly influenced the evolution of the concept of poverty, is included the Indian economist Amartya SEN. According to him, poverty is primarily a deprivation basic capacity. However, “this definition does not, in any way, deny the obvious: low income constitutes a major cause of poverty, for the reason, at least the lack of resources is the main source of deprivation of capabilities an individual”[21]. The theorist of poverty has also developed the concept of social capital. Whether intra-group relations, intergroup, or environmental, social capital is inherent in social interactions, that is to say, inherent in the structure of relations between people. The capital of an agent (the individual to the state) is a social resource, after cultural interactions and/or structural, with other agents capable of generating sustainable externalities that change their economic situation.

To sum up, we find the principle of economies of scale, which leads to decreases in individual costs and a gain in efficiency. Social capital thus generates externalities that improve market efficiency, either by supplementing either by substituting. At the micro level, social capital provides a better understanding of household poverty and their ability to cope (vulnerability). On the approach of SEN, the multidimensional concepts of poverty were circumcised by its multiple dimensions: “social poverty (corresponding to the weakness of the capital), cultural poverty, poverty policy, poverty, ethics, and economic poverty, this latter being composed of the monetary aspects, aspects related to living conditions and issues related to the potential of individuals”[22].

 

• Measure of Poverty

The measure of poverty is dependent on the conventions used to measure this phenomenon. The monetary approach is advocated by the “classical utilitarian”, and according to them, poverty is seen as a utility level below a predefined level and economically approximated by a monetary variable, so it results in a non-possession of monetary resources, because, in a market system, income and expenses are only able to account for individual satisfaction. This approach is based on household income, including imputed rent and consumption. Satisfaction achieved by an individual in relation to the goods and services they consume is assumed to be well defined (Djoke et al, 2006). The current literature indicates that there are sufficient theoretical basis to consider that spending is a good approximation to the well-being for the analysis of poverty. This theoretical basis is related to two factors: the assumption of utility maximization of individuals, the main elements of the function of welfare goods is consumed. The monetary approach to poverty, because it is intuitive and easily perceptible, remained the most prevalent in the literature. The best way to measure individual well-being is to use a monetary measure. Everyone is sole master in the construction of the utility function, and the definition of its choice, the monetary dimension of poverty is to base comparisons of well-being as well as decisions on public policy preferences individuals.

However, given its multiple dimensions, there is no single definition and consensual poverty, as perceived. One of the “official” definitions is that adopted by the European Union, which considers poor “people whose material, cultural and social are so low that they are excluded lifestyles minimum acceptable state where they live”.

This definition, although not operational, nevertheless, shows three important points for measuring poverty:

• Firstly, the definition of poverty is conventional: the choice of an indicator is a normative act which summarizes policy choices, themselves resulting from social representations and technical considerations.
• Secondly, poverty is a relative phenomenon which refers to an approach in terms of inequalities (resource allocation). Is considered as poor a person whose standard of living is lower than of the population as a whole. This view of poverty, in terms of social inequality is not reversed in all countries.
• Finally, poverty is a multidimensional phenomenon that cannot be reduced in the absence of loss of monetary resources.

Among the many approaches to poverty which focuses on the measurement of poverty, considering poor person whose income is below a certain poverty line is the most frequent. This approach is not without interest in societies, where most goods and services are traded by merchants: income appears as a synthetic indicator of the ability to acquire these assets. The greater availability of data on income distribution also explains, in part, that this approach is most common. These monetary thresholds may be absolute thresholds. The absolute thresholds are references to the idea of “subsistence” level and the lifestyle that prevail in a society at a given time.

Common sense of poverty is generally understood by all and the image to which it refers appears constant through the centuries. Disparities are technical but also conceptual and political, and closely linked to the organization that produces and disseminates statistics.

Signs of poverty are multiple: health problems, weakness or lack of income, lack of education, unstable housing, hard work, political disempowerment, undernourishment, degraded environment, physical insecurity, etc. If the weight and relationship between these factors have not yet been clearly evaluated and demonstrated, the multidimensionality of poverty is now consensus. Scientists, policy makers and development practitioners agree that the only monetary dimension (lack of income) is not sufficient to represent poverty.

In the case of poverty, it would be more appropriate to speak of systematic uncertainties, as estimations and errors are large. On the one hand, the poor live in precarious endemic: a financial crisis and soaring food prices can throw in a few weeks in poverty for hundreds of millions of individuals. On the other hand, the statistics are shifted in time and use past data for several years in their publication. Finally, some indicators together data from different methods depending on the country censuses and national accounts (themselves unequal in quality or virtually non-existent by the states), model output estimates, surveys, projections, etc[23].

 

• The lifestyle

This approach of poverty is defined in terms of relative deprivation, which was first developed by Peter Townsend, then with a different approach, by Paul Dickes. It seeks to identify a number of difficulties, lack or deprivation in different areas of the living conditions of households. These areas may refer to a kind of “existential” (food, housing, for example), or that “social” poverty (relationships, work, leisure …).

For the selection of specific practices observed, some authors have proposed the use of different criteria, for example an objective criterion corresponding to the fact that the practices discussed are distributed among the majority of the population and social criteria, corresponding to the fact that the gaps are considered unfavorable or unacceptable level by the majority of the population. In the housing sector, it may be, for example due to the fact of not having a private toilet or a shower, or living in a wet home, not eating meat or fish most of the days of the week; in the field of social deprivation, being unemployed, precariously employed, inability to offer gifts, etc. We see the implementation of this approach raising formidable difficulties and providing sufficient room for choice, necessary to conventional researchers and survey designers.

Indeed, when we think of poverty, we first think of low income levels. But they must be defined in relative terms (relative to a given reference) because the needs considered « normal » in a society become a function of higher standards of living, for example, in Europe, used as reference median income. This is which divides the population into two half earns the income or less, half higher income, and the poverty which is set at half the median income in Europe but rather used the bar to 60% of the median income. Knowledge of income is not obvious; statisticians use the “income tax” that excludes certain income assets.  A large family lives less than a single with the same income. Statisticians count the number of « units of consumption”; being poor means to be “deprived”. The income approach or the number of licensed social minima cannot describe the substance of the social reality of the poor: poverty, unability to meet their basic needs (food, shelter, and clothing).

For all these reasons, there is no real poverty rate but by those who suffer particular hardship. The level of poverty is highly dependent on certain criteria but privation is not easy to define. Among deprivations taken into account by European studies include: the inability to buy clothes and shoes, inability to maintain the dwelling in good temperature, not eating meat every two days, not having toilets inside the house, etc.

The subjective approach is not to refer to a minimum of resources or conventionally defined objective conditions of existence, but to ask the households about their perception of these realities, from questioning about their income, the minimum it required to them “to make ends meet” and/or degree of “affluence”. Different ways based on these responses, a threshold of subjective poverty: households whose income is below this threshold will be considered poor (insecurity objective existence). Another indicator (subjective insecurity of existence) is to count households that reported experiencing financial difficulties to make ends meet. The poorest households, who “have to do with” limited resources, and may have a tendency to minimize the objective difficulties they encounter in their daily lives, which could skew the results[24].

 

 

 

 

 

 

Framed:

In short, when it comes to measuring poverty, it is sometimes necessary to choose income or consumption as an indicator of well-being:

– Power consumption is a better indicator of performance than revenues,

– The consumption can be better measured than income,

– The consumer can more accurately reflect the real standard of living of a household and its ability to cover their basic needs.

At the national level, economists have measured the development of a country from GNP (measure of annual production of wealth created by a country) or GDP (measure of production in a given country) per capita in constant prices to define the economic growth. This indicator reflects an indirect increase in the rate of depletion and natural resource consumption per capita. Finally, if the quantitative growth results from economic magnitudes, qualitative development is beyond the simple growth. In the late 1980s, the United Nations Development proposes to measure the level of human development. In this context, developed indices UNDP’s Human Development Index (HDI), Human Poverty Index (HPI) which, in its adapted version developed countries, seeks to measure the level of poverty within a society with additional parameters in its monetary definition of such inequalities concerning the access to health, employment or education. Originally, the HPI was designed in two versions, one for developed countries, and for other developing countries. It tallies with the negative image of the Human Development Index (HDI).

Although poverty has been traditionally measured in monetary terms, it has many other aspects. Poverty is not only related to lack of income or consumption, but also poor performance in health, nutrition and literacy to impairments of social relations, insecurity, low self-esteem and a sense of helplessness. In some cases, the tools developed for the measurement of poverty can apply to non-monetary indicators of well-being. The application of tools to measure poverty non-monetary indicators is the possibility to compare the value of non-monetary indicator of an individual or household to a threshold, or “poverty line” below which it is considered that the person or household is not able to cover their basic needs. In general, the attention can be focused on the most important aspects, such as literacy and nutrition[25]:

• Health and nutritional poverty: The health status of the members of a household can be considered as an important indicator of well-being. Analysts can focus on the nutritional status of children as a measure of the evolution and impact of certain diseases (diarrhea, malaria, respiratory diseases), or the life expectancy of different groups within the population. If any information on the health status is available, surrogate data can be used, such as the number of visits made by a person to a hospital or clinic, access to certain services (such as health care pre-and post-natal), or the regularity of immunization of children, insofar as it determines their future health.
• Educational poverty: In the field of education, it is possible to use the standard literacy as a criterion and a considered level to represent the threshold illiteracy as the poverty line. In countries where literacy is almost universal, it is possible to opt for performing tests in schools. Scores have value of indicators to distinguish between different population groups. The alternative would be to compare the number of years of schooling actually the number years which, in principle, should have been.
• Composite indexes of wealth: An alternative to the use of a single parameter of poverty might be to combine information on different aspects of poverty. Another possibility would be to create a measure that takes into account the income, health, assets and education. It is also possible that the information relating to income is unavailable, even if other aspects are covered. It is important to note that a major limits of composite indices lies in the difficulty of defining a poverty line. The analysis quintiles still possible and provides important information profile of poverty.

The measurement of poverty is in itself a statistical function. It compares the indicator of well-being household and the poverty line and the result translated into a single number of the whole population, or a subgroup determined. There are many alternatives, but the three measures described which are most commonly used:

• Incidence of poverty (headcount index inhabitants): This is the part of the population whose income or consumption is below the poverty line, which is to say from the population who cannot afford the basket of products corresponding to subsistence. An analyst can, using several poverty lines, one for the poverty and extreme poverty for another, estimate the impact of these two situations. Similarly, in the case of non-monetary indicators, the incidence of poverty measures from of the population does not reach the threshold (for example, the percentage of the population who received less than three years of education).
• Depth of poverty (poverty gap): This measure indicates the distance in which households are from the poverty line. It saves the average income deficit collective or consumption compared to the poverty line for the whole population. The depth of poverty is obtained by the sum of all the deficits of individuals in poverty (assuming a zero deficit for the non-poor) and dividing the result by the total population. In other words, it can estimate the total resources needed to bring the whole of the poor level of the line of poverty (total divided by the number of individuals in the population considered). This measure can also be used for non-monetary indicators, provided that the extent of the distance is significant. Thus, the poverty gap in education could match the number of years of education required to reach a certain threshold. In some cases, however, this did not make sense or is not quantifiable (for example when the indicators are binary, as indicator of literacy, we are reduced to using the number of inhabitants). It should be noted that the poverty gap can serve as a the minimum amount of resources needed to eradicate poverty, which means the amount that should be remitted to the poor, in a case of perfect tender (each person receiving exactly what is required) to remove them from their poverty.
• Severity of poverty (poverty gap squared): This measure takes into account not only the distance separating the poor from the poverty line (poverty gap), but also inequality among the poor. It assigns more weight to household located greater distance from the poverty line. Regarding the extent of the poverty gap, non-monetary indicators are subject to certain limitations.

All these measures can be calculated per household, that is to say, by assessing the proportion of households that fall below the poverty line in the case of the index number of inhabitants. However, it may be preferable to measures, based on the population (number individuals), to take into account the number of people who made each household. The depth and severity are important complements to the impact of poverty. In some cases, indeed, a significant impact can be combined with a low poverty gap (when some members of the population are just below the poverty line).

 

 

I.A.1.2. Migration

 

Migration is defined as movement of people from the purpose of residence, country of origin to a country of destination. This concept is distinct from that of circulation, which involves a passage or short stay, of less than three month. Generally considered migrant is anyone from a state and established for sustainable territory of another state, even if it acquired the nationality of the latter.

So, human migration is the movement of the living individuals. This phenomenon is probably as old as humanity. Official statistics estimate between 185 and 192 million international migrants in 2000[26], for those who left their country to live and settle in another country for at least one year. This figure increases to 2% per year, despite immigration restrictions that have emerged in many countries. It measures a stock and includes voluntary migration and forced migration. Migration, within countries, is also increasing, but rather it is called displacement (which is also voluntary or forced). Statistics shows that very large waves of migration have recently declined in favor of a selective immigration tend to favor the brain drain and skills in poor countries, to the detriment of the latter. The characteristics of current migration are the diversification of countries of origin and destination, as well as the forms taken by the migration. It is estimated that the money injected into the country from the host country is at least equal, if not much higher than the amount of financial aid provided by the so-called “rich” to poorer countries. Demographers consider that migration will be an important variable adjustment by 2050, at which time 2 or 3 billion people expected additional on the planet, while the effects of climate change will probably feel and some areas can no longer feed the additional population.

Dominant representations of current international migration in European countries were forged in a context of economic crisis and job insecurity experienced by these countries in the mid 70s. Thus, between the mid-nineteenth century and the 30s, emigration from Europe to America and Asian workers to the plantations and large projects in the Americas, Africa and Asia, had already affected 100 million people, for a world population in 1900 is four times less than today. Similarly, the end of the Second World War to the mid-60s, population displacement following the war, the pursuit of European emigration, leaving from Southern Europe in particular, and labor migration in Western Europe and elsewhere have affected some 60 million people[27].

The real novelty lies, on the one hand, in the explosion in the number of refugees and, on the other hand, in the development of South-South flows. The number of refugees registered with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees has increased from about 1.5 million (early 60s) to 12 million (late 90s), with nearly 5 million in Asia and 3.5 million in Africa[28]. And the available data suggest that the majority of new migrants and refugees now head to other southern countries – neighbors from the same region – and not to the North as is generally believed. The global economic crisis but also the needs of the new workforce “emerging” countries were upset, destination and origin, the movement of people in the world created conflicts. The fact is often overlooked: most of these movements are now South-South movements (less developed countries to middle-income countries); while in the 60s, it was 80% North to North and South to North movement.

The neoclassical explanation of migration presents it as a result of “market forces” for the mutual benefit of all. They are primarily the result of the uneven geographical distribution of labor and capital[29]. Workers tend to leave the countries and regions where labor is abundant and wages are low, to reach those where labor is scarce and wages high. Migration is seen as a mechanism to help eliminate wage differentials, the disappearance of these differences in turn lead to the end of the migration. Also, in countries where labor is abundant mainly occupied with traditional activities with low productivity, rural-urban migration and international towards more productive sectors appears to be a prerequisite for development.

Among the 20 poorest countries in the world in 1999[30], with Mali and Senegal, the number of migrants in France and Europe is consistent, but for Sierra Leone, Niger, Burundi, Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Chad, Benin, etc., the figures are much lower. Among these countries, those who have experienced civil wars represent certainly a large number of refugees, but they are mainly in neighboring countries that are also poor. In fact, immigrant populations in Europe are often income countries “intermediaries” such as Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Turkey, where the NBI per capita is 5 to 15 times higher than in Burkina Faso, Niger or Chad.

Compared to the size of the country’s population (70 million inhabitants), Egypt is a small pole migration: only 3 million Egyptian migrants, or 4.3% of the total population.

 

 

Framed

Immigration is for a person to arrive or return to a country / region is not / the own (not) to install, usually for economic reasons, political or academic. In contrast, migration is the fact out from one country to another. An immigrant was necessarily emigrant. In general, migration processes are massive and coincide with the times of crisis in a given region, when thousands of people seeking to emigrate to enter a foreign country in search of a better life. Today, globalization is a social phenomenon that facilitates immigration vis-à-vis the development of transport and the liberalization of borders.

Deplorable living conditions, climate of war and violence, natural disasters, economic slumps persistent, growing inequality between rich and poor, but also mobility on a global scale and the emergence of new media, these are the causes of displacement.

Since man has been on earth, people have stopped moving in other parts of the world in the hope of building a new life. Over the centuries, these are wars that repeatedly led to massive flows of refugees. In recent decades, migration in the world took reached a hitherto unknown. Studies by international organizations actually feel more than 175 million people currently living away from home, including 19.2 million “refugees” or “displaced by the war”.

Anyone who is living outside his country of origin is considered “migrant”. Number of migrants is fleeing arid soils and pasture shortages of water, food and other necessities or lack of career prospects. Similarly, natural disasters, such as drought or floods, may compel thousands of people to emigrate. Nearly two-thirds of the population of the world lives in developing countries.

The widening gap between the rich and the poor is the main vector of international migration. In 1960, income fifth of the world’s population was richer, on average, thirty times that of the poorest fifth by 1990, this figure had doubled. Excessive population growth combined with economic development prospects is insufficient in some areas, causing a strong migratory pressure. The third world countries and the former Soviet Union suffer from a lack of capital and know-how. Nations that bend under the weight of debts are legion. In addition, the fall in commodity prices due to tariffs and import restrictions imposed by industrialized countries prevent the development of export industries. The instability of economic policy, the lack of legal certainty and the pervasiveness of corruption discourage investors and industry groups to develop long-term projects in these countries.

The term “refugee” means a person persecuted for reasons of race, religion, ethnicity or political beliefs. A number of international conventions give these people, whose liberty or life is at risk for any of these reasons, the right to be protected by third States. “Persons displaced by war”, meanwhile, after fleeing from persecution, not as individuals, but an escalation of violence in which a large part of the inhabitants of a region or country are exposed. Most victims of conflict or seeking refuge in an area spared of their State of origin or in a neighboring country, where they are usually accommodated in refugee camps to prevent unrest, famine, disease and other problems. However, accommodation and supply of a large number of refugees undermine the resources of host countries and local communities are often disrupted by the arrival of tens of thousands of foreigners. The stability of the domestic policy of the states concerned can then be threatened and new conflicts are then not be excluded.

In such cases, nations where peace and economic stability are invited to bring some of the burden by applying supportive measures such as the temporary admission of people displaced by the war, peacekeeping missions, supply material and reconstruction assistance.

By spreading to poorer well-being of the rich, tourism, television and the Internet increase the attractiveness of migration. In addition, the development of air traffic makes travel to distant destinations such as the industrialized countries. That is why today if only a minority of potential migrants is able to reach other continents; the situation could change very quickly. Indeed, those who managed to emigrate remit a considerable part of their income to their families in the country, allowing a growing number of people to raise the money needed to go to distant countries. Immigrants, preferably, move in states where many of their compatriots are already. In other words, migration generates migration[31].

A joint report by the African Development Bank (ADB) and the World Bank on African migrant remittances provides a link between migration and decreased levels of poverty in the communities. However, economists suggest a strengthening of ties between diasporas and home countries, a securitization of remittances, increased competition in the market shipments. Two-thirds of migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, mainly the poorest, will be established in other African countries. By cons, migrants from North Africa, more than 90%, settled on another continent. The main destinations of African migrants are France (9% of total emigrants), Cote d’Ivoire (8%), South Africa (6%), Saudi Arabia (5%), United States and United Kingdom (4% each). The situation tends to strengthen ties between diasporas and home countries, protect migrants, and expand competition in remittance markets. These securities are sold by public or private entities with established national abroad. Many African states are potentially able to issue bonds of this type due to their large diaspora high income. He cites Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal, Uganda and Zambia in Sub-Saharan Africa and Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia in North Africa.

 

 

I.A.1.3. Poverty, Migration and mobility

 

Remittances of migrants refer to money sent by migrants to their countries of origin. At the microeconomic level, this is a private savings that has neither the same nature or the same object using official development assistance (ODA) since it is primarily intended for family remained close to the country to finance current consumption expenditures to macroeconomic level, migrant remittances represent significant amounts of ODA to complement and contribute to sustain growth in developing countries recipients of funds. Financial remittances by migrants to developing countries reached $ 351 billion in 2011 according to the World Bank, more than twice and half the amount of ODA. They decreased during the crisis (- 5.5% in 2009) but incomparably less than direct investments abroad. These remittances are insurance-based. Studies often show that when the political or economic situation in the country worsens, remittances increase in this country. In some cases, remittances represent more than 20% of the GDP of recipients[32].

Since the 80s, when a systematic research on the determinants of remittances by workers was undertaken, it was found account that much of the money that workers repatriated to their country borrowed informal channels. The researchers speculated that the instability macroeconomic conditions of the country of origin for migrants constituted a powerful reason to use informal channels. Systematic research on the remittance mechanisms, however, was made ​​but only since a few years. In this case, efforts have focused on:

• the types of remittance mechanisms,
• the comparison of remittance costs between these different mechanisms,
• the choice of means of remittance and the evolution of the market of remittances.

Migrants resort to a wide range of formal and informal remittance from the transport itself by migrants themselves or by third, to less regulated devices through the electronic remittances.

Under the concept of remittance must be distinguished:

• Remittances for savings on workers’ wages that migrants remit themselves directly to their country of origin,
• Channeled through banks, post offices, and financial institutions,
• who use informal channels (money taken by the migrant to return during a vacation or entrusted to an intermediary),
• Remittances by social organizations or employers on behalf of migrant and his family wages sent directly by employers and social remittances (pensions, pensions, family allowances, medical expenses, etc.),
• Assets acquired and paid in the country of immigration with the money of emigrants and « exported » by migrants to their country of origin,
• Financial compensation occurring between the host country and the country of emigration.

Through the analysis of the balance of payments and other statistical sources indeed leads to an estimate of the financial remittances of migrants which is clearly below the remittances actually made by emigrants. All surveys are faced with the difficulty of quantifying the exact amount of these remittances.

The reasons for this difficulty are:

• The diversity of practices of remitting a share (because remittances are also social organizations or employers, on behalf of the migrant and his family as well as remittances acquired and paid in the country of immigration with money migrants and « exported » by migrants to their country of origin (the “suitcase trade”),
• Operation of other underground channels that drain a large portion of these funds as income remittances from emigrants operate largely outside formal channels (banks, financial institutions, post offices, etc …).

International remittances  are  cross-border person-to-person  payments,  that is, unrequited remittances from migrants to the family members they left behind, often sent a few hundred dollars at a time, nonetheless add up globally  to  billions  of  dollars  annually.    For several remittances, receiving developing economies, remittance flows exceed foreign direct investment and are a nontrivial fraction of GDP.  The market can be segmented in different ways, e.g.: by type of customer (government, business, individuals), by place of origin and destination (domestic or international remittances) or by channel type transmission (formal or informal).

 

1. Formal remittances

 

The area of ​​ remittances is very complex because it consists of a variety of formal and informal actors who use technology and institutional infrastructure evolving to serve a diverse clientele. Although studies today focus primarily remittances from developed countries to developing countries, migration and associated financial flows take place as often within the same continent. Nearly half of all reported migrants live in developing countries. Remittances between developing countries are re- it market opportunity, though they often require changes or development infrastructure appropriate remittance.

Remittances within the same developing countries represent an opportunity and similar constraints. The amount of domestic remittances tends to be lower than international remittances, but domestic remittances are more numerous and affect more households.

Remittance mechanisms are safe and affordable essential for the treatment of remittances both domestic and international. Remittance services are domestic channel ultimate, the « last mile », and the process of international remittance. Markets domestic must operate efficiently for international remittances can reach their destinations. However, the remittance networks in developing countries are often more limited than international networks because of lack of infrastructure, lack of PSF offering these services, or both. There has therefore there an opportunity for financial services for the poor, especially in rural or remote areas.

In addition to “individual” remittances (person to person), there are other types of remittance, such as business transactions (e.g. Paying bills), the flow of business to individuals (e.g. payment of wages) and government remittances to individuals (e.g. welfare).

Although they represent only a small share of remittances in the world, individual remittances are often the remittance category most important to the majority of the poor in developing countries. This is why our research is based on the treatment of individual remittances.

This is the case with most famous remittance such as Western Union, SOFICOM, Solidarity, with unions and credit unions, microfinance institutions (MFIs), banks, post office, etc. The market can be segmented by type of transmission channel: formal or informal.

It is practiced by specialized institutions or authorized banks, cooperatives, and microfinance institutions. This system was born out of the needs of urban exchanges, regional, national and international.

There are different types of remittances[33]:

• The international money: this is one way despite the often long time and high cost. The fee varies according to destination area with the minimum requirement to send;
• Remittances by SWIFT or Telex are one that is electronic. This mode of remittance is between two different countries. To perform this remittance, it is necessary that the debtor and the creditor have each an account. SWIFT (Society for Wordwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication) is one of the types of international remittances, which allow exchange private messages telematic bank members and unrivaled speed provided from where the bank sends the funds and the receiving, to be a member of SWIFT[34].
• Remittances cash: the bank makes the remittance agents with no bank account. This agent files he wants to remit funds to the bank doing the remittance order to the beneficiary. This type of remittance is the most common.
• The remittances rate: it is made by the customer of the bank who gives a payment order by debiting his account on behalf of someone whose account is credited in another locality. The beneficiary can be an account in the same bank or another.
• The inter-agency remittances: the remittance of cash. This is done between agencies of the same bank working in different cities need cash.

In fact, agency remittances money to another agency is unable to meet its customers’ withdrawals. This practice is done either by bank money, either by moving money or fiat currency.

• Remittances by mail: that is practiced by mail postal checking account.
• Remittances by telegram and mail are those made by telegram and e-mail.

Given the conditions required by some institutions providers of these services, including ceilings remittance cost; they do not meet the needs of the population. It is provided reasons that some use to remittances in the informal sector.

According to the data provided by the IMF[35], the World Bank estimated the total volume of international remittances to formal $ 88.1 billion in 2002 and $ 93 billion in 2003. According to the same source, Latin America and the Caribbean received the largest share of international remittances with 30% of global flows, followed by South Asia (18%), the Middle East and North Africa (13%), Europe and Central Asia (10%) and sub-Saharan Africa (4%). India and Mexico are among the primary beneficiaries, while the United States and Saudi Arabia are the main countries of origin of funds

The remittance market is dominated by individual large specialized companies, including Western Union, Money Gram. The rest of the market is fragmented formal remittances between commercial banks, post offices, exchange offices, credit unions and remittance companies. Sector revenues amounted to an estimated 18 billion dollars in 2003 to about 320 million transactions.

It is difficult to estimate the total number of formal remittances made within one year, as many market participants communicate the value of remittances and not the number of transactions. The profits from the market leaders are themselves much clearer[36].

Based on data provided by the IMF, the World Bank estimated the volume
overall formal international money remittances to $ 88.1 billion in 2002 and
$ 93 billion in 2003. According to the same source, Latin America and the Caribbean received the largest share of international remittances with 30 per cent of global flows,
followed by South Asia (18%), the Middle East and North Africa (13%), Europe and
Central Asia (10%) and sub-Saharan Africa (4%). India and Mexico are among
the primary beneficiaries, while the United States and Saudi Arabia are the main
country of origin of the funds. The remittance market is dominated by individual large specialized companies, including Western Union, MoneyGram and Vigo. The rest of the market is fragmented formal remittances between commercial banks, post offices, exchange offices, credit unions and money remittance companies positioned in niches.

Sector revenues amounted to an estimated 18 billion dollars in 2003, approximately 320 million transactions. It is difficult to estimate the total number of formal remittances made ​​within one year, as many market participants communicate the value of remittance and not the number of transactions. The profits from the market leaders are themselves much clearer.

 

1. Informal remittances

 

Informal remittances between migrants are largely based on trust and confidence among customers. For example, Sub-Saharan Africa is believed to have the highest share of remittances channeled through informal modes of remittance partly due to high remittance costs. Estimates of informal remittances in Africa are difficult if not impossible because they are largely unrecorded. Sander and Maimbo[37] found that ―fewer than two- thirds  of  all  African  countries,  and  just  one-third  of  Sub-Saharan  countries,  report  official  figures.  The official figures however only include cross-border flows captured by central banks as part of international transactions‖.  A larger share is not captured through informal channels. However, it is well known that these flows are often remitted through informal channels such as friends and family members traveling home, or informal remittance networks. Other methods include the use of taxi services between South Africa and other border towns in Botswana, Malawi, and Mozambique.

By definition, informal remittances are not reported. Experts estimate the total value of remittances sent through informal channels between 40 and 100% of the volume of formal remittances.

Recent studies show that more than half of the remittances from France to Mali are made ​​through informal channels, 85% in the case of Sudan.

These figures show that informal systems compete widely even the largest players in the formal market remittances. Whatever the mechanism is, informal remittances system is usually quick, discreet, and requires minimal paperwork. They are generally less expensive than formal mechanisms subject to regulation and taxation and often available in areas where no formal service exists. For customers who do not have identity documents or residence, the informal system is often a remedy[38].

 

I.A.2. Migration: solution to avoid poverty

 

The hypothesis that migration improves living conditions and wages expected to undertake those he is asked without much qualification or discussion since this is usually the reason cited by the migrants and rationality used by economic theories. However, caution is required when assuming that migration is a strategy out of poverty, and it requires human and social resources which are devoid neediest.

 

I.A.2.1. Evolution of migration

 

International migration is emerging as an essential dimension of contemporary world. Not only is it impossible today to imagine a world without migration, but the migration is rapidly evolving: it globalizes, it continues to increase in volume, it involves migrant profiles increasingly diverse, which is no longer limited to the image of « immigrant worker » of the 1970s, they put on new international actors, migrants, next state and economic markets.

 

• Data

Migration consists in the installation of individuals belonging to the population of a state on the territory of another state. Immigrants are those installed in a so-called “host”, according to the usual terminology, and to distinguish it from the territory in which they originate, it is designated by the term status “departure”. These movements therefore involve crossing one or more borders. They can also operate well within the same continent or continent to another. The international migration may involve more or less effectively, temporary or permanent. The status of migrants varies depending on whether they acquire the nationality of the host state or not. One can understand that this decision depends on several factors: family situation, activity, housing, conditions care, cultural factors, etc. It depends, also on law concerning nationality, which varies from one country to another and is therefore subjected to changes in the policy of “population” installation status. It also involved the relationships established with the people of the host state.

One can easily imagine, in these conditions, the difficulty of official statistics to capture the international population movements, obstacles also state very uneven national statistical systems[39], making use of definitions and different accounting methods, making complex international comparisons. It also happens that the migration is called “irregular”. These factors lead probably to an underestimation of flows and “stocks” of immigrants.

Certainly, the repressive climate around immigrants is not conducive to statistical activity, easily assimilated to police operations. OECD[40]statistics holds a concept of “permanent immigration”, which differs from the UN definition[41]. It is based on the inputs of the population holding a permanent or renewable residence permit, more or less indefinitely. International students, trainees, visitors through an exchange are therefore excluded from these figures. Statistics, permanent entries, according to the OECD, are currently only international statistics for which we endeavored to standardize national data on migration international movements. The OECD considers that despite their limitations, they provide a picture of the relative more realistic scale of migration in OECD countries than the national statistics usually published by the states. We note that the main countries of origin of migrants to the OECD area in 2006 remained almost the same as 2000. Inflows were permanent in 2006, increased about 5%, but down related to year internal frontiers. Geographic proximity continues to be an important determinant in the choice of destination country. But there is a geographical extension of the field of recruitment. We recorded significant increases in the United States, Korea, in the Slovak Republic and Spain but also, especially relative to their populations, Portugal, Sweden, Ireland and Denmark. The decreases were especially prominent in Austria (less than 18%) and Germany (11% reduction flow). Proportion to the total population, in Ireland, New Zealand, Switzerland and the flow of legal immigration have been the highest, followed by Australia and Canada Sweden. We can notice that the enlargement of the EU undeniably influenced the emigration of EU new states. Thus, Poland saw more than 300,000 of its citizens to register as workers in Britain between May 2004 and the end of 2006. During the last decade, countries whose population was accustomed to go abroad, such as Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain became the countries using immigration. These data can be specified for certain countries. Only some were selected based on their significant weight in attracting migrants recruited in the OECD area.

Great country of immigration, Canada has experienced 251,600 foreigners entries in 2006, among which are 33 100 people from China plus, to stick to the most important flows, 30 800 from India, 17,700 from the Philippines, 12,300 from Pakistan, 10,900 from the United States.

It is not surprising, given their relative geographical proximity, the importance of the flow of people of Asian descent entered Japan. In 2006, about 325 600 entries in this country, there are 112 500 people from China, 24,700 of Korea, but 27,000 Brazil 28,300 from the Philippines, 22,200 of United States, 11,400 in Indonesia. Migration to South Asia and the Middle East are a bit peculiar. In this set geopolitics, migration are not new things, but the demand for workforce oil-producing countries in the Middle East, which states the Gulf, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, have little population, especially appealed to countries in South Asia. That is to say that Southeast Asians are very numerous in these countries, and even more since the Gulf War. This movement a considerable extent been trafficked from inter- intermediaries who charge large commissions. Europe also receives more migrants from other continents. Spain receives large contingents from the Latina America, as well as Portugal. This country and Great Britain are appeal to migrants from former colonies, while Germany receives significant flows from Turkey and the countries of Central Europe and the East.

According to the United Nations’ report on the latest trends in international migration, the number of migrants worldwide has more than doubled from 1960 to 2005, from 75 million to almost 191 million in 45 years. However, one should remember that one-fifth of the increase was due to migration from countries breaking up from the USSR in 1991. It is therefore necessary to include the disintegration of states in the analysis of international migration. In 2005, migrants accounted for 3% of the world population. The increase in the number of migrants increased following population, because in 1990 this share was 2.9%. However, between 1960 and 1980 by migrants fell by 2.5% between 1960 and 1970 to 2.2% between 1970 and 1980. The increase in the decade 1980-1990 is mainly due to movements in migration in the former Soviet space. While South-South migration outperformed migration towards developed countries between 1975 and 1995, since this year, migrations to developed countries predominate. The result is that in 1960, 57% migrants residing in countries in the developing world, while in 2005 they represented more than 37%. Among the continents receptors, Europe is the leader with 64 million migrants, followed by Asia (53 million), North America (44 million) and Africa (17 million). On hand in Europe received 9% of the population of migrants, while the figure is 2% for Africa.

 

Figure 1: Trends in global migration and development region 1960-2005

Refugees are an important part of migration with 13.5 million in 2005, especially in certain regions, such as Africa with 18% of the total number of migrants, and Asia (15%). While migration dynamics of twenty-five years has not significantly evolved, it is the migration patterns that have evolved. Thus, Catherine Withol Wenden[42] observed a turning point in the 80s, corresponding to a change in destinations of South-North migration. Whereas before, the migration was determined by linguistic, historical, common colonial past, the last twenty-five years were marked by the globalization of migration, that is to say diversification of destinations and complexity of migration routes. Whereas in 1960 the number of migrants exceeded 500,000 in 30 countries, in 2005 the countries were in number of 64. However, only a small number of countries are hosting most migrants. The United States leads with 15% in 1960 and 20% in 2005. The global average of female migration closely approximates migration whereas it was 47% in 1960. The feminization of flow is mainly emitting regions more than others, such as Southeast Asia or Africa. Cohorts of migrants are divided into one-third of labor migration lumber. According to Saskia Sassen (1991) “The New International Division of Labour (DIT)[43] leads to a profound re-spatial distribution of economic activities across frontiers of the United Nations”. Recent migration movements are characterized by increase of men, young and unskilled. The share of migration pendulum is also increase.

 

Figure 2: The contemporary migration flows

 

 

• The challenge of international migration

The problem of migration has always been placed in the history of mankind. May the humans crossed the land, forests, lakes, oceans and moved to a different location their location of origin. The history of migration is as old as the history of mankind. From Africa to Mesopotamia, the center of Asia to the American territories, all regions of the world keep the traces of major migration flows. The reasons were various: transhumance, climate change trade, economic and political achievements.

In modern times, migration has been associated with the development of globalization economy. Mercantile capitalism was not happy merely to establish counters, but led to the conquest of territory and large population movements. Slavery costs in Africa at least 20 million people who were deported to the Americas to replace the local workforce decimated, but there were also internal displacement in Africa, Central America to Peru, to supply the needs of work in the mines.

This is obviously the development of industrial capitalism that caused major contemporary migration flows. Between 1815 and 1915, 60 million Europeans immigrated to the Americas. Unable to absorb all workers freed by greater agricultural productivity, Europe exported its « surplus population » to what was at that time the periphery: North America, South America, Australia. For some, it was also an opportunity to resolve conflicts of a different order, political or religious. Outside, the same logic had various consequences: settlements in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Algeria, colonial wars in Asia and Africa being the origin of massacres and displacement, forced migration South-South (Asians in plantations in South Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific Tamils ​​to Malaysia and Sri Lanka) and, more recently, migration to the Gulf countries, starting with India, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and the Philippines[44] or to Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, from the Philippines and Thailand.

Currently, even if we talk about it a lot more than before, migration achieved far more the figures for the two previous centuries. In fact, people living in another country than the original represent less than 3% of the world population (International Organization Migration, 2001). In Europe, it is 2.2%, in the U.S. 3%, in Canada 6%[45]. Before we examine the reasons for such a situation, remember the meaning of a number of concepts.

Even if the migration is only in the early 21st century some 150 million people (54 million in Asia, 31.5 in Europe, 30 in North America, 19 in Africa, 9 in Latin America and Oceania 9), over 6 billion people on the planet, however, increased digitally over the previous half century, reaching roughly the double of that of the 1960s[46]. The demographic dimension of the problem we often mentioned as the cause of this acceleration cannot be separated from the new phase of globalization of capital that characterizes the modern era.

It is, in fact, in the 1970s that has defined the neoliberal era economy world with its legal and political, national and international. Washington Consensus settled ten commandments restarting the accumulation of capital, following the Keynesian period of post-war, who had shared the fruits of growth between capital, labor and the state. The aim was to address the decline in productivity gains and to prepare the challenges of new technologies and the concentration of economic power. The Cold War deepened and prelude to the fall of the Berlin Wall. Depletion national development model in the Third World opened the door to international capital. While the new project would not he create the migration phenomenon, or even accelerate considerably, but it would give it a new meaning. Indeed, the new doctrine of trade liberalization, supposed to solve the problems of humanity, applied to capital and goods and services, but not labor. While it is known that the implementation of both first elements was, in fact, highly dependent on the particular interests of the economies concerned and therefore unevenly performed, it is important to emphasize the theoretical contradiction of doctrine and inconsistency of its international applications. Genuine liberalization should, in fact, wear all the elements of the production.

Two causes were originally distorted, on the one hand the lack of consideration of market as a social relation and therefore relations power and on the other hand, the complete subjection of human beings to the law of value. The first led to further the interests of the fittest, this that increased social distance between regions and between social groups, and echoed the migratory pressure. As to the second, it subjected the population movements to gain production of capital, which explains, on the one hand, the type of tenders’ labor market, and on the other hand, the barriers placed at the free movement of workers when they become useless[47].

It is therefore a logic that is implemented, corresponding to a very specific perspective, which favors a capitalist economic development and exerts its effects both on the job formal or employee and areas of the world where the majority of people are not in this report. Indeed, the two major sources of capital accumulation on the one hand are the gains on work product and other rents or extraction of wealth through financial mechanisms and legal. Both directly affect the migration problem with new effects in the context of neoliberalism.

 

I.A.2.2. Migration and development: researches

 

Social scientists have always considered the relationship between migration and development as their concern. In 2006, the United Nations’ High-Level dialogue on Migration and Development raised the conceptual and policy concerns about the relationship to a new order of importance. Despite the fact that a convergence was reached in the identification of the positive impacts of migration and in recognizing the difficulties to implementing the full developmental potential of migration (primarily the high transaction costs of remittances), the UN Dialogue did not lead immediately to any practical, cooperative resolutions[48]

Since 2006, the relationship between migration and development arises analytical interest within a pursuit of policy guidelines and further understanding of the social impact of migration. The relationship has become valued at the international policy analysis and advocacy level for its all-round advantages which is sometimes showed in ‘win-win’ or even “win-win-win” terms. The point of view around the relationship between migration and development has been strengthened by the United Nations[49] in the international policy arena by focusing the attention towards other subjects to the State’s responsibilities especially when it comes to the basic rights of the migrants[50].

The impact of the migration’s standard indicators of nowadays is presented as the costs and benefits for migrants and the countries between which they migrate meeting diverse opportunities and impulses[51]. Comparing and calculating these costs and benefits is somehow difficult as there is a deepening consensus among academic and policy analysts that the balance is encouraging and that international migration really or possibly has prodigiously positive developmental consequences. It’s is sure that a voluntary labor migration between countries may be considered as positive if it contributes to a more productive labor global division and the remittance of abilities, finances and welfare. The relationship between migration and development is rarely as direct and the association between the two at the local level is neither unavoidably nor, in case it exists, totally positive. Whereas the progress of the global division of labor may be admitted as development in the broadest sense[52], international labour migration is among the secondary methods involving contradictions and adaptations reflecting and resulting in rough development. The specific form of migration in question hugely determines the developmental forecasts of migration. Great studies on the influence of globalization theorized along similar lines to development discovered that outcome depends on each given context. Globalization “creates winners and losers both between and within countries. Specific research is needed to identify who are most likely to be negatively affected by changes in integration with the global economy”[53].

The state executes a vital institutional part in the rough process of global development where the winners and losers the Global South constantly seek for opportunity and competitive advantage. Many former colonies where witnessing the displacement of their ancient direct ties with seats of empire by more complex relationships within the global division of labor whereas huge international power discrepancies remain, when they are more dependent upon keeping positions as manufacturers within global value chains. The state in the Global South has, as a substitute of having declined significance in the era of globalization, a lingering determination mainly when it comes to developmental responsibilities matter.

The state in the Global South is facing up a specific challenge in managing the labor migration, in supervising the search for optimal developmental results and trying to avoid the birth of losers. The international nature of labor migration between countries requires more than national answers only whereas the developmental results of migration depending on the context binds policy-makers to adapt policies consequently. Portes is more about a complete analysis of the migration-development relationship[54] while analysts tend to focus on receiving countries. By his own analysis, he has identified cyclical migration as the developmentally optimal form of migration for both source and receiving countries.

Migrant workers are extensively at labor-intensive points in certain global value chains. The Global South shelters the chains that include labor-intensive plants having output that are mainly used in the Global North; those chains have the tendency to show high competition over labor costs that doesn’t protect the plants and the workers. This case is seen in the global clothing chain with its highly volatile production conditions. Companies working in the clothing field and taking part in such global chains in the Global South are undergoing pressure to  lower wages or to upgrade products and/or the productivity of labor. There is no guarantee for national or local labor markets to predict the upgrading of labor productivity and that especially constrains manufacturers in small countries of the Global South.

In the meantime, the potential product progression may be confined by conditions of increasing competition, static demand and declining opportunities[55], sub-contracting, however, comfort some, like the case studies in Turkey and India showing the way manufacturers

In the meantime, product upgrading possibilities may be circumscribed by conditions of increasing competition, stagnating demand and shrinking opportunities sub-contracting offers relief to some, with case studies in Turkey and India revealing how manufacturers “seek to outsource their own insecurity in global production networks” through local subcontracting[56].

Employing international migrants is a perfect alternative and either they permit the decline of labor costs or they keep it constant, or increase the output. Perhaps the economic rationale underlying international labor migration is obvious but there are hidden diverse and contradictory meanings under the process. The institutions of workers’ representation exists but rarely works, they neglect the rights and labor standards of the workers proved by the conditions of work and accommodation, wages and a range of restrictions the international migrants suffered in most global clothing chain plants.

 

• Migration, remittances and development

The degree to which migration and remittances is resulting to constant human development and economic growth in the areas and countries which send migrants concerns another matter even if a small number of researchers would reject the direct contribution of migration and remittances to the livings and survival of families left behind. This question arisen animated debate over the past four decades and happened during four periods in the post–Second World War thinking on migration and development. “Developmentalist” optimism ruled in the 1950s and 1960s whereas large-scale pessimism dominated in the 1970s and 1980s. The appearance of more nuanced opinions in the 1990s and the existing reawakening of remittances and the related resurrection of optimism on migration and development in recent years brought about its change.

The assertion that poor countries would be able to progress and modernize economically rapidly through a policy of large-scale capital remittances and industrialization was widely assumed in the developmentalist era of the 1950s and 1960s. In the same period, huge labor migration from developing to developed countries increased. Several developing countries including the source countries of “guest workers” in the Mediterranean practiced the migration process within the outlooks of the “dawning of a new era”[57]. Since governments of developing countries considered emigration as one of the main tools to promote national development, they vigorously began to encourage it. Developmentalist “migration optimists” considered that migration is a way to a North-South remittance of investment capital and hurries the traditional communities to introduce liberal, rational and democratic ideas, modern knowledge and education. Migrants, when returning to their origin countries, are then seen as significant agents of change, innovators and investors. Their return is generally considered as a great help for the developing countries in their economic take-off because of the flow of remittances and the experience, skills and knowledge they acquired.

On their coming back, migrants were predicted to make investments in enterprises in the country of origin. What is interesting is that the optimistic view has lately knew a renaissance despite the fact that it is associated to the development policy (neo)liberal visions than the state-centrist in the 1950s and 1960s. Migration was also seen positively by neoclassical economists. Nevertheless, it was underlined that the neoclassical migration theory is against remittances (Taylor, 1999). For neoclassical supporters of the theoretical model of balanced growth, migration took part to the best provision of production factors for the benefit of all, and this process of factor price equalization can result in the end of migration when wage levels the same for both developing and developed countries. The re-distribution of labor from rural, agricultural areas to urban industrial sectors is then a vital qualification for economic growth and therefore a whole element of the entire development process[58]. It is expected that the free movement of labor in an environment of unconstrained market will eventually result in the increase of labor shortage and thus will result in a higher marginal productivity of labor and growing wage levels in societies that send migrants. Capital flows is predicted to take the opposite direction as labor migration. The process of factor price equalization is the one through which the developmental role of migration is wholly implemented in a purely neoclassical world. This neoclassical view of migration and development dominated the financial institutions until recently. The “Policies toward migration” section of the Globalization, Growth, and Poverty report of the World Bank[59] can be quoted as an instance, seeing the benefits of migration for receiving countries only in terms of factor price equalization without even mentioning remittances. Contrary to Ratha’s (2003) chapter entitled “Workers’ remittances: An important and stable source of external development finance” in the World Bank’s Global Development Finance only one year later, causing a rapid  revival of the remittances concern.

The 1973 oil crisis not only heralded a period of worldwide economic downturn, industrial restructuring and increasing unemployment but was also thought as the end of international migration age, coinciding nearly with a turning point in thinking on migration and development. Optimistic views on migration and development in sending areas were facing up challenges due to the combined influence of a paradigm shift in social sciences toward (historical) structuralist views and an increasing number of empirical studies that often did not support optimistic views on migration and development as of the late 1960s. Migration was considered to sustain or even reinforce issues of underdevelopment according to several academic studies. The “migration pessimists” assert that migration causes the withdrawal of human capital and the breakdown of traditional, stable village communities and their economies. This fact would result in the growth of passive, non-productive and remittance-dependent communities. The “brain drain” (Adams, 1969), a “brawn drain”[60], the massive departure of young, able-bodied men and women from rural areas (Lewis 1986)—is moreover pointed out for triggering a serious lack of agricultural and other labor that deprives areas of their most respected work force.

Migration and remittances were in addition said to increase inequality in communities of origin[61] as the poorest are not generally the ones who migrate the most. Migration pessimists have also asserted that remittances were not really used in investment but on conspicuous consumption and “consumptive” expenses such as houses. Skepticism about the use of migrant remittances for productive investments has become the core of the migration and development debate. Moreover, weakening local economies and increasing dependency, increased consumption and land purchases by migrants were also said to bring about inflationary pressures[62] and soaring land prices[63].

In a sociocultural view, the consequences of migration and remittances are perceived as harmful. There was a risk of change in rural tastes if exposed to the migrants’ wealth (Lipton 1980) that would cause the increase of importation of urban or foreign goods or foods, which would further reinforce the cycle of increasing dependency.

Migration is often the main responsible for the community solidarity loss and is said to undermine the social integrity of migrant-sending communities[64]. The main “positive” outcome of migration which is the increase in family welfare for migrants and their families was reflected as artificial and dangerous as remittances are considered to be ephemeral.

South-North migration was then, from this view, discouraging instead of encouraging the autonomous economic growth of migrant-sending countries[65]. This kind of view follows the historical-structuralist paradigm on development identifying migration as one of the several expressions of the growing dependency of the developing world on the global political-economic systems controlled by the powerful (Western) states. Migration, as a natural consequence of capitalist penetration, was perceived as the destroyer of traditional peasant societies by declining their economies and displacing their populations[66].  The capitalist penetration and its related phenomena like migration are particularly viewed by the dependency school of development thinking as not only harmful to the economies of underdeveloped countries, but also as the actual causes of the “development of underdevelopment”[67]. In a process known as cumulative causation (Myrdal 1957), the growth in richness in the economic core areas of the Western world was casually related to the demand of capital and labor from peripheral areas.

The neoclassical and developmentalist approaches were turned upside down by these approaches in which it is asserted that migration did not decrease, but instead reinforced spatial and interpersonal disparities in development. In neo-Marxism, migration and remittances are the reproduction and reinforcement of the capitalist system based on inequality. Those pessimistic views remained predominant in some current studies though they have been gradually disputed in recent years. Along with dependency and structuralist perspectives which points out that migration can worsen international inequalities and can lead to a concentration of qualified human resources in a few recipient countries, new research based on endogenous growth theories with increasing returns also foresees this result (Solimano forthcoming).

 

• Current Insights into Remittance Impacts: The protective dimension of remittances

• Micro impacts

Along with NELM and livelihood approaches, the view that labor migration is a livelihood strategy pursued by social groups rather than a response to destitution or absolute poverty livelihood strategy pursued by social groups (typically households) in reaction to relative deprivation[68] in order to spread livelihood risks, secure and increase income and acquire investment capital is supported by most recent empirical research. Such household strategies have remittances as central elements to go beyond local development constraints. Though structuralist and dependency views in pointing to human agency seem to be contradicted by this, it critically depends on the specific circumstances under which such migration happens that households succeed in achieving these goals.

These circumstances determine, after all, the destination, selectivity and the returns to migration. To illustrate, recent studies conducted in Burkina Faso[69] and Morocco (de Haas, 2006) show that internal and international migration within the African continent must primarily be considered as a way to improve livelihood security by means of income diversification as the welfare gains are relatively slight. The migration in Europe is the one that allows accumulating more wealth in both countries. This then make intracontinental migration difficult to explain from a neoclassical viewpoint and, instead, appears to validate the argument of risk-spreading asserted by NELM and livelihood approaches, added to this some extensive literature on motivations to remit. The literature generally makes out two major motives for remitting money: altruism and self-interest to protect inheritance and to invest in home assets in the expectation of a return. Outcomes from empirical studies tend to be contradictory as some militate for altruism and others for self-interest (Agunias, 2006). Nevertheless, Lucas and Stark (1985) found that both altruism and self-interest are often complex and in the end, it cannot be probed if the true motive is one of caring or more selfishly wishing to enhance prestige by being perceived as caring. Consequently, they ended up claiming that instead of opposing these two motivations, a far richer model of “tempered altruism or enlightened self-interest in which remittances are one element in a self-enforcing arrangement between migrant and home” could be developed (Lucas and Stark, 1985).

In this case, remittances can be at the same time a return to household investments in migration, a part of a household risk diversification strategy (co-insurance through risk spreading, securing inheritance claims) and a source of investment capital that can be used for entrepreneurial activities, education or to facilitate the migration of other household members.

It is discovered in several studies that economic and currency crises in origin countries tend to intensify remittances[70]. The hypothesis of risk-spreading and co-insurance are further validated by such evidence. When making some analysis with households in the North-West Frontier Province in rural Pakistan, it was noticed that households that do not regularly receive remittances[71] are unable to handle with the negative income shocks. Another study has been carried out about Turkish remittances and found that consumption smoothing constitutes a significant motive for sending remittances to Turkey[72]. Lindley[73] also discovered that migrants in Hargeisa, Somalia, help financially their relatives in crisis by sending remittances from abroad and thus are considered to be safe from exchange-rate fluctuations. The NELM hypothesis about the remittances acting as income insurance and people’s protection from income shocks caused by economic downturns, political conflicts or climatic vagaries is again evidenced. Empirical studies added to this evidence, the positive contribution of international remittances to household welfare, nutrition, food, health and living conditions in areas of origin.

 

• Macro impacts

Remittances constitute an increasingly important and relatively stable source of external finance on the national level and that holds a critical social insurance role in countries afflicted by economic and political crises (Kapur 2003). Remittances are more stable and less pro- cyclical, this fact makes them a more reliable source of foreign currency than other capital flows to developing countries, if one just quotes foreign direct investment and development assistance provided to low-income countries and that they consist of the second largest source of external funding for developing countries after foreign direct investment[74]. The real significance of remittances is higher than that shown by official figures as most of them are sent through informal channels. The official economic figures in countries like Fiji, Somalia and Surinam differs from the real ones that are much better thanks to highly developed informal remittance systems[75]. To illustrate this, the remittances in Somalia have been far more important for livelihood and survival than development and humanitarian aid put together[76]. Remittances mostly help covering trade deficits in developing countries and they also improve creditworthiness for external borrowing for a country in addition to expanding access to capital and lower borrowing costs (World Bank, 2006). This proof still validates developmentalist and neodevelopmentalist views on remittances.

 

• Time dimensions: remittances are an untrustworthy source of finance

At some points, dependency and structuralist consider remittances as a source of external revenue for families, communities and states since there is the possibility of decline with the settlement or return of migrants, remittances are also seldom used in a productive way and are thus considered to create an artificial and temporary improvement in livelihoods and establish a dangerous dependency on external revenues[77]. After the migrants’ settlement and integration at the destination[78], bonds to the sending country would deteriorate and remittances would decline rapidly. This hypothesis of remittance decline is connected to the common notion that young, married, lows killed and temporary male migrants remit the most and that integrated, highly educated, well-paid migrants invest more in host countries[79]. Migration policy debates already take this remittance decline for granted. The fact that temporary migrants would remit more money and are considered to be more beneficial to the development of origin countries encourages requests for temporary migration programs. Hypothetically speaking, remittances are sent to pay back migration debts or for altruistic reasons, and this fact is considered to be the basement of the remittance decline assumption. The assimilationist model of immigrant integration assuming gradual weakening of transnational ties over time also constitutes its basement. But it seems to be against NELM and other household approaches considering migration and remittances as strategies of co-insurance and investment capital generating for households and families. It also fights the concepts on migrant transnationalism criticizing traditional assimilationist models having the evidence that social ties with origin societies can be sustained and renewed over many generations as basement. Nevertheless, future remittances are difficult to predict according to Stark (1991) as migrants are part of larger social units including families and households, it then depends on contractual arrangements and bargaining power within the family to incline towards remittance. Consequently, there is no certitude that remittances would rapidly drop down over time. According to Poirine (2006), even altruistically, there is no necessary tendency for remittance effort to rise or fall over time. Hypothesis-testing empirical research concerning remittance decline is rare and contradictory while some studies show declining remittances over time[80], others find it stable and even increasing. The integration of such apparently contradictory discoveries is possible so far by perceiving a more dynamic model where the relationship between the duration of stay, social and economic integration and remittances is not linear. Migrants’ capability to remit is positively influenced by the integration indicators like employment and income. This result might partly or entirely counterbalance the consequence of remittance-decreasing of the waning of ties with home countries over time. Such ties can often continue over very long periods and thus the waning of transnational ties over time cannot be taken for granted. This proof sets doubts on the assumption that temporary migrants would be better and more reliable remitters than integrated and settled migrants. de Haas and Plug [81] found that the stagnation or decay of bilateral per (migrant) capita remittance flows from destination countries to Morocco started only after two decades beginning from large-scale migration. Some surveys about migrant remittances show that those sent by individuals is likely to reach a peak approximately 15–20 years after migration[82] and other evidence demonstrate that remittances increase with wages, though apparently only up to a certain point[83]. A survey carried out in Egypt, Morocco and Turkey concluded that employed migrants remit four times more money than unemployed migrants[84]. Therefore, all that seems to match macroevidence that most of the variations in remittance flows are explained by the level and cyclical fluctuations in economic activities in destination countries. Decays in remittances often occur in a much more delayed fashion, and are less steep because of sustained migration and the often higher than previously expected durability of transnational bonds. No clear support for remittance decline as an automatic mechanism exists though proof is still imperfect and dispersed. Remittances will remain more stable and sustainable source of income than more volatile sources of foreign exchange for states even decays may happen some decades after the end of migration, they keep people safe from undermining consequences of absent or ill-functioning.

 

• Remittances and poverty

As remittances contribute significantly to welfare, they are said to be a safety net for relatively poor areas[85]. This “private” foreign help goes directly to those who really need it and it does not necessarily need some government fees on sending “far less of it is likely to be siphoned off into the pockets of corrupt government officials” (Kapur, 2003). Jones asserted the point that perhaps no other more “bottom-up” way of redistributing and enhancing welfare exists in developing countries. This logic contains surely an element of truth and at the same time a clear hazard of limitless optimism about the fact that remittances can reduce poverty and inequality. There is first an inclination to overvalue the migration and remittances degree. The point is international migrants are only nearly 3 per cent of the world’s population and remittances were only 1.3 per cent of total gross domestic product (GDP) of all developing countries in 2001 (Ratha, 2003). From those figures, one can argue that only remittances can create take-off development into a more accurate outlook.

Secondly, there is no guarantee that even remittances take an important part in the income stability and welfare in developing countries, that does not obviously imply that they will mitigate poverty, a topic in connection to the  migration selectivity. It is not commonly the poorest that practice migration and certainly not internationally as there are costs and risks that must be taken into account. The selective character of migration leads to the selectivity of remittances and thus excludes the poorest members of communities[86] and the poorest countries (Kapur, 2003). Lower or middle-income countries are those that benefit from remittances and receive about half of all remittances worldwide[87]. The shares of remittances to GDP are in some way high in typical emigration countries such as Mexico, Morocco or the Philippines and even higher in some small countries, especially island economies in the Caribbean, the Pacific or the Atlantic (for example, Cape Verde) (Kapur, 2003). Even though middle-income countries get most remittances, they are more significant to small and sometimes very poor countries like Haiti, Lesotho, Moldova and Tonga in relative terms which usually get over 10 per cent of their GDP in remittances (World Bank, 2006). Despite the fact that most international remittances do not go directly to the poorest people, remittances often constitutes a significant share of the income of poor people and poor communities. In addition, non-migrant poor might be positively or negatively indirectly touched through the economy-wide consequences of remittance expense on wages, prices and employment in migrant sending communities. It is also important to be aware that the precise patterns of migrant selectivity basically have consequences on poverty impacts. The selectivity occurs mainly in high-skilled or international migration than in low-skilled or internal migration, and migration under restrictive immigration regimes is more selective than migration under liberal immigration systems. As an example, migrant workers Northern and Western European countries in the Mediterranean recruited in the 1950s and 1960s were mostly low skilled and relatively poor (de Haas, 2003) the same as the poor Egyptian peasants allowed to migrate in Gulf countries. Most studies agreed to suggest that international remittances have helped reducing poverty either directly or indirectly, the same as the analysis of a data set covering 71 developing countries in which Adam and Page[88] settled that  international migration and remittances contributes meaningfully to reducing the level, depth and severity of poverty in the developing countries, suggesting that overage, and after controlling for the possible endogeneity of international remittances, a 10 percent increase in per capita international remittances leads to a 3.5 per cent decline in the share of people living on less than $1.00 per person per day. Teto[89] asserted that if there were no international remittances in Morocco, 1.17 million out of 30 million of the population would live in absolute poverty and the proportion living below the poverty line would increase from 19.0 to 23per cent.

Another survey data in Egypt and Ghana reached the same result asserting migration is a way to move people out of poverty. Yet, it was discovered that the major factor of all group’s current poverty status was their former poverty condition stressing the existence of poverty traps[90]. The internal migration of poor people implies positive role in income redistribution that should not be overlooked[91]. During a separate study carried out in Guatemala made by Adams (2004), he stated that the poverty-reducing consequence of internal and international remittances was huge relating to the harshness of poverty and this is measured according to the squared poverty gap considering number, distance and distribution of poor households under the poverty line as households belonging to the other group receive a large share between 50 and 60 per cent of their total household income from internal remittances. Discovered from an analysis of Chinese household data, an internal migrant in a household rises its income per capita by 8.5–13.1 per cent but the general effect on poverty is negligible as most poor people do not migrate, not even internally[92].

 

I.A.3. Determinants of remittances sent by working migrants

 

Though interest increases in workers’ remittances not really important work have been accomplished to develop the consideration of the macroeconomic factors of remittance flows and this is caused by the shortage and inexactness of data. Instead, IMF balance of payments data were used by researchers to study macroeconomic factors but these data presents some deficiencies mainly the great aggregation level and measurement matters.

Altruistic and self-interest motives push people to send remittances and researchers put the understanding of these motives on their agenda for at least three decades, Rapoport and Docquier[93] deliver a brilliant outline of theoretical representations. Motivation for remitting[94] is explained by the awareness that one must take care of the family consumption; this is the concept of altruism. On the other hand, there would be evolution in self-interest motives for remitting to the extent that the family is considered as a market where members aim to introduce for mutually profitable agreements. There are theories having macroeconomic implications that are dedicated particularly to aspects of inheritance, loan repayment, insurance and exchange. Stark[95] and Lucas and Stark[96] consider remittances as the effect of intergenerational agreement between migrants and their parents in the home country. Contrary to the altruistic motive, a competition for inheritance pushes migrants to send remittances as it will increase the family’s income and wealth. Other papers[97] underlined the fact that remittances are reimbursements of what the family paid out in migration. This demonstrates a U-shaped relation between the family’s pre- remittance income and remittances as poor families, contrary to the rich ones, cannot afford sending a family member abroad because of the migration coast.

Thirdly, migration is a phenomenon considered to be a way of decreasing risk by diversifying the sources of a family’s income and where remittances account as a protection against possible income shocks that might reach the recipients in the home country[98]. In a macroeconomic view, remittances will grow if the productivity is more instable in the recipient country.

Lastly, remittances may be considered as an exchange outline to the extent that they represent a payment by the migrant in compensation of family members taking care of their relatives or property[99]. The more the family’s marginal utility decreases in income, the more remittances are required to guarantee the provision of services at home. In addition, the amount of remittances increases in such case where there was a higher pre- remittance income of the family and lower unemployment at home. The empirical literature has largely focused on the microeconomic level using survey data; an overview is given in Buch and Kuckulenz[100]. Another element of literature, reviewed by Aydas, Neyapti, and Metin-Ozcan (2004)[101], studied the macroeconomic factors of remittances underlining the level of economic activity in the host and the home countries, the wage rate, inflation, interest rate differentials, or the efficiency of the banking system[102]. Wahba[103] proposes that the flow of remittances is considerably influenced by the political stability and consistency in government policies and financial intermediation. In studying a sample of five Mediterranean countries, Faini[104] discovered that the real exchange rate is also a meaningful factor of remittances. The number of migrant workers and their earnings in the host country is a positive and important factor on the flow of remittances[105]. Moreover, remittances are reduced by demographic determinants like the share of female employment or a high age-dependency ratio in the host country, however, illiteracy rates influence them in a positive extent. Aydas, Neyapti and Metin-Ozcan suggest that black market premium, interest rate differential, inflation rate, growth, home and host country incomes and periods of military regime have meaningfully influenced Turkish remittance flows. Chami, Fullenkamp and Jahjah see an important negative relation between the income gap of the recipient country against the US and worker remittances in percent of GDP.

Yet, there are mixed evidences on most macroeconomic factors mostly the inconclusive influence of the interest rate differential, the black market premium, domestic income and inflation.

Buch and Kuckulenz also discovered that economic growth and the level of economic development do not clearly influence the amount of remittances a country gets. The high thresholds for recording of remittances in the euro area, registered beyond a level of EUR 12,500 per remittance is also one of the reason of the data gathering complexity, this takes too much time to explain the reason of the euro area being a net receiver of remittances. Then, thirdly, the official statistics do not capture articles like goods imported by returning migrants or in-kind remittances that also account as remittance flows.

The level of flow remittances from a migrant depends on both its opportunities, that is to say, income and savings that part of the income, and its motivation to repatriate their savings in their country of origin. Of course, the desire to make these remittances depends on the duration of migration, family situation of migrants, and information on the growing importance of network effects[106]. One method to study the determinants of remittance flows is to analyze the reasons that animate when migrants send money. The literature, on the issue, distinguishes between pure altruism, simple interest, arrangements implied with the family in the home country, and portfolio management decisions.

As noted by Stark[107], there is no general theory of funds remitting. Works that analyze this phenomenon provide valuable descriptive and empirical research results data but they just explain that partially and have a number of limitations in geographical, sociocultural and temporal matters.

 

• Pure altruism

One of the most intuitive motivations for sending money to the country of origin is that the literature on the topic describes “altruism”, which means the concern of migrants’ welfare of their families back home. According to the altruistic model, emigrant derives satisfaction in the idea of ​​the welfare of his parents. This model is based on several assumptions:

• First, the amount of remittances is expected to increase at the same time as the income of the migrant.
• Second, this amount should decrease, as the family’s income increases.
• And thirdly, the amount should decrease over time, as family ties are distended.

It should be the same applies when the emigrant settled permanently in the host country and those members of his family join him. In recent studies on immigrants in the United States, it was also observed that the existence of remittances is inspired by altruistic motives. The probability to make remittance to households with children is lowered by about 25% to see that households without children make such remittances. In addition, immigrant’s minors whose parents remained in the country have more than 50% chance of funds remittance in this country[108].

The sense of altruism that migrants can feel for the family or relatives he left behind, cannot alone explain remittances. Other motivations, from individual or family arrangements, shipments can determine: inheritance, debt repayment to the family, exchange services, insurance or investment[109].

On altruistic behavior, the migrant exploit the usefulness of integrating of his family to his own use. Fund remittances plays a compensatory role. There are several degrees of altruism but also other forms of reasons that Lucas and Stark[110] have described as “altruism temperate”, which can replace or coexist with altruism. For example, remittances can be associated with a pattern of trade in services.

The repayment of a debt to the family, not contracted or under an arrangement can be considered as a special case of trade in services in the context of credit markets imperfect, and as part of a model comprising a social and intergenerational.

The emigration of a family member so that it, in turn, sends money is arranged in a family setting. This type of remittance is further offset a decline accidental family income as insurance. This pattern is even more common than family income is volatile and sensitive to shocks, such as income agriculture closely related to climatic conditions.

Remittances may also result from strategic behavior developed by the migrant and / or his family, or informal intrafamily contracts. Thus, the existence an inheritance would strengthen the links between the family and the migrant, and maintain remittances over the long term. For the migrant, it is to ensure, through its remittances, it will receive better a share of the inheritance from his parents when the time comes.

Overall, the empirical literature favors a combination of motivations. The reasons of pure altruism are rarely present alone and combined with interest according logical individual and / or as part of family arrangement. Most empirical studies measure the pattern of altruism by observing the effect of higher income families and the beneficiaries of higher income migrants on likelihood or the amount of remittances.

A positive relationship between income and migrant remittances is a recurring result of these works[111]. But other elements contradict the thesis simply because of altruism. Thus, the fact that there are more migrants in the same family should be allowed to share the amount shipments[112]. On the other hand, altruistic migrants should send higher amounts to families or families in need. But this link is not checked very often.

From a theoretical point of view, the extension of the duration of stay in the host country and reducing the frequency of visits to the country of origin are often associated with erosion family ties and reducing the degree of altruism and shipments. But most empirical studies do not confirm this negative relationship between length of stay migrant and shipments. The hypothesis is that the duration of immigration should be linked to the context of departure, which means dates and place of departure from the country of origin that do not distinguish between different identified studies.

 

• Simple interest

Remitting funds to family members in their country of origin can have another reason, namely the personal interest of the emigrant:

• First, a migrant send money to his family’s legacy in mind, as long as the legs are subordinate behavior heirs.
• Second, the fact of owning property in their country of origin may induce migrants to send money to parents who remained to ensure that they properly handle these assets.

Data from Kenya and Botswana show that parents receiving are much richer than the share of wages remitted by the emigrant is important[113]. However, we cannot know with certainty if the reason is the prospect of the inheritance or the desire to see parents take care property belonging to the migrant. Data from a survey of migrants from Tonga and Western Samoa installed in Sydney show that migrants are urged to remit funds for the sake of their own interest, in particular because they strive to accumulate wealth and invest in their region of origin[114].

• Third, the intention to return to his country may also push the migrated remit funds to invest in real estate, financial assets, in public goods (thereby enhancing its prestige and political influence in the community), and / or social capital (relationships with family and friends by example).

Observational data on the migration of the Greeks shows that, for each migrant, the amount of remittances from Germany is higher (for those who feed the illusion of return) who is sent to Australia or the United States (which is explained by the “finalization syndrome”[115]. In the United States, immigrants have the same behavior remittances. For each 1% increase in the length of stay in these countries, the probability of remittances decreases of 2% and is even lower in half immigrants that are interested in political circles in the United States. Host countries mainly permanent immigrants, Canada knows similar situation: the immigrant households spend only a modest part of their budget to fund remittances. On average, they do not affect only 2-6% of their total expenditure.

 

• Family arrangements implied: co-insurance and loan

Arrangements made by households, particularly within the extended family, can be considered more complex in reality, and certainly more balanced than in the case of two extremes, pure altruism and simple interest staff. Thus Lukas and Stark explain the motivations to remit funds using a more eclectic model called “altruism tempered” or “enlightened self-interest”.  In this model, the decision to remit is part of a family; these remittances constitute an aspect endogenous migration process. If one considers the household as a whole, the designation of certain of its members as migrants may be a strategy Pareto-superior and remittances should be the device redistribution of gains. Two main sources of potential gains are taken into account: dilution risk and investment in the education of young members of the family. In this context, the arrangement within the same family is considered “convention of implicit co-insurance” or as an “implicit family loan agreement”. This tacit contract between the migrant and his family is protected from breakdown by assets that are characteristic of families, namely credit and loyalty, but also by purely personal reasons of migrant, namely the idea of ​​inheriting investment in his hometown in property that his family take care and intend to return to his country with dignity. In the model of implicit co-insurance, it is assumed that, initially, the migrant plays the role of an insured person and the family remained in the country of the insurer. Family finance the initial cost of the migration project, which in most cases is a take all expenditures supported. This large margin uncertainty related to the realization of the intention to migrate can be minimized with the financial support of family members. In a second phase of migration process, the migrant itself can also act as an insurer for the family members back home. It is assumed that this is possible if the migrant already has a secure job, receives a wage sufficiently high and is increasing its income. Receiving the remitted money, the family has the possibility to improve its consumer to engage in investment projects involving larger risks, and thus get much more useful. Data collected in Botswana show these are the families with the maximum cattle that receive more remittance funds in times of drought.

According to the theory, the model is based on the loan agreement in the form of “Three waves”:

• As a first step, we assume that remittances constitute a loan contracted informally and implicit for the migrant to invest in training, and reimbursement for expenses incurred emigration.
• In a second phase, migrants are lending to the youngest of their families to finance their studies until they themselves are ready to migrate. During this phase, the amount remitted should decrease overall value because those migrants are not all supposed to grant a loan to members of their family.
• During the third phase, migrants invest the capital they have accumulated in their country before returning, and therefore the amount of their remittance increases. Subsequently, the next generation of emigrants repays the loan granted by the former emigrants becoming creditors who may have retired to their country native. Given the nature of the “ready”, there is no question that the amount of remittance decreases over time – as would be the co-insurance or theory altruism – and is no longer used for consumption.

 

• Savings target of migrant

Another method of modeling the decision to remit funds is in the hypothesis that the migrant’s objective is to return to his country after a certain amount saved will be called its “savings goal”. Remittance flows made during the stay of migrants abroad therefore a result process of “negotiation” between him and his family. In this operation, the claims of family back home on the migrant’s income are considered side « Demand » while the ability of migrants to remit their income or savings made from such income corresponds to the “supply side”. The migrant has an interest in achieve its goal of saving and minimize the drain on his income

Therefore, it must constantly revise its income expectations and unravel a bundle of interrelated factors including the duration of his stay, the intensity of work and the flow of remittances to his family for the consumption of it. On the other hand, we consider that the family intended to have an income (remittances included) than neighbors to justify its decision to send some of his members abroad. The amount depends on income remittances from migrated from per capita income in the country of origin and the bargaining power of the two parties. In a recent paper, Lucas[116] gives a summary of responses to the question whether the migration to a permanent establishment in the host country resulting in the remittance of an amount lower than in the case of a migration temporary. Temporary migrants may have more incentive to send money to relatives back home those permanent migrants. Moreover, more migrants stay long outside their country, with more links the economy of this country and less distended remittances are high[117]. On the other hand, the more they stay long in their country home, the more they are paid. Lucas concluded that the amount of remittances increases probably at first and then decreases as the stay is prolonged, it which leads to finding an optimal length of stay to maximize remittances flow, in an equation that compensates the weakening links by increased ability to earn money.

 

• Portfolio management decisions

Most of the current literature dealing with determinants of remittances focuses on the reasons animating individuals and not on variables macro. Certainly, the overall flow of remittances reflects the considerations underlying microeconomic mentioned above, which determine decisions individual remittances. Nevertheless, it is legitimate to assume that some number of macroeconomic factors involved in the country of origin and in the host country, and that these factors are likely to affect the remittance flow significantly. Saving a migrant has accumulated and which he does not need to personal use or that of his family can be remitted because his investment is relatively cost-effective in a country like the other. The remittance falls within a range of portfolio management. Unlike remittances for consumption, remittances of this type of savings are an exogenous phenomenon of migration and are assumed depending on macroeconomic factors on specific host country and country of origin, as interest rates, exchange rates, inflation and rates of return various financial and physical assets.

With these assumptions, the migrants’ countries of origin’ governments have implemented incentive plans, including preferential exchange rates, accounts currency deposits offering higher returns, etc., to attract remittances from their national expatriates. But contrary to what one might think, the empirical analysis showed that these incentives have not been very successful. According to some researchers, microeconomic factors play a more important in determining remittance flows over the long term while considerations portfolios are expected to have only a short-term, creating some fluctuations over the long-term trend. In addition, the situation macroeconomic, mainly in the countries of origin, might be affected substantially on the choice of the circuit which channeled the funds remitted. This aspect can take decisive importance with regard to the amount of remittances registered officially. It was found that inflation in the country of departure could have an adverse impact on remittances, reflecting perhaps uncertainty of emigrants who operate[118]. Thus remittances have been decreased as the economy plunged into crisis in 1999 and 2000[119]. Note that many assumptions by which we try to explain the decision to emigrate, and to repatriate funds are not mutually exclusive. In fact, it remits may be determined by all these reasons the same time, each explaining a part of the amount remitted or the period of execution of the operation. One these aspects may take precedence over the other for a certain period or for a sample of migrant workers and their roles can be interchanged thereafter. This implies that the phenomenon of fund remittance and its determinants are complex issues, and explains the challenges of developing a universal theory[120].

 

I.A.4. Effects of remittances

The impact of remittances on economic development of countries of origin is debated in the literature on international migration Deep disagreements have arisen on the effects of international migration, including migrant remittances on the economy. This is a subject very hotly debated. The extent of the controversy and its intensity are perfectly illustrated[121]: “Everyone agrees that migrants seeking to improve their economic condition individually and / or social. Similarly, many developing countries accept without further argument that the emigration of their citizens promotes national economic development at least three ways: it is a source of foreign currency exchange sent home by workers (installments) it reduces unemployment labor markets saturated, it relieves overcrowding and other aspects of national poverty. For these reasons, a number of nations – South Korea, Bangladesh, Jordan, Barbados and Mexico, to name a few – have promoted the emigration and benefit from it. Overall, the effects are poorly understood, and they seem uncertain at best.

For the first point, the flow of official payments, there is consensus that the amount of money is relatively high, only crude oil exceeds the value. For developing countries, this volume equals or exceeds half the value of official development assistance. In some countries, remittances are an important component of gross national product, sometimes equivalent to half the value of merchandise exports. Add that substantial fractions of these payments go through informal channels, and that the official figures are likely underestimated. Here, alas, ends on consensus.

For some analysts, the payments distort the economy and worsen the inflation of land, housing and construction materials for others; they increase domestic production by facilitating the import of necessary goods. Some believe that money is wasted on consumption rather which invest in production, while others argue that even consumer spending stimulate the economy and reduce the need for government subsidies. Effects on other possible interpretations are also contradictory. Some find that emigration reduces unemployment in the country of origin, others are concerned that the departure of workers significant increases unemployment, leading to a bottleneck in the productive sectors. Migration can also have contradictory effects on skilled labor available, skilled workers are lost when they migrate, or may return migrants with qualifications obtained abroad, or resources to invest to improve the education of their children. As we have shown, some see emigration a valuable mechanism for poverty reduction, while others noted that the poor rarely have the means to emigrate. There is evidence that migration exacerbates inequalities in income, but others suggest that their effects are neutral”.

We see the controversy on the effects of remittances on development is intense. One could summarize the arguments most often cited as those of a negative or a positive vision of those of the impact of these remittances.

 

I.A.3.1. Negative view

 

• Weak effects on investment and capital formation

Among the negative or perverse effects of migration are often cited prevalence among migrants and the logic of consumption on those accumulations. It refers specifically to purchases of presence, evidence of social success (such as cars). Such remittance assignment, according to some, does not allow migration to be an instrument for the development of countries of origin. In addition, consumption remittances patterns and lifestyles, which appear frequently in view of the case studies in this program of research, are not beneficial from the point of view i: economic (as opposed to remittance modes of organization). Satisfying new consumer habits usually involves an increase in the demand for imported goods, which partly offsets the positive impact of remittances on foreign currency reserves.

It is therefore concluded that even if the amount of remittances reached a very high level, despite its density, that cash flow cannot solve the main problems of capital formation that arise in the emigration countries to ensure their economic development .

If we consider instead the money remitted but those invested for productive purposes, it appears that the “attrition rate” is particularly strong. Several studies, already old, showed that the value of investments is generally quite low in agriculture, it is significantly higher in the housing, transportation and hotels and restaurants but it decreases strongly in trade, crafts and other non-agricultural enterprises

So there is both a lot of money available and little investment. Another study in northern Portugal highlights this fact: in banks of several municipalities the amount of savings is greater than the amount of loans to the Bank.

 

• Limited effects on productive employment

Induced jobs by migrant savings (whether reported or remitted at the end of the migration cycle), in addition to their relatively small numbers, is not a source of technical progress and somehow blend into the economic environment rather they modify and this for several reasons.

First, because of the location of these jobs: they returned many migrants do not want to go back to farming but carry out activities under the “small commercial” value added almost zero (small shops, restaurants, taxi drivers and other similar trades). Then, when there is actually a return to the earth (or maintaining, in the case of family members who have not emigrated), there has been little change in the operating mode. A survey in Morocco noted that the degree of agricultural mechanization is relatively low; there is no significant difference between migrant and non-migrant households (except for the use of the water pump and, in a very small proportion

Moreover, when individual investment takes place in the industry, it implements a very simple technology that borrows from traditional crafts or when it is imported. André Lebon provides an explanation for this unusual behavior “productivist” citing individual and collective factors (acting even in cases where financial remittances from migrant is accompanied by his return to the country, a situation priori more favorable to productive use funds remitted when the immigrant settled in the host country).

Individual explanatory factors

For various reasons – objective and subjective – returning migrants rarely play the expected role behaviors and explain the use of unproductive accumulated savings. By objective data means all those related to this position in which workers were placed during their stay abroad and their situation on their return home:

• Some of them are retiring and those who carry on an activity some consider themselves too old to invest for productive purposes,
• During their expatriation, most worked as unskilled or semi-skilled, and therefore they are not able to feel the need for innovation,
• The type of job they held did not allow them to have access to some knowledge of technological progress or because it was in domestic service, or because – in the industrial sector, it was employment and repetitive plot,
• Finally, a very small number received vocational training in the country of residence.

In this state of affairs resulting so very general conditions of employment are those migrants in their professional life abroad. There are other causes, a subjective:

• Arrangements for economic reintegration: Many of those who wish to return or have a small business or work at their own account, all situations perceived as more rewarding than returning to agriculture or industry.
• The spirit of imitation leads the migrant returned – that guide the search for immediate profit – to invest in the model of what can be observed in the immediate vicinity, behaving like businessmen and traders the area of ​​rehabilitation and hopefully generate the same benefits. This practice leads either to the proliferation of small businesses, where there is-industrial investment – to overcapacity with respect to the absorption capacity of the local market. The establishment of such enterprises excessive saturation causes that could be solved only in the export. But then, the product is unsuitable (need to concentrate more and not fruit juice), the packaging should be modified, special trucks purchased, etc… All new investments that exceed the financial institutions recently created.

The effect of alignment on the social milieu in which the return is made: in this text are grouped a number of behaviors such as consumers or investors who have been recognized in various countries of origin:

• Consumption patterns do not differ from those of local families of same socio-economic level has generally increased with money from abroad, which will catch up on the most affluent;
• Similarly, investment is usually done according to the examples offered by the regional economic context, which blunts the capacity for innovation

To conclude, it seems wrong to expect that all workers who return to their countries become “automatically” contractors or agents of development because of their savings or by experience. The human factors analysis shows, in fact, only a minority is ready to take on this role when, in addition, the community did not turn away.

 

Collective explanatory factors

Often, indeed, migrants do not find support after their return they were entitled to expect from the community and this lack – or perceived as such, but the consequences are the same – to is still more keenly felt at the local level, where the remitted assets must be invested. When asked about the reasons for their reservations from any productive investment, workers returned expressing disillusionment and allege this is the lack of support or lack of infrastructure investment, linked to the failure of public authorities to provide technical assistance and financial support. The lack of information has sometimes private stakeholders of the benefits that the law gives them, and the indifference of the banks that caused the failure of the initiatives taken by migrants during their annual leave.

Reports have clearly demonstrated the consequences of a lack of integrated regional planning. Without agencies or public bodies to advice on investments to lack of model for the use of their savings, ex-migrants are left to fend for themselves when the time comes to use their capital. Henceforth, it is hardly surprising that carries the spirit of imitation described above, or that the money saved is used to spending prestige or is immobilized on bank accounts.

Many surveys have shown that the indication of a direction (a kind of « manual » economies) was one of the most important factors to guide for productive resources.

 

• Inflationary effect

Many studies conducted highlight the inflationary effect that results from an application whose solvency is incommensurate with the rest of the population not receiving external resources. Examples could be multiplied, and all the countries of emigration are concerned. We do retain a few to illustrate the main effects of the pressure exerted by the individual use of remittances:

• Speculation on land related to the purchase of land for the construction of a house and / or to invest money available study on northern Portugal indicates that the market value of the land is double their value economic;
• A similar speculation on real estate, higher prices of building materials and an increase of indiscriminate rents (which often discourage demand Aboriginal).

Finally, in general, a propensity to consumption and high costs which, in turn, harms local consumers unable to keep up with rising prices

 

• Effect of static expansion

The impact on economic development, some, as we have seen, as very limited, the subject of another critical appraisal. Indeed, the positive aspects caused by migrant remittances, are not – alone – an indication of probative real economic development of countries of emigration. The economic boom generated by the remittances is described by some as “static expansion”, closely dependent on the outside. That is to say, it would lead to a development that would present but, at the same time, some specific features that restrict the scope (extension of the tertiary sector which has the majority of investments available to the consumer products mainly imported, immobility of production structures, etc). Firstly, it is-and often it is only-of a response to a rise in demand appears as the real engine of growth recorded. Hence the expansion of the tertiary sector, where it is seen, has the majority of investments. On the other hand, this growth is to make available to consumers (with a high purchasing power compared to their pre-migration and to that nationals have remained on site) a number ever-growing products. However, these products are either imported intermediate and then only receive the request or locally manufactured according to the manufacturing process and in a traditional production crafts, small workshops. The stagnation of production structures contrasts with the dynamism engendered pole “consumption”, thus limiting the possibilities for the establishment of a real industrial fabric. In other words, if the expansion that emerges can be assessed in quantitative terms, it does not hold true when trying to assess in qualitative terms.

 

• Dependence effect

The economic development of sending areas is further vulnerable because it is in a state of high dependency on the outside. Its continuation is indeed related to the continuation of remittances, itself subject to the maintenance of migrants’ behavior in this area and uncertainties surrounding the immigration policy of the country of employment. However, this behavior is the result of an arbitration revised at any time between consumption and savings, investment and remittance between economies in the country host for a variety of reasons ranging from the objectives (the arrival of the family intensifies the integration) to more subjective such as lack of confidence in the currency of the country of origin, the fear of losing the investment, etc.. Similarly, the decision to admit new immigrants or close borders to any new arrival of labor falls as user countries (except interstate co-signatory of bilateral free-circulation). It therefore measures the extent to which economic development based on such a basis and which fails to emancipate them remain precarious. The risk of dependence and insecurity resulting development is illustrated by Jean-Pierre Lachaud highlights the contribution of a form of social capital mobilization through remittances internal and external for the reduction of inequality and poverty in rural and urban Burkina Faso but emphasizes that positive the impact of remittances on inequality and poverty in Burkina Faso should not underestimate the weight of remittances from Côte d’Ivoire, and, therefore, the double dependence, short term standard of living of the people of Burkina Faso with respect to the international transmission of economic conditions in neighboring countries, and, in the longer term, the ability of accumulation of physical and human capital with respect to external resources . In this regard, the Ivorian economic crisis of the 1980s and early 1990s has slowed considerably the amount of remittances in Burkina Faso and, all things being equal probably influenced negatively the rate of poverty in this country. Conversely, the standard of living of Burkina Faso, especially in rural areas, and the availability of physical and human assets are likely to be much lower than current levels in the absence of external remittances.

Remittances of migrants do not produce dependence comparable to that caused by the consumption of drugs: they nourish a need for more foreign exchange and thus exacerbate the balance of payments, further increasing the need for more consignments funds that increased dependence to the host country[122].

 

• Distorting the development

• Monetary distortion:

The privilege of holding currency may result, in addition to accelerating inflationary pressures, adverse effects on the monetary side. The development of parallel exchange, the extension procedure import without payment, resale high prices of property acquired abroad, the widespread clearing procedures mean that the Maghreb countries, in particular Algeria, have two monetary units: the national currency for essential goods and currencies for “extra”. This trend of currency substitution in countries with inconvertible currency urges governments looking to attract emigrants’ money to periodically devalue the national currency[123].

• Effect of migration campaigns – cities / A new rural exodus:

Several studies show that real estate investments caused by remittances are concentrated in some countries, in urban areas thus raising campaigns migration – new cities and rural exodus

This is the case of Morocco, for example, this has led to a massive displacement of families of migrants to a small urban center in the first instance, then to regional capitals or extra-regional in a second step. But this pattern is not general, since in most cases, the trips are made directly to the place of birth or extra-regional regional capitals, bypassing the smaller regional centers. It follows that the circles of birth of immigrants benefit less emigration. These are the cities and regional capitals including that attract more and more.

From a high proportion of rural migrants attach more in towns and cities especially in regional and extra-regional. Migrants after a shorter or longer stay abroad, leaving their community to settle in the city. For them the choice of installation is dictated by the city benefits from the cities to the countryside. Among the benefits most often mentioned, appear likely to ensure the future of children, the proximity of the administration, the importance of socio-community facilities (water, electricity, hospital, etc.), but also the possibilities create a project. (…). International migration would result in massive remittances of rural migrants to cities including major cities located in their region or elsewhere.

 

• Reinforcing effect of inequality

Financial remittances also have an impact on income distribution: they may be responsible for the observed differences in the evolution of living standards of families with and without migrants. Consequences in terms of inequality then depend on the origin of migrants (they belong to the most affluent and the poorest instead) and remittance recipients (who are the beneficiaries? What is the meaning of the concept of extended family? Certain authors[124] have developed the idea that migration and remittances resulting accentuate inequalities. According to them, indeed, are the favored classes in the country of origin are more likely to financially bear the costs and risks of migration.

 

The analysis of these negative effects of remittances is that they generate economic decline masked by short-term profits that takes a minority of beneficiaries. Labor migration and remittances do not reduce the gap between rich and poor countries; they rather increase. Rich countries benefit from migrants. Exporters of labor does not benefit in return for real compensation for the investment costs of the workforce. They face bottlenecks that result, they collect inflation and increased imports fueled by remittances and they are faced with the task of reintegrating returnees’ unrealistic aspirations and unemployment of group frustrated in his upward mobility[125].

 

I.A.3.2. Positive view

 

To this negative view, some would say overly pessimistic and even apocalyptic vision opposes other much more positive effects of remittances on emigration and that sometimes takes the exact opposite of the arguments that just review.

In the literature, these perspectives, in terms of migration and development, are less pessimistic expressed by proponents of the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) for which the new economy resulting from the migration of labor has the advantage of be a potential catalyst for the development dynamic, in that it can reduce the constraints in terms of production and investment faced IES households in an environment of imperfect market and create links between income and growth.

Some articles and studies, as summarized here, assess the development potential of remittances considered from the point of view of this new form of economy and argue empirical evidence tends to show that remittances can be a positive factor for economic development[126].

 

• Effects on the standard of living and well-being of families

Undoubtedly, remittances allow an increase the standard of living of the migrant and his family and an increase in material well-being. They may cover a greater or lesser degree; the consumption needs of the family left the country, including cash incomes are often low or very unstable. Increasing and diversifying their income sources, money of emigrants helps to improve the daily lives of families and can cope with crises such as droughts or famines. This money can also facilitate access to family members and close to essential services such as health or education. The remittances are somehow the role of safety nets and compensate (in part) the absence of a system of social protection and insurance. They contribute in this direction capacity of people to participate in the development process.

Such advances take many forms: home improvement, purchase of household equipment, acquisition of livelihood, means of locomotion, home land ownership, etc. When we remember the primary motivations that drive the vast majority of immigrants at the time of expatriation, the combination of these achievements should not be underestimated.

In many developing countries, the migration is a strategy for family not only to improve the prospects for one that goes, but also those of the extended family. In approving the departure of one his family, the family can hope to benefit from income that the migrant will receive when established – remittances, which often outweigh the initial costs or income that the migrant would have been entitled in his country of origin. These remittances can in turn be used to finance large investment, as well as consumer needs immediate.

Numerous studies have confirmed the positive contribution international remittances on welfare nutrition, food, health and living conditions of households in the country of origin.

This contribution is now well accepted in the literature on migration and is reflected in the data more accurate international remittances, which are published by the World Bank, among others. Even people who migrate because of conflict can be transmitters of funds net as illustrated various episodes in the history Bosnia-Herzegovina, Guinea-Bissau, Nicaragua, Tajikistan and Uganda, where remittances have allowed entire communities affected by the war survive[127]. In some international migration corridors, the cost of money remittances tends to decrease with time, which is a clear advantage for people who send or receive these fonds4. Recent innovations have also helped to reduce costs at national, such as Kenya. With this remittance cost reduction, families who previously depended their parents and close friends who used informal intermediaries to perform remittances, for example the bus driver local decide now to send money through by a bank, a remittance or even their mobile phone.

One of the main functions of remittances is to diversify sources of income and to protect families in the event of an attack, for example disease or shock due to serious economic downturn or climatic hazards. Studies in countries as diverse Botswana, El Salvador, Jamaica and Philippines showed that migrants respond to climate by increasing the amount of each remittance, although it is difficult to whether this is actually insurance social.

Migrants can provide protection if their income is sufficient and do not vary not at the same time as those of their families. In particular, remittances cannot provide warranty against the effects of the current global economic recession since almost everywhere migrant workers suffer job losses, at a time when families most in need of assistance.

Even when the volume of remittances is important, direct impact on reducing poverty depend on the socio-economic people have migrated.

More generally, however, the possibility of starting abroad is limited to the low qualified, this restriction means that shipments funds are not sent directly to the poorest families or more poor countries[128].

At the same time, migrants are good from poor households and significant funding is sometimes sent to individuals who are not family members.

The effects of internal migration on poverty reduction, which have been demonstrated by studies in various national contexts, may be even more significant.

One factor that appears to play migration on remittance flows is sex. Data suggest that women tend to return home a larger share of their income and more evenly, although their lower wages often involve absolute amounts less increased.

There is also a time factor to these flows. Over time, the impact of remittances can significantly increase the effects on poverty and inequalities. The poor can gain when remittances are made to generate local employment in the construction of houses for example, or to create or magnify enterprises. Studies have shown that fund recipients demonstrate a more important entrepreneurship and higher marginal propensity to invest cash that households not having migrant[129]. However, the investment earnings can take years to be fully realized, they are complex and far from automatic. This discrepancy can be explained by delays in remittances, time that migrants adapt to their new environment, or the political and economic development in the countries of origin, which can slow or deter remittances. Finally, remittances may come to be new migration capital finance, years after the departure of the first member of the family.

Some commentators underestimate the importance of remittances on the grounds that partially finance consumer spending. This criticism is misguided, for two main reasons. Firstly, consumption intrinsic value and, often, long-term effects term comparable to investment, especially in poor communities. The improvement of nutrition and other consumer items greatly increase the human capital and therefore future incomes. Similarly, spending Tuition is often a priority for families who receive funding because they increase income prospects of the next generation. Secondly, most forms of expenditure, goods and services including intensive labor, such as housing or other benefit to the local economy and can affect multiplicators. All these effects are positive.

It appears that one of the families whose members migrated is more likely to send their children to school, using the remittances to pay the fees and other costs.

The result is a reduction of child labor. Especially since, once in school, children migrants are more likely to complete their education, as better prospects related to migration have an impact on social standards and incentives from the perspective may encourage investment in education[130]. This is suggested by the theory and what is true in practice, for some countries.

The impact of migration prospects on incentives to schooling depends on the context and said prospects. Thus, when internal migrants have secondary education, it generally encourages children remaining in the community to pursue higher education, while in the provinces where migrants have for the most part not been further than college; rates of school completion are lesser.

Migration may have consequences on the health of people staying in the country, through their effects on nutrition, living conditions, rising incomes and transmission of knowledge and practices. Data show that an increase in income and a better understanding of health attributable to migration have a positive influence on the rate infant mortality.

Migration may alter the gender relations in the country origin. When it is women who leave, the traditional roles may change, particularly those relating to the care of children and old. When it is men who leave, women rural areas can gain autonomy.

Field studies conducted in Ecuador, Ghana, India, Madagascar and Moldova showed that when men migrate, women rural areas are more involved in decision-making within the community[131]. Overall, however, the data on its effects on traditional gender roles are mixed.

 

• Indirect effects of remittances on the stimulation of productive sectors.

Moreover, the satisfaction of these needs – with now, the financial means to do so – is certainly, in many countries, support for traditional economic activity. Several sectors – the construction, the supplies for the home, car repair, small business – benefit from the amount of money from outside and direct effects, easily ascertainable, add those induced by circulation of capital[132].

Prioritization remittances based solely on concept of productive or non-productive use and granting remittances alone invested in productive activities (strictly) positive impact on the development of countries of origin is too restrictive. It tends to underestimate, for example, the potential role of health spending or education (which in fact correspond to investments in human capital), or to neglect the impact of the housing (jobless direct or indirect). These two types of expenditure have a real economic impact. In addition, in situations of extreme poverty, consumer spending is themselves productive[133].

If some theories focus on indisputable impacts but heterogeneous, in the countryside, others emphasize their large positive effects. The diversity of rural areas is a variety of attitudes. When the migration has not led to a phenomenon of congestion population, it is likely to infuse a dynamic agriculture through the purchase of agricultural equipment, amelioration livestock, acquisition of real estate, etc., in addition, the environmental conditions, the size of land ownership; over water resources are the factors that determine investment. It was noted in some Maghreb countries a tendency more pronounced vis-à-vis agricultural activity. Since the 80s, Tunisia is the development of new areas of fruit trees that attract migrants. This choice has a valuation of the land and a revival of the agricultural sector expressed by the extension of the engine and irrigated crops in the homes of migratory tradition. The latter undergoing a process of transformation induced by the rapid diffusion of cash flows and a way of life propagated by migrants. Research on the evolution of man / space in campaigns indicate that the system of consumption gives way to a trading system favoring apparition banking structures in the villages, in the example of the North west of Morocco and southern Tunisia.

These changes, coupled with rising prices of plots of land inside the small towns are undergoing profound changes, going so far as to question of criteria for classification of urban communities by the main producers of emigrants space. The juxtaposition of community facilities implemented by the State with money from emigrants allows growth of towns facilitating their access to urban status, a diversification of their economies as well as dissemination of lux back to their own countries: implementation of infrastructures: banking, hotels, baths, dispensaries, etc. These changes are visible both in the north of Morocco and in Tunisia oasis environment where sometimes anarchic urbanization in turn leads to the development of economic sectors such as brick, as well as the emergence of hitherto minor branches in the Maghreb, such as aluminum carpentry. These changes are even more significant when they affect large areas without “urban traditions” as the Rif mountains, where villages hitherto seats weekly souks experienced very significant growth in construction[134].

 

I.B. Empirical illustration

 

A conclusion to a study observing the impacts of international remittances on rural Egypt and based on a household review stipulates that poverty, income distribution, and development in rural areas are deeply impacted by international remittances.

The study observed the social and economy factors of international migration that the context of migration and human capital models of development contain. According to the models used, the reason younger and better-educated people decode to migrate is the difference in earning possibilities in spatially separated labor markets. Age, marital status, employment, education, age of household head, amount of land farmed, and predicted per capita household income (not including re­mittances) are the variables used to analyze the reason of migration of certain workers. The marital status, employment (agricultural laborer), and education (beyond elementary school) are the variables having a positive relationship with the choice to work abroad while the other variables have but negative impact.

While assessing the influence of international remittances on poverty and income distri­bution, predicted equations are used to evaluate the changes occurring between two circumstances that are the exclusion of remittances and its inclusion.

While using this context, it was discovered that even slight, remittances have a positive impact on poverty. The results show a decline of 9.8 per cent of the number of poor households when remittances from the 104 households with migrants still living abroad are included in per capita household income (estimated household income divided by the number of family members). The same discovery is suggested by Sen’s index of poverty where it stipulates that there is a drop of 12 per cent in poverty when remittances are included inper capita household income.

International remittances have a negative impact on income distribution though they impact positively poverty as their inclusion in predicted per capita household income increases inequality. This paradoxical result is explained by several reasons according to the author; one of these is the fact that the lowest income quintile generates its pro­portionate share of still-abroad migrants whereas the second and third income quintiles do not when remittances are included. In addition, the fact that remittances are included leads the two top income quintiles to generate over a proportionate share of still-abroad migrants. The cause of the negative impact of international remittances on rural income distribution is these differences in the number of migrants generated by various income groups and not variations in either migrant earnings abroad or marginal tendencies to remit.

Nevertheless, let us highlight that the opposing impacts on income distribution are avoidable. The negative impact of remittances on income distribution is explained by the fact that when the survey was carried out, most of the still-abroad migrants were from the upper-income groups. Yet, among the category of once-abroad, there were as many migrants from poor and lower-middle-income households as from upper-income house­holds. The effect of remittances on rural income distribution would as well have been more equitable while the households who sent migrants abroad had been equally distributed during the period of the study. Marginal budget shares dedicated to consumption are higher for households no having migrant in all but one quintile using expenditure data and controlling for level of expenditure. The remittances earnings are seen as a passing income stream that is not dedicated to be spent on newly desired consumer goods according to migrant households.

The once international migrant households spent the majority of their remittance earnings on housing. Construction or repair of houses monopolize the entirely 53.9 per cent of remittances expenditures on nonrecurring items. Expen­ditures on housing come out on top against the durables in the sorting system used in this study, which divides expenditure into consumption, durables (housing and household goods), and investment. Marginal inclination to allocate expenditures to investments such as land, agricultural equipment, vehicles, and small businesses is noticed to be higher among once-abroad migrant households than non-migrants.

The empirical outcomes of the study carried in Egypt then indicate that asserting that “migrants don’t invest” or “investment is only the fourth and last priority for remittances” is erroneous. This analysis shows the high inclination of migrants in investment contrary to their non-migrant peers. Marginal budget shares to investment for once-abroad migrant quintiles are reliably superior to those of non-migrants while using expen­diture data and controlling for level of expenditure.

This section of the study deals with few studies on the effect of poverty on migration and discusses later on about the methods used by the authors to assess the effect and results in the case of Egypt.

 

I.B.1. External migration and remittances

 

Six main labor-exporting countries in North Africa and Europe (namely Algeria, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia) are studied in this part, with reference to the patterns of official remittances according to the work of Ibrahim A. Elbadawi and Robert de Rezende Roch[135]. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland have been the host countries having captivated most of the migration from the areas afore mentioned.

The accessibility to the data on workers and total population abroad determined the period during which the analysis was carried out, that is between 1977 and 1989.

The normalized values of three key variables were shown in Figure 1: workers’ remittances in current US dollars, the average income in the host countries in current US dollars, and the number of workers abroad. A series measures the weighted average income per capita in the host countries for each labor-exporting country. There are more demographic and macroeconomic indicators information for each of the six labor-exporting countries in the appendix, as well as the details of data sources and construction. It is proposed in Figure 1 that there is a close correlation between the income cycles in the host countries and the stock of migrant workers though to a lesser extent with the latter. For Morocco and Turkey, the three variables are strongly connected. In the case of Portugal and Tunisia, remittances and host country income are closely related whereas this relation is to a lesser extent for Algeria and Yugoslavia. In these four cases, the relation between remittances and the number of workers appears to be less important. The connection between remittances and the number of nationals working abroad is considerably strong across countries even though it appears to be weak on an individual basis. In Algeria, remittances are exceptionally low compared to those of the countries with larger numbers of workers abroad whose remittances are greater, the relation is, of course, not firmly comparative. Per capita remittances across countries are importantly different whether they are divided by the number of workers abroad or total population abroad. Between 1977 and 1989, average yearly remittances per worker vary from US$2,700 for Turkey to US$4,200 for Morocco, without including Algeria in the comparison. Concerning average yearly remittances per total population, they ranged from US$1,100 for Turkey to US$2,200 for Portugal, while Algeria presents significantly lower per capita remittances.

The noise in the migration data is, perhaps, partly the cause of these disparities in per capita remittances. The quantity of unregistered migrants may differ substantially across countries and over time. Nevertheless, variations in the length of stay and many other determinants are also reflected. Significant variations still remain in the length of stay though most of the registered migrant workers arrived in Western Europe before 1977. The quite old history of Algerian migration to France explains in part the very low level of remittances per worker for Algeria. Similarly, long before 1977, most of Turkish migrants had already arrived in Europe though the number of Turkish workers continued to grow afterwards whereas the Moroccan and Tunisian migration just appeared but recently and partly explains the high level of remittances per worker in the two countries.

 

Figure 3:  Remittances (US$), Income per Capita in Host Countries (USS), and Number of Workers Abroad (Normalized Series)

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 1:  Remittances, Workers Abroad and Total Population Abroad, 1977-89 Averages (Remittances in US$ Millions, Migrants in Thousands, Per Capita Remittances in US$)

 

 

There is as well an apparent correlation between success in mobilizing remittances and the markers of macroeconomic policy.

The following four equations are used as a basis for the econometric estimation specifying and estimating linear specifications in relationship to remittance flows to some of the factors identified:

 

log Remt = CO + 1 log workt + aa log Yhoste + £3 log Premc + £4 Length, + a. Inft + a’ DUM                                                                                                                                      (I)

 

log Rempcw,= ao+ a,. log Yhost, + a2 premC + a3 Length, + a Inf, + of DUM                 (II)

 

log Remr = 90 + al log PoPt + a2 log Yhostt.III) + £3 Premt + a4 Length, + a4 Infe + a’ DUM                                                                                                                                      (III)

 

log Rempcp, = a, log Yhoste + £2 Prem, + £3 Length, + a. Inft + a’ DUN             (IV)                            

 

Where:

• Rem represents the real DM value of official remittances to the labor-exporting countries
• Work is about the stock of migrant workers;
• Pop concerns the stock of total migrant population;
• Rempcw is remittances per migrant worker (Rem/Work);
• Rempcp is remittances per migrant person (Rem/Pop);
• Yhost is the real DM value of the host countries’ average per capita income;
• Prem represents the black market premium, described as the percentage variation between the black market exchange rate and the official exchange rate;
• Length concerns a proxy for the length of stay;
• Inf reflects the rate of domestic inflation in the labor-exporting country; and
• Dum includes country-specific dummies in addition to a dummy for Turkey in 1979-the year before a key change in the political regime and a stabilization program.

Notice: the stock of migrant workers is used in equations I and II, while the stock of total migrant population, including workers and their families, is used in equations III and IV.

DM and French Franc are the two main currencies in which remittance to the countries under examination are denominated, thus real DM were used to express both remittances and per capita income.

Using DM, moreover, keeps from the possibility of prejudice caused by the use of US dollar, a fake connection between remittances and income could be the result of the great instabilities of the European currencies during the sample period. Anyhow, the relapse outcomes with the US dollar are also reported in this part. There were two different variables to proxy the length of stay.

One of those proxies is the ratio of the actual stock of migrant workers, or the whole migrant population, which is comparative to a reduced stock by means of a discount rate of 5 per cent. Thus, the highness of this percentage depends on the oldness of the story of migration, or the extent of the average length also substituted by a simple linear inclination. The models presented above show that log Work (log Pop), log Yhost and Length represent the demographic and income determinants.

The coefficient of log Work (log Pop) Lu anticipated being positive perchance with a unitary elasticity[136]. Log Yhost must be positive as well because it represents a key factor of savings in the host country. Both length-of-stay measuring proxies should, then again, negatively influence remittances since labor force abroad, when getting old, is likely to remit less as a result of the ties lessen with the home country.

The real per capita income in the labor-sending country is a possible factor which has not been mentioned in the stipulations afore. This variable is used as a proxy for a potential contractual duty from the migrant member towards the rest of the family returning home. Adding the sending country per capita income did not lead to acceptable outcomes. The portfolio and macroeconomic factors of official remittances are those represented by the set of determinants that remains.

The premium on the black market for foreign exchange and the discrepancy between depreciation-adjusted interest rates at home and abroad represent the portfolio factors. Official remittances are anticipated to be discouraged by a high premium or a higher devaluation-adjusted foreign interest rate compared to the domestic rate.

Nevertheless, the discrepancy of the interest rate was also considered as steadily unimportant which put the premium and domestic inflation in place of reflection of the portfolio and macroeconomic concern. A high inflation is a reflection of higher risk and uncertainty, thus it should bring about lesser official remittances. Premium should have more influence on remittances than domestic inflation as it has a direct connection to the market for remittances.

 

• Results

A panel data for Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia over the period between 1977 and 1989 with a sample comprising 65 observations helped to reach the results that are hugely improved across all the stipulation measured by the elimination of Algeria.

It appears that Algeria’s form of remittances certainly differs from that of the other countries due to the history of migration that is greatly longer and its extremely centralized economy.

The expected signs are present in the coefficients of all of the variables and are generally important in terms of statistics. Amazing similar results were found from the assessments of the stock of migrant workers and the stock of total migrant population. The results are reliable with previous studies[137] to the topic of the demographic and income variables.

Strong and systematic evidence asserts that macroeconomic and portfolio determinants are relevant to the lasting purpose of official remittances.

The predicted coefficients do not undergo noticeable change despite the imposition of a unitary elasticity corresponding to the stock of workers or population. Certainly, the amplified strength of the assessed coefficients provides solid support to the per capita models in spite of the failure in explanatory power compared to the open levels models case. Previous literature does not contain such characteristic.

A close correlation between remittances and income cycles in the host countries and, to a lower degree, stock of migrant workers is exposed in the study, showing that the connection between remittances and the number of nationals working abroad is significantly strong across countries even if it appears to be frail on an individual basis. Yet, the association between the three variables is not exactingly relative. In addition, the considerable variations in remittances per worker across the six countries prove that there is likely an impact of the length of stay and the macroeconomic determinants.

 

I.B.2. Impact of remittances on poverty in developing countries

 

Cross-country studies carried out recently are more and more proving the advantageous influence of remittances on the reduction of poverty. This positive influence is shown in a World Bank study made by Adams and Page (2005)[138] where they suggest that an increase of 10 per cent in per capita official international remittances will result in a decrease of, on average, 3.5 per cent in the share of poor people. The IMF (2007)[139] study has done the same discovery stipulating that a growth of 10 per cent in the share of remittances in a country’s GDP leads to a drop of 1.5 per cent in headcount poverty and a decrease of 1.1 per cent in poverty gap. For the period between 1980 and 2008, a panel data were used for 77 developing countries to have an estimation of the influence of remittances on poverty in developing countries with a separate analysis undertaken for 29 countries with remittances to GDP ratio higher than 5 per cent to experiment if the influence of remittances share in GDP is stronger ahead of a threshold level. Still in that way, additional study carried out for 21 Asian developing countries with remittances to GDP ratio higher than 5 per cent was done to evaluate the regional variations in the influence. According to Ravallion and Chen (1997), poverty is considered as a function of per capita income, some measure of income distribution, and the remittances to GDP ratio. See the baseline specification in the following:

 

Log (POVit) = α₁ + α₂ log (PCYit) + α₃ log (INEQit) + α₄ log (REMit) + ϵit

(Where, i = 1…..N, t = 1….T)

 

Where:

• POVit represents poverty measures in country i at time t; a captures fixed effects;
• PCY is per capita income;
• INEQ concerns income inequality as measured by the Gini index; and
• REM is remittances to GDP ratio.

The model anticipates poverty to reduce as per capita income increases, therefore, a₁ is anticipated to be negative as well. Previous studies stipulated there is an expected correlation between higher poverty and greater income inequality, consequently, α₂ is anticipated to be positive. The model approximates the sign and degree of α₃, controlling for these two variables, indicating the direct influence that remittances share in GDP has on poverty.

There are three indicators for measuring poverty:

• Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (percentage of population);
• Poverty gap at $1.25 a day (PPP) (percentage);
• Poverty gap at $2 a day (PPP) (percentage).

Poverty gap is used to measure the mean distance under the poverty line as a ratio of the poverty line and apprehend how poor are the poor, in other words, it tries to discover the extent of the average poor person’s income under the poverty line.

The measure of inequality is Gini coefficient. Remittances reflect the recipient countries’ GDP ratio. The per capita GDP is the per capita income variable used in stable 2000 United States dollars. The qualification of the coefficients as elasticities is allowed by the log transformation of the whole variables. Despite the fact that some studies have predicted the influence of remittances on poverty approximating the equation afore, the correlation between remittances and poverty may not be unidirectional so far. Higher poverty levels results in higher migration and thus it brings about higher remittances. Three Stage least Squares method and two equations are estimated to embrace the endogeneity issue with IMF (2007) following the same methodology. There is a similarity in the specification for the poverty equation and the one above and there is another estimated equation that embraces the factors of remittances.

 

Table 1:  Three stage least squares estimations: Dependent variables – poverty and remittances (asian developing countries with remittances to GDP ratio of 5% or above; 1980-2008

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Variables	Dependent variable Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population)		Dependent variable Poverty gap at $1.25 a day (PPP) (%)		Dependent variable Poverty gap at $2 a day (PPP) (%)
	Povertyhc	Remit- tances	Poverty1	Remit- tances	Poverty2	Remit- tances
Per capita GDP in constant 2000 United States Dollars	-0.94*** (-6.47)	…	-1.96*** (-8.71)	…	-1.54*** (-5.54)	…
Gini coefficient	2.91*** (8.55)	…	4.17*** (6.67)	…	2.03*** (2.66)	…
Remittances as a ratio to GDP	-0.39*** (-2.66)	…	-0.30*** (-2.32)	…	-0.35*** (-2.20)	…
Lagged remittances	…	0.79*** (12.44)	…	0.99*** (18.16)	…	0.97*** (17.20)
Poverty	…	-0.01 (-0.38)	…	-0.006 -(0.23)	…	-0.01 -(0.41)
Trade to GDP Ratio	…	0.06 (0.53)	…	0.02 (0.22)	…	0.06 (0.63)
Literacy levels	…	-0.03 (-0.22)	…	0.10 (1.03)	…	0.09 (0.32)
Constant	0.02 (0.02)	-0.32 -0.73	1.86 (0.58)	-0.49 (-1.25)	…	-0.57 (-1.41)
Observations	145	145	145	145	124	124
Adj R Square	0.78	0.81	0.89	0.96	0.75	0.96
Chi 2	169.86	208.96	211.91	607.17	174.7	601.53

 

Source: UNCTAD India Project estimation. The data source for the variables is World Development Indicators, 2009.

Note: ** and *** represent the significance level at 5 per cent and 10 per cent level respectively.

 

It is indicated by the empirical results that, for the Asian developing countries having share of remittances over 5 per cent of GDP, the poverty-reducing elasticity of remittances is higher when compared to all developing countries with 5 per cent or more share of remittances in GDP.

Estimating equation undertakes the influence of remittances as a share of GDP on poverty markers for the period 1973-74 to 2006-07 reported before.

The influence of remittances on the diminution of poverty in 21 developing countries in Asia with remittances to GDP ratios of 5 percent or more is reported in Table 2. As seen in the results, remittances influence strongly poverty headcount ratio in Asian developing countries. With the given GDP levels, on average, an increase of 10 per cent in remittances results in a fall of 3.9 per cent in poverty headcount ratio and nearly 3 or 3.5 per cent in poverty gap in Asian developing countries having a share of remittances in GDP over 5 per cent.

According to the results, poverty ratio in India is negatively impacted by remittances as described by National Poverty line. A growth of 10 per cent in remittances as a share of GDP will result in 1.7 per cent drop in poverty ratio which is far more inferior to impact as revealing by dint of scarcity of poverty ration data and the postulation thus adopted.

 

The second equation estimated is remittances (ReM) as a function of poverty (PoV), trade openness (Trade to GDP ratio), literacy levels and lagged remittances (Remt-1).

 

 

Log (REMit) = ß1 + ß2 log (POVit) + ß3 log (TRADEit) + ß4 log (LITit) + ß5 log (REMITit-1) +ϵit

(i = 1…..N, t = 1….Ti),

 

The literature on the motivation to migrate and remit suggests the variable used to estimate the factors of remittances. The data on migrants is not used openly due to its limit. ß₂ is predicted to be positive since it is anticipated that higher levels of poverty will result in more migration and higher remittances. Trade openness as measured by trade to GDP ratio means openness of the economy. Once the economy is open, it becomes easier for the remittances to pour out then labor mobility can be settled. Hence, trade openness (ß3) is considered to have a positive impact on remittances. The sign of ß4 may be theoretical conditional on whether the more educated migrate from the country or less educated migrate. The percentage of literacy is calculated according to the literacy rate among adult of 15 and above. The dynamic influence is captured by the use of delayed remittances.

The study was first carried out with all developing countries where data on remittances are accessible along with an unstable panel formed for 77 countries for the period between 1980 and 2008. The outcomes of the three stage least squares assessment indicate that poverty headcount ratio is highly negatively impacted by remittances but this impact is not statistically important as far as other measures of poverty like poverty gap and squared poverty gap are concerned (Table 2). Per capita GDP and inequality show the expected signs and prove themselves to be statistically important while the influence of poverty on remittances is considered as insignificant. It was noticed that only lagged remittances have statistically important influence on remittances which means that countries having higher remittances in the first year, likely to indicate higher migrant stock, is provided with higher remittances.

Nevertheless, there is a significant improvement in the outcomes with the study carried out in the 29 countries having remittances as a percentage of GDP of 5 per cent or more (Table 2). Again, the influence of remittances on all poverty measures is noticed, stipulating that with the given level of GDP, an increase of 10 per cent in remittances diminishes the poverty headcount ratio by nearly 3.1 per cent and poverty gap by nearly 3 to 5 per cent and this depends on the way of measuring poverty gap in developing countries.

 

Table 2:  Three stage least squares estimations: Dependent variables – poverty and remittances (29 countries; 1980-2008) – countries with remittances as a ratio of GDP as 5% or more

 

 

Variables	Dependent variable Poverty headcount ratio at $1.25 a day (PPP) (% of population)		Dependent variable Poverty gap at $1.25 a day (PPP) (%)		Dependent variable Poverty gap at $2 a day (PPP) (%)
	Povertyhc	Remit- tances	Poverty1	Remit- tances	Poverty2	Remittances
Per capita GDP in constant 2000 United States dollars   Gini coefficient   Remittances as a ratio to GDP Lagged remittances   Poverty   Trade to GDP ratio   Literacy levels   Constant   Observations Adj R Square Chi 2	-1.16*** (-8.68)     2.95*** (9.22)   -0.31*** (-2.82)   …   …   …   …   1.54 (0.92) 229 0.78 248.39	…       …       … 0.87*** (17.84) 0.001 (0.03)   0.10 (1.04)   0.050.52   -0.32 -0.73 229 0.87 472.96	-1.21*** (-6.96)     4.25*** (10.06)   -0.31*** (-2.31)   …   …   …   …   …   229 0.75 305.21	…       …       … 0.87*** (18.35) -0.01 -(0.62) 0.10 (1.01) 0.10 0.91   -0.49 (-1.10) 229 0.84 554.32	-1.08*** (-7.36)     2.97*** (8.30)   -0.51*** -(4.36)   …   …   …   …   …   219 0.71 164.67	…         …       … 0.87*** (16.63) -0.02 (0.59)   0.07 (0.84)   0.09 (0.86) -0.31 -(0.71) 219 0.87 440.51

 

Source: UNCTAD India Project estimation. The data source for the variables is World Development Indicators, 2009.

Note: ** and *** represent the significance level at 5 per cent and 10 per cent level respectively.

 

There is a consistent indication that remittances diminish poverty in recipient countries according to the outcomes of the study that used 29 developing and 21 Asian developing countries where remittances are over 5 per cent of GDP, a percentage which constitute more trustable results. A reduction by nearly 3.1 per cent of the poverty headcount ratio and the poverty gap by nearly 3 to 5 per cent in developing countries is considered to be the result of an average growth of 10 per cent in remittances for the given level of GDP, this depends on the way of measuring poverty gap. For the given level of GDP, a growth of 10 per cent in remittances for the given level of GDP brings about a decline of 3.9 per cent in poverty headcount ratio along with a decline of 3 to 3.5 per cent in poverty gap in developing countries having share of remittances in GDP over 5 per cent. For India, empirical approximations indicate that an increase of 10 per cent in remittances as a share of GDP results in a decline of the poverty ratio to 1.7 per cent.

 

I.B.3. Remittances and governance

 

Various research studies have highlighted the positive impact of remittances in reducing volatility in income, home improvement, education, health (Adams, 2004), investments (Glystos, 2002, Lucas, 2005), productivity and employment (Leon-Ledesma and Piracha, 2004) and financial development (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2005). This study focuses specifically on the issue of the impact of remittances on growth in African countries by highlighting the role of governance. From the dynamic panel econometric analysis we seek to whether better governance can it improve the relationship between remittances and growth in these countries.

The longitudinal structure of our data and the need to capture the long-interaction term between remittances and governance on per capita GDP promote the use of econometric methods of panel data. Estimation techniques of panel data have several advantages.

In addition to their ability to take into account the heterogeneity of units or individuals

(Such as countries in sub-Saharan Africa in the context of this study), they provide more variability and precision, may reflect the influence of unobservable characteristics, involve less risk of multicolinearity among variables, more degrees of freedom and higher performance. They promote the study of the dynamics of change in to capture the effects of short long term. The impact of governance in the relationship between remittances an economic growth may indeed be better understood if we consider waves successive global remittances and state governance. However, that this method has limitations such as the lack microeconomic data taking into account the individual behaviors of remittances and the problem of unbalanced panel. In addition, the data analysis panel is much more difficult to model because the researcher will initially time verify the presence of fixed effects or random effects that otherwise, and test and correct for potential problems such as heteroscedasticity, correlation residuals and endogeneity.

In practical terms, our dependent variable is explained and the logarithm of GDP per capita (LogPIB). This variable is observed for each country in our sample period: 2002-2006, as well as the explanatory variables are:

• The logarithm of the ratio (percentage) remittances and compensation of non-residents received in the country, the GDP (LogTrf).
• The logarithm of the ratio (percentage) of the gross capital formation to GDP (LogFBC). This variable refers to the value of the increase in capital stock.
• Dummies governance (GvnceJ) for political stability, efficiency government, the quality of regulation and control of corruption, which take the value 1 if the value of the indicator GvnceJ governance is above the median during t 0 and if this value is less than or equal to the median.
• A composite governance variable (Gvnce) which takes the value 1 for country I during the time t, if the values ​​of at least three indicators 4 are above the median t. This variable is used to check whether the effect of governance is important in the context of good governance general or unrestricted. Our econometric analysis is based on the method of panel dynamics that incorporates one or more lags of the dependent variable (logarithm GDP per capita) as explanatory variables. We estimate a production model Cobb-Douglas log-linear:

 

LogPIB i, t = α LogPIB i, t -1 + β 1 LogTrf i, t + β 2 G vncei, t + β 3 G vncei, t ⋅ LogTrf i, t + λ i + υ t + ei, t                  (4)

 

Where:

• α, β j, j = 1, 2, 3 are parameters to be estimated.
• λi, the fixed effect or country heterogeneity factor takes into account all factors (unobserved) constant over time have an impact on growth.
• υt is the specific effect temporal and
• ei, t is the error term that takes into account specific factors not observed (which vary in time) have an impact on the growth of GDP per capita.

Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic panel gives efficient estimation of such a model (unlike OLS) by allowing control for individual specific effects and temporal and a bias endogeneity of variables such as remittances. This endogeneity is justified that countries with poor economic performance are those who have tend to receive more remittances from their emigrants who want to help out of poverty and poverty their parents and relatives remained in the country of origin.

The estimator most commonly used in the literature for the type of models Equation (4) is the difference in Generalized Moments « Diff GMM » of Arellano and Bond (1991)[140]. This estimator is based on the first difference of the variables and eliminates country-specific effects while taking for instruments appropriate levels of lagged values ​​(level) for all variables potentially endogenous.

If we denote by X the matrix of explanatory variables other than the variable delayed Log GDP per capita level in equation (4), the difference equation is:

 

 

Log GDP n i, t – Log GDP i, t -1 = α (Log GDP i, t -1 – Log GDP i, t – 2) + Β ‘(Xi, t) + (T υ – υ t – 1) + (ei, t – ei, t – 1) – Xi, t -1

 

 

The underlying assumptions are that the error terms are not autocorrelated E [ei, t. ei, t – s] = 0 ∀ s ≥ t and the initial conditions are predetermined by at least one period E [LnPIBi, t. ei, t] = 0 for i = 1, …, N and t = 3, …, T.

They involve m = 1/2 (T – 1) (T – 2) orthogonality restrictions or conditions which are linear in α:

2E [LogPIBi, t – s. Δei, t] = 0 for s ≥ 2 and t = 3, …, T

 

This model provides a consistent estimator especially for N sufficiently large T and relatively small. Arrelano and Bond propose an appropriate test for check the basic assumption of no second order autocorrelation error terms in the difference equation: E [Δei, t. Δei, t – 2] = 0.

An over identification (Elevated number of instruments) model is expected for T ≥ 4. Test Sargan / Hansen is developed for also check the over identifying restrictions or validity of instruments. One limitation of this estimator is weak asymptotic accuracy and the instruments which are causing substantial biases in finite samples. The time series of GDP per capita are typically persistent over time and number of years of observation in our model is limited. Under these assumptions, the lagged values ​​of the explanatory variables are weak instruments for the equation first difference. In addition, the differentiation of the level equation eliminates variations between countries and takes into account variations within countries.

Blundell and Bond (1998)[141] following Arellano and Bover (1995) propose as solution the system GMM estimator (GMM-Sys) which focuses on the estimation, simultaneously, the first difference equation (2) associated with the level equation (4).

Their model allows the generation of efficient estimators for dynamic panel analyzes over short periods (T is small). They develop T-2 conditions additional time assuming that the explanatory variables are stationary:

 

E [ΔLog PIBi, t -1 ⋅ (λi + ei, t)] = 0 for t = 3, 4, …, T.

 

These conditions on the equations levels associated with those of Arellano and Bond (1991) on the difference equation first used to obtain the system GMM estimator is much more efficient than in difference.

The model estimation GMM system in two steps (asymptotically more efficient than the estimate in a single step) is made by means of the command xtabond2 Stata[142]. Windmeijer method (2005)[143] for correcting the covariance matrix in finite sample eliminates the potential bias could result from the two-stage estimation.

 

• Results

We present and discuss a first step on the statistical results variables in our study before we dwell on the econometric results highlight the impact of remittances on the temporal variations in the rate of GDP per capita in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.

Results provide statistics on the variables for all 32 countries (2002-2006). Average growth rate of per capita GDP is 4.51% on period for the group of countries studied. The share remittances and gross capital in GDP (average) 3.79% respectively 21.82% and the period. Governance indicators are generally negative in most countries of sub-Saharan Africa. For political stability and absence of violence, the value average over the period is -0.23. It is -0.50 for government effectiveness Public -0.43 for the quality of regulation and -0.46 for the control of corruption.

Results show that the share of remittances in GDP is on average higher for the group of countries where the value of the governance indicator is considered above the median (the best country in terms of governance). This result is true for three indicators, including political stability and absence of violence (4.55% against 3.04%), the effectiveness of government (4.33% against 3.25%), control of corruption (4.39% against 3.17%) and also for the composite variable governance (4.71% against 3.05%). However, the opposite is observed at the quality control (3.45% against 4.12%). These results indicate some as the best country in governance are averaged over remittances as worse (Ratha, 2003).

The Pearson correlation coefficients highlight a negative but not significant relationship between remittances and GDP per capita. For Least good governance, there is a negative correlation and significant and non significant positive correlation between remittances and, respectively, gross capital formation and final consumption expenditure of households. For the best country in the period, the signs of correlation coefficients are reversed but are not significant. Remittances could thus less contribute to capital formation or investment in a climate of poor governance and would probably be more consumer-oriented.

The report on Economic Prospects 2006 (World Bank, 2006) maintains that the response to adverse shocks remittances to households with incomes palliative for consumption and investment are less when sent to households in extreme poverty. These statistics are checked under estimates econometric results of which are presented in the next sub-section.

The objective is to evaluate the impact of remittances on GDP / capita in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and see how the governance in these countries influences this relationship. Estimates are made from the generalized method of moments (GMM) dynamic panel Blundell and Bond (1998), which is appropriate in the context of a finite sample (short time series).

In a first step, taken in isolation and monitoring for the appearance of redundant growth, remittances do not influence the significant growth of GDP / capita in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa on period 2002 to 2006. The estimated coefficient is positive but not significant.

The addition of a governance indicators (dummy variables) causes the coefficient of the remittance becomes negative but increases in value with an estimated standard deviation lower. It is not significant or is slightly to 10% in the case of government effectiveness.

This result shows the relevance of controlling for governance assessment the impact of remittances on growth as suggested by Catrinescu et al. (2008)[144]. The remittance interaction with dummy governance allows to test whether there is a difference between the best and worst countries in terms of governance on the impact of remittances on growth. The results indicate that the interaction variable has a positive overall coefficient, except with quality of regulation. It is positive and significant at 5% for which for political stability and 1% for the control of corruption.

But in both cases, the coefficient on remittances is not significant. We mean that the remittance could have a more positive impact on the growth in countries more efforts for good governance. Stability policy and control of corruption also appear as factors governance that can influence further the relationship between remittances and growth. Results provide the opportunity to verify the junction of several governance factors is likely to influence the impact of remittances on evolution of GDP / capita. The estimated coefficient on this variable is negative but not significant. We note that the variable remittance a negative coefficient (-0.035) and highly significant (1%) and the interaction with the composite variable governance has a positive coefficient (0.016) and significant at 5%. This shows that remittances negatively affect growth in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa (Over the period 2002-2006), but this negative impact is lower (about half) for countries with higher levels of global governance. These results confirm for countries in sub-Saharan Africa, the negative relationship between remittances and growth (Chami et al., 2005) which could be justified by the reduction in the supply of work and productive efficiency among individuals or families receiving remittances. Another possible reason is that the funds received serve more consumption of final goods and could encourage consumption of imported goods. A question remains whether governance can improve the impact of the binomial remittances/gross capital formation on growth.

When we control for gross capital formation to GDP (log BCF / GDP), the estimated coefficient of remittances is negative but not significant. That means that the gross capital formation is positive but also non-significant. The interaction variable is also significant at 10% when it is added. In addition, remittances (Log Remittances/GDP), gross capital formation (Log BCF / GDP) and their interaction affect significantly higher GDP / head when we take into account the composite governance dummy variable. The coefficient of the variable remittances (when the log (BCF / GDP) is close to 0) is -0.062 and significant at 5%, the log (BCF / GDP) is 0.033 and significant at 10% and the estimated value of the variable interaction is significant and 0.020 to 5%. To correct the likely endogeneity of gross capital formation ratio to GDP, this variable is instrumented by its second order delay. The results remain almost the same magnitude and with a higher significance (0.042 and significant at 5%) for the ratio of gross capital formation in relation to GDP and a lower significance (10%) for the ratio of remittances to GDP.

These results show that for countries in sub-Saharan Africa with similar levels of government (above or below the median) remittances from emigrants negatively affect growth when share of gross capital formation in GDP and investment opportunities are low. This negative effect is significantly reduced if the remittances are associated with the gross capital formation or investment. The observed differences the significance of the coefficient on Log (Remittances/GDP) between column III one hand and columns IV and V for other parts show the importance of governance in the relationship between remittances, investment and growth.

It should be noted that in all estimates, all instruments seem valid since statistics Sargan / Hansen restrictions over identification is not significant at any acceptable level (p-value high enough). Statistics AR (2) Arellano-Bond test of first order autocorrelation level or second-order difference does not reject the null hypothesis absence of autocorrelation.

From the method of dynamic panel or “Sys-GMM” Blundell and Blond and data on 32 countries in sub-Saharan Africa for the period 2002-2006, we show that governance plays a key role in the analysis of relationship between remittances and growth as outlined. But unlike these early authors, it is observed, like work and Chami al. who do not distinguish the case of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, an effect negative and significant in the ratio of remittances/GDP growth rate of GDP / capita. This negative effect is real for both countries with better environment good governance for those whose level of governance is relatively weak. This indicates that the remittances are much less vectors growth in the countries of sub-Saharan Africa. They are likely to benefit less entrepreneurship, serve more to support the consumption of households poorest and create dependency which reduces labor supply and productivity.

 

I.B.4. Importance of remittances on the home economy

 

The significance of remittances in the three economies we studied is what we are going to observe in this part. We will briefly talk about the significance of the three areas that are the movements in remittances, the relationship between remittances and economic growth and the significance of remittances as a source of foreign exchange in the three economies along with a study implemented for Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka between 1977 and 2006.

The period until and including 1979 indicates a strong growth in remittances as a ration of trades before a key rise in 1980 when Sri Lanka more than doubled its remittances whereas Bangladesh and India nearly doubled in one year. This growth is encouraged by the rise in oil price happening in the mid 1970’s that results in the increase in wealth in exporting countries in West Asia and the Gulf region. The increase in wealth led to the carrying out[145] of development programs such as roads, schools, hospitals, houses and other commercial complexes. This increase in wealth resulted as well in a change in many households behavior in the oil rich areas where the tasks like cleaning, cooking and household maintenance have become neglected that they now be able to hire fulltime maids and grounds keepers to do the work resulting in an a growth in demand for semi-skilled and unskilled workers that suited India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.

Annual time series data from 1976 to 2006 is the tool for the two variables that are per capita remittances and economic growth in Bangladesh, India and Sri Lanka in this analysis. Several matters of the World Bank[146] were used to collect the data. The results indicate that the means of the time series are changing over time due to a rising tendency in both series which means that both series in their original form may evolve. The schemes of the first-differenced series of per capita remittances and economic growth in logarithmic form does not show any proof of evolving means, meaning that the per capita remittances and economic growth series can probably be integrated of order one, in other words, both time  series are I(1). In order to statistically confirm these discoveries, the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit-root test was used to officially assess the static properties of the two series.

The ADF test assessed separately the per capita remittances and economic growth series by implementing the valuation of the models via the econometric software SHAZAM and check whether there are unit roots via the methodical technique defined in Enders[147]. Next Table shows the outcomes of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) assessment for the static feature of the two original series. It is noticed that each of the two series have at least one unit root and thus are evolving in relation to their original form excluding the remittance series in Sri Lanka. The process of Engle and Granger (1987)[148] based on the assessment of a unit root in the outstanding series of the estimated symmetry correlation by using the Dickey Fuller assessment was also used.

Thus, the insignificant and substitute theories are:

• H0: The residual series has a unit root (or per capita remittances and economic growth series are not co-integrated)
• HA: The residual series has no unit root (or per capita remittances and economic growth series are co-integrated)

Rejection of the null theories would suggest that there is a co-integration for per capita remittances and economic growth series.

The results provided clearly indicates that both least square residual series are evolving and thus, there is no co-integration for the series per capita remittances and economic growth series, that means that a long-run symmetry link between per capita remittances and economic growth series in all three countries does not exist.

The following relation shows the estimation of the variance system with all variables in first-difference form and tests various theories:

 

 

Remt  = α01  + α11Remt-1 + α21Rem t-2 + α31Rem t-3  + α41Remt-+ α11Growth t-1 + α21Growth t-2 + α31Growth t-3   + α41Growth t-4  + ϵ1t

 

 

Growtht  = α02  + α12Rem t-1 + α22Rem t-2 + α32Rem t-3 + α42Rem t-+ α12Growth t-1 + α22Growth t-2 + α32Growth t-3   + α42Growth t-4+ ϵ2t

 

 

The outcomes indicate that (for assessing the null theory, H: Growth/Remittances):

• the p-values are 0.59 for Bangladesh and 0.50 for India, which are greater than the level of significance, 0.05, and
• the p-value for Sri Lanka is 0.00 which is less than 0.05.

Therefore, the null theory that “Growth does not cause Remittances” at the 5% level of significance for Bangladesh and India cannot be rejected whereas we can reject for Sri Lanka The p-value for this test is 0.04 for Bangladesh, 0.39 for India and 0.01 for Sri Lanka.

At that point, the study exposes that remittances and economic growth are both I(1) and are not co-integrated and that leads us to examine the connection between remittances and economic growth. The outcomes reveal the existence but one-way fundamental link between growth in remittances and economic growth in India while a two-way guiding connection is discovered in Sri Lanka. Though our studies in both series are static only in first difference and therefore our discoveries are more valid in the short run, the implications of the results is not the least important.

The outcomes stipulate the important role that remittances hold in the development of economic growth in Bangladesh though its significance is not satisfying regarding the economy of India, yet, that does not weaken the significance of remittances to its economy. As for the household, remittances income introduced by the expatriates does not meaningfully increase the economic security of millions of families which are excluded from a greatly collected study as this one. The outcomes concerning the connection between remittances of income for Sri Lanka are greatly substantial.

Conclusion of the first part

 

Remittances have become a source of foreign exchange for developing countries in 2007, with official remittances totaling more than U.S. $ 190 billion of which $ 110 billion went to developing countries 1. They come from 200 million migrants scattered around the world who have kept ties with their communities of origin. They travel through different channels, formal or informal, and are intended for all continents. Large countries with ancient migration (Mexico, Egypt, etc.) receive the largest amounts, but it is especially in small very poor countries that remittances represent a higher share of GDP. Between 1970 and 2005, this important source of foreign exchange for developing countries is increasing and weakly volatile, unlike foreign direct investment.

Remittances are the result of interpersonal exchanges, consequences of different motivations. The first explanation given for the existence of remittances is altruism: the migrants remit funds to their family because they want it and want to help. Opposite explanation has also been proposed: the migrant remit funds for personal interest like purchasing services with his family. A migrant worker can also remit funds to maximize his income in the host country: according to the information available to employers in the host country, remittances can be designed either to encourage or dissuading unskilled workers to emigrate.

In the context of developing countries, two other remittance motivations were notices. Indeed, these countries are characterized by particular credit markets and insurance failures. Migration and remittances may therefore be a household strategy to overcome their constraints (they cannot borrow on the market) or to diversify risk (since they cannot make the market). The migrant is subject to certain expectations from their community of origin for its success in the host country and therefore for its remittance behavior. Thus, it is expected that a successful migrant in the host country remits a large amount. A migrant who sends a lot of money acquires a high social status, while remitting a little sees prestige decrease (because the community of origin considers that a failure in the host country).

They are sent by altruistic or selfish way, under a contract of insurance or reimbursement, or due to strategic behavior of migrants who wish to increase their income in the host country or preserve their social status in their communities of origin, funds flow usually a migrant to his family.

In the short term, remittances can lead to higher household incomes in the community, especially if they are used productively and / or have strong multiplier effects. This additional income that flows from developed to developing countries, in reverse migration, has an impact on household poverty recipients.

Studies on the impact of remittances on poverty generally lead to a positive conclusion; they consider remittances as exogenous or endogenous phenomenon. However, their influence on income inequality is more ambiguous and depends on the initial level of inequality, the migration history of the recipient community and the share of remittances in household income recipients. However, when one considers remittances as an endogenous phenomenon of migration, that is to say when the situation with migration and remittances is compared with no migration or remittance at all, it appears that remittances induce an increase in inequality. Indeed, if the migrants had not gone abroad, they have contributed to the household income and residents would not necessarily have the same behavior on the labor market.

Remittances therefore have a positive impact on household income and poverty levels and an ambiguous impact on inequalities within recipient communities. These effects depend heavily on community characteristics. It is the same for the impacts of remittances at the macro level. Indeed, the volume of remittances is such that aggregate macroeconomic variables also critically influence the growth of developing countries, and this impact depends on the characteristics of the economies recipients.

In the empirical model we saw earlier, the first effect outweighs the second: migration and investment remittances are positively related. The econometric study we are conducting in Egypt will also help confirm or refute this result.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

1. Econometric modeling

 

Introduction of the second part

 

It was previously indicated that poverty, economic troubles and rude socioeconomic policies influences strongly Egypt. Until the mid-1950s, Egyptians seldom migrated internationally whereas foreigners came to Egypt. Internal migration represented a normal reaction to poverty and the rough economic actions distribution and it held a key role as a complementary mechanism since there was a beginning of Egyptian migration to the Gulf and somewhere else. The sustenance of several families in rural Egypt still depends on internal migration.

The River Nile which stands for the main source of water for agriculture for Egypt remains the factor of the spatial distribution of population and economic life. In terms of administration, Egypt is divided into 27 governorates including Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez that are totally urban. In the Nile Delta, also called Lower Egypt, there are nine governorates extending from Cairo to the Mediterranean Sea along with nine governorates situated in the Nile Valley or Upper Egypt. Another five frontier governorates are located in the western and eastern boundaries of Egypt (See Figure 1 for more details). Development efforts in Egypt were mainly impeded by a fast growth of the population which took only thirty years to double from 1947 to 1976 whereas between 1897 and 1947, it took fifty years to double, going from 9.7 million to 19 million people. Nowadays, the population in Egypt counts 72 million people. The annual growth of population is rated approximately to two percent and nearly five percent of the total land area following the course of the Nile is occupied by around 95 percent of the population while the outstanding 95 percent of the land is desert. Migration to big cities, even considered as a sort of ‘natural response’ to the geography of economic prospect, disturbed the population distribution in Egypt. A high level of unemployment is connected with fast growing population where official figures in 2004 show an unemployment ratio of nearly 9 percent while independent assessments found over 20 percent. Nevertheless, Egypt requires a sustained real GDP growth rate of at least 6 percent per year in order to control unemployment with the economy bound to produce between 600,000 and 800,000 new jobs every year so as to attract new comers into the labor force. Yet, only around 370,000 new jobs were created every year between 1990 and 1997. The magnitude of the problem is enhanced by the dimension of the informal sector and the level of over-employment in the public sector.

Egyptian migration is possibly considered as a survival and livelihood policy with nearly 2.7 million Egyptians living abroad, including 1.9 million in the Arab Gulf countries, and the harshness of overpopulation and unemployment. Considering the macro level, there are four sources on which Egypt’s economy is relying; those are tourism, remittances from Egyptians working abroad, revenues from the Suez Canal, and oil.

There is a significant impact of international remittances, the money and goods sent to households back home by working migrants on poverty, income distribution, and development in rural areas of Third World countries. The impacts of international remittances on rural Egypt, where extensive migration has been noticed in the recent years, are analyzed in this section of the study.

 

II.A. Empirical study of the correlation between poverty and migration

 

International migration is one of the most important factors affecting economic relations between developed and developing countries in the 21^st Century.  At the start of the century the United Nations estimated that about 175 million people, roughly 3 percent of the world population, lived and worked outside the country of their birth.

 

II.A.1. Methodology using regression analysis

 

The purpose of this part of our study is to examine the impact of international migration and remittances on poverty in a broad cross-section of developing countries.  In the past, a number of studies have examined the effect of international migration and remittances on poverty in specific village or country settings[149], but we are not aware of any studies which examine the impact of these phenomena on poverty in a broad range of developing countries.  Two factors seem to be responsible.  The first is a lack of poverty data; it is quite difficult to estimate accurate and meaningful poverty headcounts in a wide and diverse range of developing countries.  The second factor relates to the nature of data on international migration and remittances.  Not only do few developing countries publish records on migration flows, but many developed countries which do keep records on migration tend to undercount the large number of illegal migrants living within their borders.  At the same time, the available data on international remittances do not include the large (and unknown) sum of remittance monies which are transmitted through private, unofficial channels.

The studies lead to the discovery that both international migration and remittances play an important part in reducing the level, depth, and brutality of poverty in the developing world. Those results, after the instrumentation for the possible endogeneity of international migration and the control for several determinants, show that a 10% increase in the share of international migrants in a country’s population will lead to a 2.1% decline in the share of people living on less than $1.00 per person per day on average, and the same 10% increase in per capita official international remittances will result in a 3.5% decrease in the share of poor people after instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of international remittances.

In this part, the way international migration and remittances affect poverty in the developing world is analyzed by using cross-country. The following presents the relationship we want to evaluate by means of the basic growth–poverty model suggested by Ravallion (1997)[150] and Ravallion and Chen (1997)[151]:

 

log P_it=  α_i + β_{1 log} μ_it + β₂log g_{it +} β₃ log x_it + ϵ_it            (1)

(i= 1, … , N; t= 1, … ,T_it)

Where:

• P: is the measure of poverty in country I at time t,
• α_i : is a fixed effect reflecting time differences between countries,
• β₁: is the ‘‘growth elasticity of poverty’’ with respect to mean per capita income given by μ,
• β_2: is the elasticity of poverty with respect to income inequality given by the Gini coefficient, g,
• β₃: is the elasticity of poverty with respect to variable x (such as international migration or remittances) and
• ϵ: is an error term that includes errors in the poverty measure.

Eqn. (1) shows the basic model of poverty determination that a mass of researchers used. The model demonstrates poverty will be reduced by economic growth measured by growth in mean per capita income. It is then expected that the relationship between poverty and the income variable is negative and important. Still assumed by the model, the level of income disparity has an effect on poverty reduction. As shown by past works, poverty is reduced by a given rate of economic growth more in low-inequality countries than in high-equality countries where the variable is likely to be encouraging and important.

A variable set to measure the level of international migration or remittances to be introduced into Eqn. (1) constitutes the innovation in this study. Following income and its distribution, the theory that countries having more international migrants or receiving more international remittances are less poor is confirmed. Two different ways can size the income variable in Eqn. (1):

• (1) per capita GDP, in purchasing power parity (PPP) units, as measured from national accounts data; and
• (2) per capita survey mean income (expenditure), as calculated from household budget surveys done in the various developing countries.

These two measures of income do not naturally agree according to what Deaton (2001)[152] and others have revealed. Income expenses according to the measurement by household surveys are calculated from the answer given by individual households. Nevertheless, the GDP data got the income measure from the national accounts measuring household income as residual element, thus mistakes and oversight somewhere in the accounts inevitably have an effect on the calculation of household income (expenditure). As several elements are included in the national accounts data as well and which are not part of the household surveys, namely the expenses of non profit organizations and the imputed rent of owner-occupied dwellings, it is not a surprise that the two measures of income differ. In this study, Eqn. (1) was estimated to use both measures of income. One should note that no measure of income includes international remittance income. International remittance income should not be included in the GDP data from national accounts, and it is proposed in our experience with household budget surveys that most of these studies do not effectively include international remittance income as they do not comprise questions on remittances. Eqn. (1) have frequently been assessed by other researchers in first variances for dealing with possible correlation issue between the variables, as the dependent and independent variables come from the same single source of data, household budget surveys. Eqn. (1) is, nevertheless, estimated to be a level equation as various data has brought the dependent variables deriving from household budget surveys and independent variables for GDP, international migration, and international remittances coming from different other sources. The two measures of international migration and remittances developed in the last section are used to also estimate Eqn. (1) considering international migration as a share of country population and per capita official international remittances received by a developing country. It’s not a surprise that the two measures lack of correlation in the data set (simple correlation of 0.579) due to all the troubles implied in their construction in addition to the number of the countries with missing/incomplete migration or remittance data. Furthermore, it seems that a considerable share of international migrants may migrate without remitting. It was then practical that, in order to experiment the heaviness of our discoveries concerning the impact of international migration and remittances on poverty in the developing world, each of these variables are used. Tables 1 (using per capita GDP) and 2 (using survey mean income) show the OLS estimation of Eqn. (1) using the international migration data. Five regional copy variables come complete with the model to control for preset effects by geographic region of the world. Results in each table are exposed initially with regional models then without. With regard to the relevant variable, the results can be considered as elasticity of poverty given that all of the variables are calculated in log terms. The coefficients for both per capita GDP and survey mean income show the predicted negative sign and are important in terms of statistic in all cases. The poverty elasticity with regards to income inequality, Gini coefficient, in the two tables also shows the predicted positive sign with an extent being reliable with other recently done poverty reduction analysis.

The results for the international migration variable are negative and important in terms of statistics when poverty headcount or poverty gap is the dependent variable but if squared poverty gap is taken as the dependent variable, the international migration variable is not so important. The assessments proposes that a standard increase in the share of international migrants in a country’s population of 10% for the poverty headcount measure will lead the share of people living on less than $1.00 per person per day to decline to 1.4%.

When Eqn. (1) is calculated by the use of international remittances data, using per capita GDP and survey mean, income confirm the results. Each of the three poverty measures that are headcount, poverty gap, and squared poverty gap, are importantly influenced negatively and statistically by the remittance variable, per capita official international remittances. According to estimates for the poverty headcount measure, a standard increase of 10% in per capita official international remittances will result in a decline of 1.8% in the share of people living in poverty. Using poverty gap and squared poverty gap, being the more sensitive poverty measures, demonstrates that remittances will somewhat largely influence the reduction of poverty.

 

Table 3: OLS estimates of the effects of international migration on poverty, estimated using per capita GDP

 

 

Table 4: OLS estimates of the effect of international migration on poverty, estimated using survey mean income

 

 

Table 5: OLS estimates of the effects of official international remittances on poverty, estimated using per capita GDP

 

 

Table 6: OLS estimates of the effect of official international remittances on poverty, estimated using survey mean income

 

 

A new data set on international migration, remittances, inequality, and poverty was used by this study to observe the effect of international migration, and remittances on poverty in the developing world.

The first one suggests that both international migration and remittances influence strongly and importantly in terms of statistics the reduction of poverty in the developing countries. Outcomes for the poverty headcount measure demonstrate, following the instrumentation for the possible endogeneity of international migration, and the control for level of income, income inequality and geographic region, that a standard increase of 10% in the share of international migrants in a population of a country will result in a decline of 2.1% in the share of people living with below $1.00 per person per day. A same increase of 10% in per capita official international remittances when instrumenting for the possible endogeneity of international remittances will result in a standard decrease of 3.5% in the share of poor people. As each of these variables is incomplete and subject to underreporting in many developing countries, the discovery that both international migration and international remittances diminish poverty in the developing world is vital. The migration–remittances–poverty relationship could be tested thanks to the analysis of samples including information on each of these variables for the maximum number of labor-exporting countries providing solid evidence that both international migration and remittances influence the reduction of poverty in the developing world.

Endogeneity is the second discovery of the study where, by comparing the instrumented and non-instrumented (OLS) assessments for international migration and remittances in this paper, it was advocated that the coefficients for the instrumented variables appear to be greater and more accurately calculated compared to those for the non-instrumented variables. All this lead to the conclusion that it is possible that international migration and remittances are endogenous to poverty implying the fact that the theory of variations in poverty in developing countries bringing about changes of international migrant workers’ share and in the official international remittances sent home level cannot be excluded. Nevertheless, our discovery indicates that this endogeneity unfairness degree on poverty is not categorically significant:

• the instrumented outcomes advocate that a standard growth of 10% in per capita official remittances will result in a decrease of 3.5% in the poor people’s share whereas
• the non-instrumented (OLS) assessments submit that a same growth in official remittances will result in a reduction of 1.8% in the poor people’s share.

 

II.A.2. Methodology using instrumental variables

 

As, in our complete sample of developing countries, international migration and remittances decrease poverty, we need to look at the factors of migration. In literature review, the type of gravity model advocated by M. Greenwood and George Borjas is frequently used to study the factors of international migration. The following equation expresses such a model in broad terms:

Mij = α₀ + α₁ pi + α₂ yi + α₃ cij + ϵ

(i = 1, . ., N; j = 1, . ., N)            (2)

 

Where:

• M ij concerns the migration flow between labor-exporting country i and labor-receiving region j,
• Pi represents the population of labor-exporting country i,
• Yi is the per capita income of labor-exporting country i,
• Cij suggests is the costs of migrating from country i to j, and
• ϵ is an error term.

Equation (2) may not, regrettably, be estimated since it is probable that no information on the costs of migration is included in data set.

A recent empirical work was added to the three explanatory variables in equation (2),

In addition to the three explanatory variables (population, income and migration costs) declaring that the decision to migrate may as well be influenced by economic, demographic and political variables. From an economic view, putting both an income variable and its square in the equation is practical in order to notice whether the tendency to migrate increases then drops with the level of development of country income. Hypothesis from some other studies stipulates that migration from labor-exporting countries is promoted by other economic variables like higher rates of income inequality, inflation and unemployment. Regarding demographic factors, the argument from human capital hypothesis suggests that the ones who tend to migrate are mostly people who got higher education as they have more chance to get higher wage-earning in labor-receiving countries.

The following equation the empirical version of the migration model to be estimated when all these variables are combined together:

 

Log Mij = λ + λ₀ + λ₁ log(dij) + λ₂ log(g_i) + λ₃ log(yi) + λ4  log(yi)2 + λ₅ log(rfi  + λ₆ log(rui) + λ₇ log(pi) + λ₈ log(edi) + λ₉ log(govi) + λ₁₀ log(cri)  + ϵij

(i = 1, . ., N; j = 1, . ., N)                        (3)

 

Where:

• Dij concerns the distance between labor-exporting country i and labor-receiving region j, and for each labor-exporting country i,
• g_i represents the level of income inequality (measured by the Gini coefficient),
• y_i stands for income (measured by per capita GDP),
• rf_i is the rate of consumer inflation,
• ru_i is the rate of unemployment,
• p_i represents the population density (people per square kilometer),
• ed_i is the share of the population over 25 years with a secondary education,
• gov_i concerns is a measure of government stability, and
• cr_i is the country’s credit rating.

In estimating equation (3) all of the variables are expressed in log terms meaning that the outcomes can be taken as elasticities. Equation (3) is assessed in a stepwise way for every group of variables. As the tendency to migrate might differ depending on geographical region, model variables which have not been shown accompany the model for the different regions.

 

I.A.3. Analysis

 

The distance variable is the first and most significant outcome whose coefficient, in all versions of the model, is linked to migration in negative and important way. An average of 10 percent growth in distance to a labor-receiving region will diminish the share of international migration from a country by between 9.5 and 15.3 percent. This outcome based on flows of legal migration between countries is similar to that of other studies[153].

In Table 4, only income inequality (Gini coefficient) and per capita GDP (and its square) which are two of the economic variables have a meaningful relation with international migration. There is a positive relationship between Gini coefficient and migration meaning that countries with higher levels of income inequality generate a greater share of international migrants. An average growth of 10 percent in the Gini coefficient will increase the share of migration from 15.2 to 24.5 percent. Prima facie, these elasticities seem to be rather huge but one should remember that a change of 10 percent in the Gini coefficient is rare. Gini coefficients are generally likely to be quite stable over time.

The statistically important outcomes for the per capita GDP variable and its square are helpful and propose the existence of an inverted U-shaped curve between the level of country income development and international migration.

Replacing the per capita GDP variable and its square in Table 7 with the per capita GDP variable and its square and re-estimating the equations is useful as the study is centered on international migration and poverty.

As seen from the results, the poverty variable is not at all statistically meaningful, that is to say, the headcount index of poverty is not systematically related to the share of international migrants generated by countries although, in Table 4, the level of poverty in developing countries are statistically declined by international migration. This obvious discrepancy may be possibly explained by the substantial travel costs related to international migration, international migrants may come from those income groups positioned beyond the poverty line and whose remittances sent to poor family members at home, impact the poverty in labor-exporting countries by reducing it.

In Table 7, the demographic variables that are population density and share of population along with high school education have a positive and important relationship with migration. The first result is found to be rational as it signifies that countries with more population generate superior shares of migrants as well. The latter result agrees with human capital hypothesis stipulating that more people having received secondary education are those who tend to migrate due to the chance of getting higher wage-earning while working abroad.

Country credit rating is the last variable statistically significant in Table 4 having negative relationship to international migration. This outcome indicates that countries with elevated credit rating generate an inferior share of international migrants. This discovery can be interpreted by saying that countries with superior macro-economic management can implement a higher credit rating in the international marketplace enabling them to attract more foreign and domestic capital in order to generate more employments at home and diminish the people’s desire to migrate internationally.

 

I.A.3. Modeling

 

Reliable with the context of this model, this section is centered on the direct impacts of remittances the number of poor households. Logic poverty index denotes a standardized biased total of the income gaps of the poor. It assesses the number of the population living under the poverty line and the biased amounts by which the income of the poor is deficient of the stated poverty line. The following equation can express it:

 

p = (q/n)(l/z)[(z-m))(l-G)]

 

Where:

• q represents the number of people in poverty,
• n is the total population size,
• z concerns the poverty line, m is the mean income of the poor, and
• G is the Gini coefficient of the distribution of income of the poor

 

 

In order to experiment the impact of the determinants, namely land, predicted per capita income excluding remittances, and males over 13 years old, on how poor households generate migrants, the study uses the poverty line to assess two reviewed forms of migration equation:

 

M_ijk  =f(X_ijk,X_jk,X_k),

 

Where:

M._jk concerns the probability of migration of the ith individual in the jth household in the kth community,

X_ijk represents the individual-level variable,

X_jk is the household-level variable, and

X_k symbolizes the community or village-wide variable.

In this case, an individual i, in household j in village k, studies information and evaluates magnitudes at the individ­ual, household, and village levels.

The first reviewed equation shows that the dependent variable turns out to be the prospect of migration of males belonging to poor households. The equation expresses it as follows:

 

 

1. _k = AGE + MAR + EMP1 + EMP2 + EDUC1 + EDUC2 + LND + MALE13 + PREX + AGEHH + AGR + DIS,

 

Where:

• _k symbolizes the probability of migration of the individual in the poor or non poor household in the in the kth community,
• AGE is the age (for migrants, measured at the time of migration),
• MAR represents the marital status (one if married, zero otherwise),
• EMP concerns the employment (operationalized as a set of dummy variables explained below),
• EDUC represents the education (operationalized as a set of dummy variables explained below),
• LND is the land farmed (rented and owned) by household,
• MALE13 represents males in household over 13 years of age,
• AGEHH characterizes age of household head, and
• PREX is predicted per capita household income excluding remittances.

The international migration socioeconomic factors are stated in the equation we see above including data concerning males in relation to a given age e.g. 13). The dependent variable which is a dichotomous one (i.e. migrant/non migrant) is theorized as a function of the variables stated below:

 

Migrant/Nonmigrant =  f (Age, Marital status, Empioyment, Education, Age of household head, Land farmed, Males over 13 years in household, Predicted household income, Agriculturalists in village, Distance of village)

 

It can also be stipulated that total income abroad is equivalent to the income earned monthly abroad multiplied by the total number of months abroad for each migrant still living abroad.

 

 

Remittances = (Total income abroad) – [(Travel costs abroad)n+ (Housing costs abroad)b+ (Food costs abroad)]

 

Remittances means money and goods received by migrants still living abroad with a part already been sent home, in the country of origin. The stationary suppositions of this analysis have considered the rest to have been sent home.

Lastly, a suitable efficient form should be picked for the model to compare the way households’ way of spending money with different incomes, several socioeconomic determinants other than income can be considered. The differences in expenditure mode may be explained for instance by differences in family size or in this case to the presence and the length of time a worker spent abroad. All those variables for household features are to be built in the function in a manner which permits them to move the intercept and the slope of the Engel curve together. To do so, the variable for used for household size is HS and that of length of time abroad of migrants is MNS (months abroad) and MIG is as well a model variable for migration (1 for migrants, 0 otherwise) allowing difference in expenditure behavior along with a migrant or non-migrant household sorting. See below the complete model.

 

C/EXP = a + b (MIG) + _c (log EXP) + d (MIG)(log EXP) + e (HS) + f (MIG)(HS) + g (MNS)

Where:

• C represents the expenditure on good i,
• EXP concerns the total annual per capita household expenditure,
• a is constant,
• b is the parameter to be estimated for good i,
• HS represents the household size,
• MNS (months abroad) indicates length of time abroad of migrants,
• MIG is dummy variable for migration (which allows expenditure behavior to differ according to classification as a migrant or non migrant household).
• log EXP symbolizes log of total annual per capita household expenditure,
• (MIG)(log EXP) is migration dummy variable x log of total annual per capita household expenditure,
• (MIG)(HS) concerns migration dummy variable X size of household.

Regarding all these equations, predicted income equations is used in the analysis in rural Egypt to estimate the effect of international remittances on poverty and income distribution and it shows that there is small but positive impact of international remittances on poverty. The analysis discovers that land assets represent more significant factor of migration than predicted per capita household income as a result of a review of the socioeconomic factors of international migration for the poor. The tendency to migrate is connected in a positive and important way with tented and owned land farmed among the poor since the financial and opportunity charges of international migration require some land assets. The poor’s tendency to migrate is also linked, in a positive but not important way, to calculated per capita household income not including remittances, and this tendency to migrate rises only a little with calculated per capita household income for poor males.

 

II.B. Case studies: Egypt

 

Since the early 1970s, Egypt has been a main exporter of both educated and uneducated labor with international labor force of nearly 10% or 2-3 million workers at any point in time primarily in the Gulf States. Following the oil boom of 1973, the development plans of the oil-exporting countries in the Gulf were constrained by labor scarcities and began to import huge amount of workers from countries in the neighborhood representing a peak of 90% imported labor force by Gulf States. 5 million foreign workers migrated to the Gulf Co-operation Council[154] during the period between 1975 and 1995. Arab neighboring countries were the leader in labor exporting to the GCC in the 1970s and 1980s and by the end of the 1980s and in the 1990s, Asian nationals replaced the Arab workers. Egyptian workers outflows still continued even at a lower extent. A significant characteristic of migration from Egypt to the neighboring Arab countries represents its short-term nature given the labor and migration laws in the GCC and fixed term contracts and that makes an interesting study case of Egypt. The superior imported labor income and the level of migration brought about great entries of remittances to Egypt as well as other labor exporting countries in the region like Jordan and Yemen. It was estimated that official remittances from the Gulf countries in the last three decades amounted to nearly USD 70 billion. Egypt is one of the ten worldwide highest remittances receiving countries since in 1992; remittances reached USD 6.2 billion and have been nearly 3 billion in the last few years. Government bonds, incentive rates in banks, “own-exchange” imports and a crackdown on the black market are used by the state to attempt to rise the share of remittances introducing through legal channels. Yet, a large discrepancy among formal and informal exchange rates was considered to be a discouragement to the return of remittances via official channels in labor-exporting countries. The fact that the government maintains various exchange rates and restrictions concerning business access to hard currency until the mid-1980s stimulated the introduction of funds through illicit means at the black market rate allowing migrant workers to get at least additional 30% for their foreign currency compared to the official rate of exchange on the open market. Nevertheless, remittances inflowing through authorized channels were highly affected by exchange rate reforms by the late 1980s. The readjustment of exchange rates occurring in 1987 brought about a growth in bank deposits of nearly USD 750 million whose majority came from remittances of international workers. Egypt achieved the building of a significant cushion of foreign exchange reserves following the accomplishment of a stabilization program in the 1990s. A great increase of capital inflows is the consequence of the high degree of difference between the interest rate on the Egyptian and foreign currencies. All in all, the experience of Egypt demonstrates the influence that macroeconomic, political and institutional determinants in the labor-sending countries have in attracting remittances.

 

II.B.1. Economic situation

 

II.B.1.1. Egypt and Poverty: Statistical Data[155]

 

With a population of nearly 71.8 million, Egypt is one of the countries having low and middle turnover. 16% of GDP is constituted by agriculture and holds a significant part in the economy; industry represents 34% and 50% concerns services where tourism is the vital activity contributing to the sector.

With a percentage of import/export (products and services) of nearly 45%, economy is relatively open and where energy is the key component. Oil exports generate 40% of export earnings, while oil and electricity represent 20% of GDP. The income related to gas is increased when exports to the European Union are included. There were economic reforms led by the Egyptian government since July 2004 including reforms of the trade, taxation and finance bringing about a recovery of stock market activity. At the beginning, exports of goods and services, mainly tourism, were the determinants of economic performance but now, they are increasing thanks to the recovery of building activity. In fiscal financial year 2005, real GDP grew by nearly 4.9% and is expected to reach 6.0% in 2006.

Reducing average cost is one of the remarkable measures taken by the government, increasing from 14.6% to 9.1%, declining the number of charge levels and abolishing import taxes and surcharges. Simplifying the structure of tax rates and reducing taxes on individuals and income are among the restructuration made by the government in the law relating to income tax.

Budgets are now presented in accordance with that of the international with the IMF’s help. 17 non-financial companies have been privatized between July 2004 and March 2005 with the restart of the process of privatization.

Globally, the government has made significant progress in financial restructuration by selling its shares in joint venture banks, consolidating the sector via mergers between companies, privatizing one of the four major state banks and progressing in the reform of non-bank financial sector, a reform has contributed to the stability of the exchange rate and to improve the investment environment. Between 2004 and 2005, foreign direct investment amounted to € 3.3 billion.

Agriculture remains a key sector of the Egyptian economy. Since the mid-1980s, productivity improvements made possible by long-term commitment of the government to reform and liberalize trade and the assistance provided by donors, have contributed significantly to the increase in the production of cereals and vegetables, thereby reducing the gap between supply and domestic food demand. Nevertheless, Egypt remains a major net food importer. As part of its business relationship with the EU, Egypt is looking for better market access in accordance with the Euro-Mediterranean route sheet for trade liberalization for products which it has a natural comparative advantage. This requires continuous cooperation with Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS). In addition, attention should be focused on areas that complement trade in agricultural products, particularly rural development and the improvement of production quality.

In recent years, Egypt has undergone a series of serious budget deficits. Public deficit reached 9.1% of GDP in 2004-2005. According to IMF’s estimates, this figure should fall to 8.3% and 8.1% in 2005/2006 and 2006/2007 respectively. Despite the expected improvement in the situation, efforts to reduce the budget deficit and fiscal consolidation should continue. They will curb public debt and stimulate private investment and growth. In its efforts to improve the public finances management, the government will pay particular attention to internal financial controls.

The Central Bank of Egypt has introduced greater consistency in managing money by adopting a series of measures aimed at improving monetary policy and to depart from the approach of direct intervention of the state. As regards to the banking sector, new banking law was adopted only to adopt new minimum ratios of participation, more stringent rules to control the central bank and the government’s privatization. The supervisory role of the central bank should be strengthened. The reform also addresses the restructuring of the insurance sector, the development of capital markets and the introduction of other financial services.

The economic situation has improved, but there is still much to be done. Persistent weaknesses in the business environment have hampered the performance of manufacturing. These issues have been addressed very recently in the rates and other budget areas. One of the disadvantages is the inability to effectively implement new economic legislation, often due to inherent weaknesses of institutions regulating the economy. The private sector is facing an uncertain commercial law system in which transparency, competition and contract enforcement are far from satisfactory. An improvement in governance business is a major challenge to attract and retain investment.

Despite some improvements in social indicators during the period 1990-2002, nearly 44% of the Egyptian population is living with less than 1.7 euro per day (upper poverty line). Egypt is ranking at 119th out of 177 countries in the human development index of UNDP 2005. With a population growth rate of 2% per year and about 6,000 newcomers on the labor market each year, the per capita growth increased only very modestly. The official percentage of unemployment is 10%.

Although poverty has declined during the period, there was no decrease in regional disparities[156]. In Egypt, the test confirms that the poverty is closely linked to education and inversely proportional to the latter, over the half of the country’s poor are illiterate (against less than 30% of “non-poor”).

Egypt is experiencing a major structural problem (jobs are mainly concentrated in low productivity and non-commercial sectors), without tangible link between gains productivity and job creation. The long-term growth and strategies for poverty reduction could be threatened by a job concentration created mainly in the non-market public sector. At the same time, the private sector is not yet sufficiently attractive in terms of salary to interest a highly qualified workforce.

 

II.B.1.2. Historical background and General Trends of Migration

 

International   migration   has   always   been   considered   as a   demographic   and   socio-economic phenomenon, which is affected by both internal and external factors. The most important among these  factors  is  the  labor  market  at  the  international  level  and  the  political  conditions  in  both sending and receiving countries[157]. Egyptian government policy toward migration has gone through different phases that are  defined  by  changing  international  conditions  and international  labor  market  needs,  particularly  in  the  Arab  region.  These  phases  are connected  and  the beginning  and  end  points  of  each  phase  are  not  distinct.  There are no standard phases in the Egyptian migration literature that are agreed-upon by all researchers.

 

• The phases

• The Early Phase of Migration (Before 1974)

Historically, Egypt was a land of immigrants rather than emigrants. In the nineteenth century, students went abroad and with early Egyptian nationalism, some temporary migration for political reasons occurred in association.  Nevertheless,  systematic  migration  started  only  with  Egypt’s  provision  of school  teachers  to  Iraq  in  the  1930s,  a  program  that  spread  to  other  countries  following  the revolution of 1952 [158]. Until around 1961, other migration policies mostly concerned immigrant issues, such as the legal status of the non-Egyptian heritage population. Little focus was put on Egyptians who migrated or wanted to migrate. Political controls on migration were operational primarily through “exit visa” requirements.

In the mid-1950s, due to political, demographic, and economic pressures, Egyptians’ interest in migration started. The government was motivated to assume it by providing job opportunities.  Yet,  cumulative  population  growth,  along  with  the  lack  of  growth  in  the economic and technological sectors, weakened the state’s ability to create jobs. This phase was described by virtual full-employment, since unemployment rates were very low.

After  1967,  many  determinants  combined  to  motivate  the  state  to  encourage  migration.  The  state  had previously  imposed  restrictions  on  the  migration  of  skilled  workers,  but  in  mid-1966  it  eased migration  procedures  and  permanent  migration  began.  Numerous graduate students were tempted to stay abroad due to unfavorable economic conditions at their home country after the 1967 war, resulting in the start of the Egyptian “brain drain”. In  1971,  permanent  and  temporary  migration  was  authorized  under  Article  52  of  the  1971 Constitution, stating that ‘all Egyptians are granted the right to emigrate and to return home’.

Also  in  1971,  the  government  issued  Law  73,  giving  public  sector  employees  the  right  to return to their jobs within one year of resignation. This was then extended to two years and other legal impediments were removed. Large numbers of temporary migrants began to work in the Arab Gulf countries.

 

• The Expansion Phase (1974-l984)

The expansion phase began directly after the 1973 war. The oil embargo brought about a large increase in oil  prices,  which  was  followed  by  ambitious  development  programs  in  the  oil-producing Arab  countries.  This situation increased the demand for Egyptian labor.  The number of Egyptian emigrants was estimated by the Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMAS)[159] to be nearly 70,000 in 1970. By 1976, the figure had increased to about 1.4 million according to that year’s census.

During this period, the government further eased migration procedures.  Migration became a top priority for the following reasons:

• To solve unemployment problems,
• To use remittances to supply payment deficits and finance private projects,
• To supply Arab countries with required labor,
• To get rid of pressure caused by political and economic factors

There  was  a  sense  of  stability  in  relation  to  labor  migration,  as  government  agencies  took responsibility for organizing labor migration. Increasing  demand  for  teachers  became  evident  in  other  Arab  countries  during  this  phase. Government   reinforced   migration   from   the   health   sector,   including   doctors,   veterinarians, pharmacists, and dentists. Iraq became a favored destination for uneducated labor due to its liberal immigration  policies  towards  fellow  Arabs,  and  its  need  for  foreign  labor  as  a  result  of  the  war against Iran.

Nevertheless, the inflow of cheaper Asian and South Asian labor to the labor-importing Arab countries began to threaten Egyptian workers, thus, presidential decree No. 574 of 1981 established the Ministry of State for Emigration Affairs to oppose this.  This  new  ministry  sponsored Egyptians migrating  abroad  and  provided  them  with  a  number  of  services.  In addition, it drew up an overall migration strategy aimed at national development.

 

• The Contraction Phase (1984-1987)

The contraction phase started around 1983 following the start of the Iran-Iraq war, which depressed oil income. From 1983, the number of Egyptian emigrants decreased. From the second half of the 1980s, Egyptian migrant labor faced several new problems:

• End of the Iran-Iraq War in 1988,
• Fall of oil prices,
• Declining demand for construction workers in Arab countries,
• Policy of replacing foreign labor with nationals in the Arab Gulf states

During this period, skilled workers migrated to the labor-importing countries to replace the uneducated workers. Some countries realized plans to provide training for national workers to reduce the dependence on foreign labor.  The promulgation of the Emigration and Sponsoring Egyptians Abroad Law No. 111 of 1983 was one of the most important outcomes of this period. With its five chapters, this law is considered as the main migration law in Egypt.

 

• The Deterioration Phase (1988-1992)

This stage was featured by a significant movement of return migrants from the Gulf area to Egypt and a continuous decline in the number of contracts granted to new emigrants from Egypt, with 1988 taken as the base year, the number of contracts reached the half in 1989. This big decline was due to the decrease in the number of contracts with Jordan, Iraq, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab Gulf countries.  In  1990,  the  number  of  contracts  further  declined  to  43  percent  (of  the  base  year 1988).  In 1990, however, contracts with Saudi Arabia and Libya increased.  The Gulf War of 1990 forced almost all Egyptian immigrants in Iraq and Kuwait to go back to Egypt.

 

• The Recent Phase (1992-2004)

After the Gulf War, migration rates went back almost to status quo ante the beginning of the war. Receiving countries wanted to reduce the number of immigrants.  In addition, many returned migrants settled down in Egypt. The discoveries of the latest census of 1996 stipulated that the number of migrants abroad was nearly 2.8 million.

 

• Migration and Arab Spring[160]

From the emergence of popular uprisings in North Africa and the Middle East, the European media and politicians were worried about the prospect of breaking a « tidal wave » of North African and European. These predictions were not based on sensationalist or scientific basis, and we should not find it surprising that they do not realize it.

Migration in its various forms has nevertheless played a role in the uprisings that have spread through these regions. Vehicles fleeing Libya cities and besieged villages, migrant workers waiting for repatriation in detention centers in Egypt and Tunisia, boats stranded on the island of Lampedusaand in which piles of Tunisians and Africans SSA wanted to cross the Mediterranean Sea and return to Cairo. Many emigrants and academic students who want to join the Tahrir Square demonstrations are only a few examples to show how this took place between the intersection of human mobility and the events in North Africa.

Some recent phenomena of migration cannot be reduced to a mere side effect of revolutions. The potential links between, on the one hand, the potential reduction of migration from North Africa to Europe (because of the economic crisis and the intensification of border controls) accompanied by disadvantaged youth and disenfranchised sense of exclusion and discontent, and on the other hand, protests in the streets in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Algeria and Morocco, deserve a closer attention.

As a starting point, it is useful to make a distinction between uprisings themselves, and transition and subsequent consolidation of new political regimes. Such distinction allows a clearer view of both schemes mobility patterns of intersection between migration/displacement and uprisings across time and also engagement models that have been adopted by international agencies in a rapidly changing situation policy otherwise there would be a risk of loss under the generic label of “Arab Spring”.

 

• From the North shore:

The mass of documents, policy statements and position papers that were published by the EU institutions during the year highlights the anxiety that is felt against the exodus of people from North Africa to the western shores of the Mediterranean. Even though this exodus never occurred, it is this striking image of an “invasion”, which accompanies the mythic status of the Italian island of Lampedusa, which undoubtedly permeated public perceptions and policy responses of the Member States of the EU. The EU response to the migration-related conflicts in North Africa has also highlighted the tensions between internal and external dimensions of governance migration. The Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)[161]EU as of November 2011, sought to reframe the EU approach on four “equally important” pillars to facilitate immigration legal and mobility, to prevent and reduce illegal immigration and trafficking, to maximize the impact on development and promote international protection and the “capacity of the external dimension of asylum policy”. Even though this is a step in the right direction away of seemingly unilateral prejudices on security issues, GAMM (despite the more moderate tone) still remains encased in false and misleading dichotomy of “legal” and “illegal” migration. Enforcement actions and migration control are central and remain paramount, and the enhanced role of Frontex, which has seen its operational budget explode to spend 6.3 million Euros in 2005 to almost 42 million in 2007, 87 million Euros at end of 2010, represents such a priority. The point is sea mortality of about 2,000 migrants in 2011 alone (according to the Council of Europe), at a time when the Mediterranean became one of the most militarized and heavily patrolled in the world, is a stark reminder of the gap between the EU rhetoric and the reality of how they practice development and respect for human rights.

The popular social and political unrest and outbreaks towards more democratic forms of government in North Africa have upset comfortable relations and collaboration on emigration which had been established between governments in Europe and North Africa. In years before the revolutions, the EU and its North African counterparts thought the « undesirable » problem of crossing external borders of Europe, if not solved, was, at least, going to be so. In more migration regimes progressively more restrictive, EU has outsourced its border controls in North Africa countries through initiatives such as bilateral agreements between the former regime in Libya and Italy, Tunisia and France and Morocco and Spain. Instead of stopping migration, these measures have increased the illegal nature of migration and led to a geographical diversification in terrestrial migration routes and sea to and from Africa. Thus, the migration becomes more expensive and more risky for migrants and therefore they also become more vulnerable to exploitation and suffering. Those who make policy decisions in the EU seem to rarely consider the side effects.

 

• From the South shore:

Hundreds of thousands of sub-Saharan Africans and other migrant workers were trapped in Libya during the civil war and sought refuge across the Egyptian or Tunisian border suddenly revealed public as a global scale migration within the same Africa. It is generally on migrant workers from more than 120 countries that this conflict has displaced. Because of its “eurocentricity”, the reports that have been given practically ignored the profound impact that the Arab Spring has had on the country of origin of different migrants. This concerns not only the potential role of these repatriated during political violence in countries such as Mali, but also the fact that many families in extremely poor countries are now receiving private income from vital remittances from abroad since the return home of migrant workers who were in Libya. In many ways, the returning migrants exchanged insecurity against insecurity. Many migrants were in fact migrants who had lived in Libya for years. Following the conflict, most of them sought to return home, which invalidates the idea that the Arab Spring would cause a mass exodus to Europe. However, the most vulnerable group consisted of migrants and refugees who were unable to return home because of the danger it posed to them and/or because they did not have the money or the necessary contacts to organize their escape. They found themselves stuck in a situation that the migration researcher Jorgen Carling described as relevant “involuntary immobility”. Other migrants did not want necessarily to return home, to the extent that they fled insecurity, persecution and hardship in their own countries, and that they lived in North Africa in the Middle East for several years or even decades. Among these groups are Sub-Saharan migrants and Tuaregs in Libya of Iraqis, Palestinians, Somalis and Syria, and Sudanese and Somalis in Egypt. Policy instability, the economic crisis, the rising cost of life and unemployment and a growing insecurity (due to a reduction of police activity) have made these groups even more vulnerable than they already were. Massive leaks were largely limited to the case of Libya, and there has been no major increase in emigration from other countries of North Africa. Increasing Tunisian emigration was facilitated by the reduction of policing during the revolution, but is part of a long tradition of maritime illegal migration to Europe that has existed since the country in Southern Europe have introduced visas for North Africans in the early 1990s.

Considerable changes have already been brought by the Arab spring and it will not stop there. Social movement triggered political changes for the first time in recent Arab history. In the long-term, one can anticipate it to produce overall impacts on migration such as on people’s movements, on the awareness of migration-related questions by opinions and states, and on policies in all migration-related concerns. There will certainly be change, but no one can say in advance its direction and magnitude. If the purpose of revolts is the setting up of regimes that meet peoples’ demands and establish trust, both economically and politically, emigration can be expected to steadily loosen and even some return migration to occur. However, the opposite movement is expected to occur if revolts freeze and fall short to offer political freedoms and economic security. In addition, anticipating how governments who still remain to be established will deal with migration-related problems is somewhat impossible.

 

• Migration activities from and to the Arab countries since the beginning of the Arab Spring[162]

During the time this was written, migration statistical information after the start of the Arab spring is enormously insufficient and does not make possible a complete answer to these questions. Yet, it proves that former trends just kept on going on. Only Germany, Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom are the EU countries which provide annual statistics of (legal) immigrant stocks by country of citizenship until 1 January 2012. In those annual statistics, an increase in migrant stocks from Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Lebanon and Syria has been noticed in 2011. However, there was no noticeable break in 2011 when observing the movement over the last five years. The annual increase in total migrant stocks from these was 90,839 in 2011, while in 2010, it was 67,214 and 111,738 in 2009. In addition, migrant streams from Morocco alone constituted the 72% increase in 2011, where street manifestation is only of a restricted degree and brought about an even political change rather than a revolution. Relatively, the Egyptian  emigration has grown the most between 2007 and 2011 including a growth by 19% in Germany, 22% in the United Kingdom, 45% in Spain and 58% in Italy whereas in 2011, it hardly increased and there was no noticeable flow.

This is the same case for all six Arab states. It can be concluded from data available at the time of writing that Arab rebellion did not generate any modification in earlier tendencies of legal migration to Europe. Immediately following the start of revolution in both countries, Tunisia and Libya became the place where boats left the port with scores of clandestine migrants and refugees towards Italy. 42,807 persons were recorded to illegally enter Italy by sea between January and September 2011, most of them came ashore in the Island of Lampedusa where the population represents is only 4,500 people whereas it was less than 5,000 in 2010 and less than 10,000 in 2009, and an annual average of 18,788 in the previous decade. The following three notices must be made in order to analyze the situation: first of all, illegal trip occurred mostly in Spring 2011, this is when police forces were messy and where there was no coastal control in Tunisia; secondly, several non-Tunisians, 18,451, that is 47% of the total, including over 17,000 Sub-Saharan Africans, representing a number of 17,342, were clandestinely transported to Italy together with Tunisians in 2011; and lastly, the peaking in 2011 of illegal entries in Italy had a connection with their decline in Malta and Spain to such a degree that, if combined together, illegal entries for all three countries happened in greater numbers in 1999, 2006 and 2008 compared to 2011.  All the afore mentioned facts propose that: firstly, among the 29,685 illegal Tunisian migrants recorded accessing in Italy in 2011 were pushed to travel due to the existence of an opportunity, i.e. the absence of border control, rather than a reply to a structural change, a revolution that was just starting at that time in this case; secondly, there were clandestine migrants who would otherwise have taken another itinerary, like travelling from Senegal, Mauritania or Morocco to Spain, seized the same opportunity. As a result, revolutions would have more redirected current streams of illegal migration than encouraged the emerging of new ones.

While Arab revolts did not produce any significant inflow of new migrants to Europe, neither regular nor irregular, apart from a short-lived movement of peopled smuggled from Tunisia in the first days of the revolution, events in Libya and in Syria resulted in considerable population displacement. During the spring and summer 2011, approximately 1,128,985 people escaped Libya who was destroyed by war to Tunisia, Egypt, Niger, Algeria, Chad and Sudan, as well as to Italy and Malta. Those people were divided into three categories including firstly Libyans, in number of 422,912, who searching for refuge in a neighboring African country. Most of those people are believed to have gone back to Libya at the end of the war in autumn 2011. The second category included migrant workers from all over the world, mainly from Arab and Sub-Saharan neighbors of Libya. This category stands for a huge yet undefined part of the recorded 706,073 foreign-nationals who left Libya during the events. And thirdly, there were the refugees, that is to say people who were living and working in Libya and who required protection but are not recorded as refugees because the status is not recognized by Libya as it does not belong to the 1951 Geneva Convention. These people had hailed from Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Chad and other countries in Africa. Many of them were likely to be unable to come back to their home countries and were stuck in Egypt, Tunisia or Algeria.

The journey back home or to a country of refuge was always a deplorable experience for people escaping from Libya. But the most hazardous itinerary was the trip across the Mediterranean to Europe. Nearly 1,500 migrants and refuge seekers died were drowned while crossing the Mediterranean from Libya to Europe during the first half of 2011, whereas no huge numbers of people dying were recorded among those who were crossing the Sahara in the opposite direction away from Libya. The second refugee crisis initiated by the Arab Spring began in Syria in the summer 2011 and took a run-up in 2012. At the time of writing, it is hard to guess how it will evolve.

 

• Challenges relating to migration probable to follow the Arab Spring

For the last decade, among the triggers of migration from the Southern Mediterranean were seen joblessness and underemployment, primarily of young educated people; the difference in terms of wage differentials between the North and South; the magnetism of Europe relating to advanced skills and education; the wish to be mingled in European cultures and lifestyles; and for family reunification. After the Arab Spring, these reasons for migrating still remained; they have, perhaps, only strengthened because of the enforced instability and uncertainty in the region.

Since revolutions begin to fall down, for the time being, and as there are, now, elections all over the Arab World, consolidating their regimes will get indispensable for newly rising governments. Establishing new governments will be hard considering the long histories of tyranny and dictatorship, and democracy is still unpracticed by several leaders, as well as nationals, in the Arab World, let alone Islamic democracy, no matter what this may mean. The leaders who rule the countries having recently underwent revolts lack of experience but are now responsible of the government of the nationwide economies, social concerns, and foreign policy (all while establishing the versions of democracy of their states, actions which have been highly praised by the West, but are somewhat undemocratic now and then when they are implemented). The past taught that years and even sometimes decades of instability always follows revolutions. For that reason, the migratory pressures mentioned afore probably increase in this period. The region’s economies were also dreadfully affected by instability due to Arab Spring. Despite the resume of Libyan oil production and Egypt remaining a producer of natural gas, there was a disintegration of other sectors of the economies all over North Africa and the Middle East. In 2010, Egypt’s economy leader, i.e. tourist industry, generated approximately $13.6 billion in income[163]. In 2011, the country registered a drop of approximately 35 per cent with just $9 billion. Syria has been put under economic sanctions by Western and Arab governments due to the current civil war that happens there which has claimed the lives of 12,000 people. Syria’s economy has been impacted and the path towards upturn seems to take a while. In addition, foreign investors who constitute a great help in the stabilizing of these economies are frightened by instability that reigns throughout the region.

Migration has, for the most part, become neglected in public debates in the Arab countries whereas regime and state consolidation, and economic and social concerns monopolize priority. In this situation, migration policy is pushed into the background as “bread-and-butter” concerns, thus migration management is not the priority. Furthermore, MPC collaborative survey in Morocco indicated that current EU attempts at migration management, Mobility Partnerships, do not attract Arab leaders in their current form, and migration will probably continue with or without such a management tool. Libya has been attracting migrants once more as it has been a country of immigration for hundreds of thousands of Tunisians, Egyptians and Sub-Saharan Africans and less South-East Asians and Eastern Europeans. Yet, a further destabilization of the situation in the country could result in new exodus. Now, elections have been delayed until July 2012, meanwhile, the interim government suffers several difficult concerns such as the absence of experienced leaders acclimatized to tribal loyalties to govern the country; the amplified propagation of weapons within tribes and society during the revolution; increasing terrorist elements all over the country; and brutal ethnic arguments which go against the respect of human rights. Libya’s neighbors, Mali, the Horn of Africa and Chad, could also generate more refugees which create supplementary refugee movements in the Southern Mediterranean because of their own internal disagreements. Refugee exodus could also persist if the Syrian government keeps on committing violence against its people. Lebanon and Jordan, and to a lesser extent Turkey, are stuck with previous refugee streams from Iraq, and Iraq is still recovering and soothing after the invasion led by the US and consequent civil war. There is a risk that the refugee situation become very complicated for these countries of first refuge so that people can probably look for shelter in another place.

 

 

The idea that revolutions radically transform patterns of long-term migration seems rather unlikely. The same processes that created favorable conditions for revolution are also those that lead to emigration, and it is possible that these two phenomena are mutually reinforcing. In this region, a new generation has grown up, better educated, with more aspirations but also more aware of opportunities that exist elsewhere and injustice in the country of origin was not any other previous generation, and they feel rejected and angry because of high unemployment, corruption, inequality and political repression. The arrival of adulthood and a new generation made that conscious young men and women grew angry at both the emigration and the revolutionary potential of Arab companies. Even under the most optimistic scenarios, the idea of ​​stopping the emigration is improbable. It is certain that populous countries such as Egypt have important poor potential of emigration for years to come. However, the choice of destination, Europe or elsewhere that these migrants will do will depend mainly on the future economic growth in Europe and elsewhere. At the same time, it is likely that the Libyan economy based on oil continues to depend on labor migrants, and Egyptian and Africa Saharan migrants begun to return to Libya. For the political elites of the region, migration has played an important role as a safety valve to the extent that the possibility of emigration abroad has eased the pressure to obtain reforms to unemployment, discontent and the internal political situation. It is likely that this lack of opportunities migration has contributed to direct attention and anger inward, and it tipped the scales in favor of the revolutionary forces. In addition, Egypt and Tunisia, migrants and political exiles were very certainly played an important role in supporting revolutions. What will be the impact of policy reforms and possibly modes of more democratic governance on the migration and migration policies? Some observers argue that more conservative nature and religiously inspired current and future governments could contribute to increased emigration aspirations of secular elites, minorities and women whose rights could be compromised. On the other hand, possible reinforcement of respect of rights with respect to their own citizens could also push North African companies to further reflection and self-criticism against xenophobia and violations of the migrants and refugees’ rights, and make governments less inclined to work with safe migration policies of European countries.

 

·         Immigration to Egypt

–          Voluntary migration

As stated by the most recent Egyptian Census of 1996[164], the number of immigrants living in Egypt reached 116 000 including 94 000 living in urban areas, and 22 000 in rural areas. They were only 0.1 % of the whole population in the 1996 Census.

Presently, there are several thousand Americans, Europeans, and other non-Arabs in Egypt working on projects funded by foreign governments, international agencies, and private charitable groups. The United States placed over 2,000 diplomatic staff in the country. The majority of this staff is working for the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), managing most of the several socioeconomic aid programs in Egypt[165].

As stated by the Egyptian labor regulations, the number of non-Egyptian employees in any establishment must not surpass 10 percent of the total work force for unskilled or semiskilled workers. For skilled workers the limit of foreigner labor is 25 percent. The Egyptian labor market is controlled by the Labor Law No.137 for 1981. However, a new “Unified Labor Law” has been drafted and is now under parliamentary discussions. The proposed law includes 270 articles that address all the legal features regulating the Egyptian labor market. The new law aims at swelling the private sector contribution and at the same time accomplishing a balance between employees’ and employers’ rights.

Foreigners who want to work in Egypt have to be granted work permits and follow the matching regulations delivered by the Ministry of Manpower and Migration in this regard. After obtaining work permit, the foreign national’s visa whether tourist or temporary is converted into a work visa with the same length as the work permit.

It’s easier to obtain work permits for technical staff than for unskilled or semiskilled workers. Work permits are generally granted to foreigners for a period of ten months, and then it is easier to renew them afterwards.

The percentage of migrants working in Egypt was around 28 % of the total foreigner population 15 years and over who were seized in the 1996 Census. Over the half of the employed resident migrants came from Arab countries (58.1 %), followed by those who came from Europe (21 %), from Asian countries (6 %), and from North America (6 %). At the time of the 1996 Census, 71 % percent of the working migrants were employed in the private sector.

Regarding the professional structure of the working migrants, nearly 25 % of them were specialists, i.e. having scientific occupations, then professionals, technicians and managers (17 %). Around 10 % of the migrants were working as assistants of technicians and specialists. The similar percentage applies to craftsmen and services and sales. 8% practiced in agriculture. Working migrants who were involved in other occupations represent but a small ratio.

The total number of work permits for foreign workers in Egypt in 2002 was 17,897. Including 5,005 first time permits, and the remaining 12,892 was for renewals. Work permits for nationals of Arab countries consist of nearly 50 % of the total work permits issued in 2002, followed by European countries natives with 26.3 %, and 14 % for Asian countries natives. This geographical distribution of foreign workers in Egypt matches the discoveries of the 1996 Census outcomes showed in the previous section concerning the percentage distribution of foreign national employees, excluding the obvious rise of Asian countries natives working in Egypt. This possibly advocates that a minor change in the pattern of foreign employment in Egypt arose between 1996 and 2002.

 

Table 7: Number of Work Permits Issued for Foreigners in Egypt by Type of Permit and Main Nationality Groups (2002)

–          Forced Migration (Refugees)

People escaped to Egypt after the 1917Bolshevik revolution in Russia, the Armenian massacres in Turkey in the 1920s, and from the two World Wars. Egyptians hosted 25,000 Croats in 1944[166] and during World War II, it hosted the Albanian and Greek governments in exile, several African nationalist politicians or their families, primarily those of Kwame Nkrumah and Patrice Lumumba, found refuge in Egypt during the 1960s.

The term “refugee” as used in this analysis includes Palestinian refugees who start arriving from the mid-1930s, with mass arrivals in 1948, 1967, and 1990-91[167]. It also comprises people of other nationalities who have been called as refugees by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). In Egypt, it is the UNHCR that determines refugee status but not the Egyptian government. Thousands of refugees unrecognized by UNHCR also keep on living in Egypt[168]. The core source of refugees has been wars and massive human rights violations in Africa and the Middle East. Of the thirty refugees’ nationalities known in Egypt, Palestinians constitute the major groups, followed by Sudanese, Somalian, Ethiopian, and Eritrean. Other nationalities arrived in minor numbers, but groups of significant size arrived from Afghanistan, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Yemen, and Burundi. UNHCR is also in charge of the stateless in Egypt.

Currently, Cairo, Egypt’s capital, “accommodates one of the five largest refugee populations living in urban areas” in the world[169]. This valuation is based on the number of asylum seekers received by UNHCR. It is difficult to give exact figures of refugees in Egypt and ‘guesstimates’ range from 500,000 to 3 million. Although all refugees in Egypt face similar hardships and predominantly rank among the poorest of the poor, each community in Cairo shows its uniqueness in its different cultural and religious background.

 

• Emigration and data[170]

• The volume migration

Nasser has developed with “Infitâh” (political liberalization and economic opening) from the 70s the migration of Egyptian workers in extremely limited time basically towards Arab oil country. Given the number of important publications aroused by this phenomenon, the lack of reliable statistical data on the volume of emigration may seem surprising. To this was especially the migration which led to quarrels figures that are essentially polemical, where scientists more temperate in their estimates of the disputed land to the press and government statements. President Mubarak himself has advanced the figure of 2.5 million workers by the end of 1985. At the same time, Ministry of Emigration proposed meanwhile the 4.5 million Egyptians abroad. An economic columnist for the daily Al-Ahram proposed the figure of 9 million Egyptians abroad at the end of 1985 and a renowned world sanitary measure told that there were 3 million Egyptians living in these countries[171] returning from a trip to Iraq. Publication of results of investigations of CNP (1985) and CAPMAS (1987) offers an opportunity to finally try to make an assessment of the likely volume of temporary emigration Egypt.

If one believes the results of the investigation CNP, emigration would have received between 1974 and 1984 about a quarter of the Egyptian workforce, or 2.8 million workers. However, it seems that Egyptian emigration has truly developed “later on” for 70% of investigations have left Egypt between 1980 and 1985; these immigrants accounted for 83% of emigrants at the time of inquiry and only 58% of former emigrants. With an essential difference with the investigation of CNP, CAPMAS’ survey has limited estimate in terms of stocks: it does not attempt to measure the overall volume of emigration since 1974. Thus CAPMAS proposed as stock assessment of Egyptian workers abroad in October 1987 to 1,964,000. This figure includes both temporary emigration and permanent emigration. Now, on the one hand, it seems that the latter has, in recent years, slowed considerably in favor of temporary emigration, and on the other hand, on the 1964 000 Egyptians abroad, 1,578,000 have migrated to Gulf countries employing mostly temporary workers. We can therefore conclude that there was in October 1987, 1,578,000 active and inactive or temporary migrants representing 80% of the global migration, including 1,429,668 emigrants are assets (90.6%), 126,240 attendants (8%) and finally 22,092 “visitors” (1.4%). The permanent emigration, meanwhile, concerns 366,000 people in October 1987.

In reading these data, we can first remember that immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon: it is particularly developed with the 1980s. Thus, between 1985 and 1987, and it is given in results from the comparison of the two surveys, that the stock of emigrants is between 1.5 and about 1.6 million, while the sum of net emigration since 1973 was 3.5 million people. In addition, and in line with this observation, these two surveys seem to relativize the commonly accepted idea of ​​a final return and mass of emigrants from 1984. And the last general census of the population conducted in November 1986, in mid-term between the two considered surveys, declared 2,225,000 population emigrating temporarily or permanently. If we use the estimate of CAPMAS of 1.964 million people emigrated in 1987, it must be concluded that between these two dates, there has been a net decrease in migration.

However, if we compare the survey reported by CNP that there were 1,474,000 temporary workers in early 1985, and the CAPMAS which found 1,578,000 in 1987, this time we are tempted to infer the existence of a progression, or at least that of a resumption of flow from 1986 and 1987. The news is too hot, the inadequate and different statistical decline founded in order to rule on this point. However, the rumor of a major tender for the reconstruction of Iraq which meet one Egyptian workforce most be affected by the previously difficult living conditions, has been confirmed in several centers of Egyptian research. As a recent phenomenon, emigration would be far from completed. Given the individual benefits associated with migration, saturation of the Egyptian labor market and “media noise” on macro-economic consequences of emigration, the question that arises is why emigration has not been greater.

 

• The destination

Taken from CNP investigation, results indicate that four countries received 84% of Egyptian workers still abroad in 1985, they are is Iraq (35%), Saudi Arabia (30%), Kuwait (12%), the Jordan (7%). The surprise of this distribution is undoubtedly the number of Egyptians in Iraq in early 1985, even if that country keeps the first place as host of the Egyptian workforce: less than 450,000, whereas most previous estimates often exceeded wind million.

The survey indicates that the CNP countries of employment have changed in rank during the decade when the share of Libya and Jordan have been considerably reduced. With regards to Libya, the observed reduction is due to the deterioration of relations between the two countries, while in Jordan it is the national economic difficulties which explain the contraction opportunities for Egyptian labor. But reducing Jordanian and Libyan markets was offset by the growing importance of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and also from the early 80s, by that of Iraq, which takes the place of Saudi Arabia at the forefront importing Egyptian workforce. The CAPMAS survey in 1987 confirmed this hierarchy of destinations.

Egyptian emigrants: Iraq with 37% and Saudi Arabia with 33% appear here to be the two largest employers in the Egyptian labor. Furthermore, CAPMAS’s investigation seems to establish a link between the destination of the labor and the migrants’ social origin: 53.5% of emigrants in the case of Iraq would be rural against 36.5% in the case of Saudi Arabia and 10.2% for Kuwait.

 

• Features: selectivity of migration

All available data in the two surveys with respect to gender, age and qualification of migrants suggest this process is more and more selective. In fact, the requirements of the importer country combine the evolution of the internal characteristics of the Egyptian labor market. The confrontation between the supply and demand gives this image an atypical immigrant population compared to the non-Egyptian immigrant population.

The investigation of CNP is the first of its kind to provide accuracy on the characteristics of migrants compared to non-migrants. Indeed, the methodology identifies three categories of assets: current migrants, former migrants and non-expatriates. The CAPMAS survey, meanwhile, has so far presented so partial preliminary results on the characteristics of emigrants. The comparison between the two surveys is limited. According to the CNP’s survey results, 96% of migrant workers (former emigrants as current migrants) are men against 86% not in the labor force emigrated. The average age of migrants is 32 years against a little more than 37 years in the not emigrated workforce. However, in respect of current emigrants, they are on average 4 years younger than their predecessors. In fact, 49% of present emigrants are fallen in the range of 20-30 years old against only 32% in the former emigrants. The higher age, the 30-39, is about 36% for one former emigrant against 29% among today’s immigrants. Emigration therefore mainly drains, and more with time, young adult males working age to be productive. Emigration is therefore a significant drain on the youth labor force.

Regarding the marital status of migrants, we find that married men migrate less frequently during the recent period. In fact, 65% of today’s migrants are married against 80% of their predecessors. As for the non-immigrant workforce, it is composed of married workers to 74%. This decrease in the proportion of married men seems to enjoy a part of “single” (26.5% among today’s immigrants against 14% among former emigrants), and secondly to “engaged” (11% and 5.5% respectively). This double phenomenon is explained by the young immigrants’ lack of financial resources to get married and by extending the engagement period that follows. Marriage and installation appear now to be among the main causes of young immigrants’ departure. For their part, the Arab Gulf countries seem to operate for more economic crisis for a selection of unaccompanied migrant. Indeed, the visit rate became lower (0.94% among the emigrants against 5.5% of their predecessors). Thus, while some countries

Arab deliberately limit family reunification and much more visits, other countries such as Iraq and Jordan provide such living conditions for immigrants that the installation is particularly difficult for familes.

It seems that for some time, as the selection is made by the number of children: the latest wave of immigrants have fewer children load average (2.77) than older immigrants (2.90). This is explained on one hand by the lack of enthusiasm with which the host families receive but on the other hand by the fact that migrants represented more single men and engaged. It is the same for “Other dependents”. The average per capita decreases quite significantly over the recent period reaching 0.98 in current migrants against 1.46 among former emigrants. Over time, the selectivity played in favor of immigrants whose family burden was less important.

Another form of selectivity also increased: one that establishes the education of migrant labor. On this point the two investigations together: if non-graduates continue to be the largest share of immigrants – the illiterate and people knowing only to read and write represented 56.2% of former emigrants (CNP) or 51.2% (CAPMAS) – these categories show a significant decline in recent years: 53.7% in 1985 emigrants (CNP) and 43.5% in 1987 emigrants (CAPMAS). This decline was mainly performed for the benefit of “Bacc + technical education” categories and diplomas. In 1985, after the CNP, 25% of current emigrants against 21% of former emigrants had received training from Bacc or technical education; in 1987, based on the results of CAPMAS, the rates are as follows: 25.7% to 23.6% against immigrants today for former emigrants. The graduates of higher education represented 12.5% ​​of former emigrants and 11.4% of current emigrants in 1985 (CNP) and 20% and 23.7% (CAPMAS). It remains that the two categories are offset larger compared to the non-immigrant population. The “Boats and technical” and university graduates represent 18.7% and 9% of non-immigrant population in 1985 (CNP).

In addition, the selectivity is also on the type of qualification measured here from CNP’s figures alone. In former emigrants, industrial technical specialties (18.5%) and general education (60.8%) were more prevalent than in the rest of the workforce (respectively 9.1% and 58%). Current migrants account more specialized skills: twice in agriculture (10.6% instead of 5.8%) and one and a half times more in trade (19.6% instead of 12.7%). However, the industry retains the same importance on the different waves of immigration (18%). These developments are realized at the expense of general education: 49.4% among current immigrants against 60.8% for the former emigrants. With respect to the same motivations of departure, the principal merit survey of CNP is radically call into questioning the “Explanation” systems generally used to account for the logic migration, in particular what has been written about “the search for consumption patterns” being appropriate “ostentatious”, but also an image of migration as a process, thoughtful, to make possible « primitive accumulation » which finds its culmination in time of return migration. The results of the survey show CNP’s “Saving for buying durable goods” is cited as a cause of starting as it is 2.2% among former emigrants against 4% for current emigrants.

Emigration appears over the entire period as a solution, the more immediately accessible, to improve living conditions and employment prevailing in Egypt. According to the survey of CAPMAS, the definite returnees in the time of the survey (October 1987) had been pushed initially to 55.5% by the cost of living and 34.8% reunited financial resources to marriage and the home. The CNP offers, meanwhile, a more detailed breakdown through that lack of income being the primary stimulative cause to departure: it is cited by 63.5% of former emigrants and 59% of current emigrants. Living conditions, saving for marriage or acquisition of housing are cited in equivalent proportion to those of CAPMAS, respectively 31%, 37% and 17.5% for current migrants. The remaining innovative aspect of these investigations highlighted the apprehension of unemployment where it was cited by only 5.5% of former migrants interviewed in the CNP’s survey, unemployment is initially considered as an incentive to 27.6% of current migrants. With these figures, therefore, two waves of migrants emerge: beyond the improvement of reproduction labor force, the common denominator of the two waves, the current migrants are fleeing their predecessors more than the prospect of unemployment. In fact, the unemployment rate in Egypt, which was 2.5% in 1975, progressed slowly until 1984, where it reached 6%. But the general population census in 1986 suggests unemployment singularly up to 14.7%. Current SOAT emigrants are not further the unemployed. In fact, in 1984, unemployment affects 95% of first-time job seekers, rates rising steadily since 1970 when it concerned “only” 90% of this category. However, we have seen that the current emigrants are increasingly young and free of family commitments. This does not contradict the idea that the qualification of “new immigrants” tends to rise: graduates are indeed, as noted Leila El Khawaga, the first hit by the crisis on the market employment.

Moreover, migration is no longer perceived as significantly a financial source to implement, back in Egypt, a productive project. “Saving for a project” and “save to buy land or immovable property” are mentioned by respectively 6.1% and 3.2% of former emigrants and by 5.8% and 6.4% of current emigrants (CNP). Migrants do not appear in the “hardening of entrepreneurs” even if the statements collected by investigators aimed primarily at “excusing” the initial decision.

When returning to Egypt, the economic difficulties (rising unemployment, weak job creation 1980s) that prevail there would not encourage migrants despite themselves to invest in small-scale production as the only alternative means of livelihood. In addition, the new migrants’ income injected into the Egyptian economy have not led to an increase of small-scale production, even if migrants are not directly involved in productive projects.

 

• The return of emigrants

The question of the impact of migration on Egypt’s economic structures can be understood from the changing characteristics of the stock of permanently returned migrants. Indeed, CNP, and occasionally CAPMAS, provide detailed information on the mobility sector, geographical, professional, consumption patterns of permanently returned migrants. The results of these investigations are estimated to 1,583,000 between 1974 and 1985; 18.5% of them have returned between 1974 and 1979, and 77.5% between 1980 and 1985. Among the permanently returned emigrants between 1975 and 1979, 35.9% be returned from Saudi Arabia against Iraq 9.8%, in the second returns final wave, between 1980 and 1984, the proportion is reversed: 42.4% of definitively returned migrants worked in Iraq, against 22.2% in Saudi Arabia.

 

• Sectorial and geographical mobility

The sectorial and geographical mobility offer little surprise after their final return, migrants seem to return in the industry and in the place where they resided before departure. Before their departure from Egypt, the 36.6% of definitive returnees worked in the agriculture, 27% in services (public and private) and 12% in the building sector. Upon their return, 32% of them return to agriculture, 29% to services and 10.3%for the building. Obviously it is impossible to know if these are the same people who, from an industry, return after working abroad. So, structure sectors of employment abroad are just that of former emigrants before and after their return: 36% of former emigrants were employed abroad in construction, 20% in services, 12% in trade and hotels and 9.6% in agriculture. But emigration could be the step back in time, after which Egyptians return to their home industries. If this is the case, emigration could no longer be seen as promoting the acquisition of new qualifications.

Geographical mobility goes in the same direction: the former emigrants come to 52.2% in rural areas of low and high Egypt. Upon their return, they return to the same areas to 52.1%. For their part, the major urban centers housed 24.2% of returning migrants before their departure abroad and 19.3% of them upon their return. This decrease occurs at advantage of low medium-sized cities and Upper Egypt: 23.3% of the former migrants before their departure abroad and 28.5% on their return to Egypt. These changes do not seem to reflect a high geographical mobility. In any case, they run counter to the perception that emigration encourages rural exodus, that is to say, the passage of the hand-implementation of a rural area and emigration to urban areas.

During the reference period, finally returned migrants from abroad were 94.7% employees against 4.4% self-employed. Not surprising since it is known that migration abroad is accompanied by a real salaried. For cons, the return seems to favor a relative increase in the number of self-employed: while 71% of former emigrants were  employees and 20% self-employed before departure abroad, 68% are employed and 23.6% become self-employed in their return. The revenue structure of former emigrants after emigration dedicated a clear shift towards non-wage income: 80.8% of the former emigrants received a wage before back of emigrating. This relative decline is in favor of increased profits: 14.4% of former emigrants earned profits prior to emigration and 25.2% after return. While the benefits of productive activities were 38.2% from services, 21% from agriculture and 20.7% from commerce among returning migrants before their departure, the return is accompanied by a net profit growth of business activities (25.6%) to expense of service activities (34.1%) and agriculture (22.5%) in the composition profits hit by former emigrants returning to their Egypt. This small increase in entrepreneurship, business in the first place, is more apparent through the structure of income sources and through the employment situation, suggests the hypothesis of multiple concomitant development. Everything happens as if the phenomenon increased in the second activity was not declared on the occasion of the investigators’ questions on the work situation, but became hardly concealable in issue ssources of income.

The analysis of the increase in savings among the emigrants suggests another hypothesis, aligned to the first: the income earned by emigrants and injected into the economy would be used for the construction, other than small industrial projects. By iteration, even if remittances are not directly an expansion of productive investment, they nonetheless retain a stimulating important effect on national production. In fact, 25.7% of the former emigrants’ savings are used in the construction of residential housing (19.2%) and habitat improvement (6.5%). This position of the most important in the structure of savings actually stimulates the small private sector construction, less than 10 employees, which includes 74.9% of the building workforce in 1982, an increase of 16 points compared to 1972. The private sector of more than 10 employees do not seem to benefit from these savings and remain marginal in employment in the construction sector: it provided jobs to 2.2% of the workforce employed in 1982, sales decreased by 0.4 points compared to 1972. In addition, the second position of use of the former emigrants’ savings consists of cash assets and deposits (18.9%). However, it is impossible to know this from hoarded savings and hand placed in the banking system.

 

II.B.2. Internal and international migration

 

There is a complex relationship between migration and development. While migration involves a change of place of usual residence and development means growth and better living conditions, measuring the relationships between these two theories is difficult[172]. The relationships between migration and development were studied by means of migrants remittances impact assessment, especially remittances of international migrants, enforcing economic theories of migration since Ravenstein’s laws of migration  until the latest economic theories of migration such as the “new economics of migration”[173], going through Lee’s theory of migration[174], the dual economy model of development and migration introduced by Lewis[175], later extended by Fei and Ranis[176], and the work of Todaro and Harris in this field.

Theoretical models were suggested to measure the connection between migration and development[177]. Nevertheless, empirical studies expose various effects of migration on development depending on the type of movement, i.e. permanent versus temporary or circular, impacts of remittances, and the original stage of development.

A recent study by de Haas (2003) on migration and development in Southern Morocco points out the importance of internal and international migration in supporting livelihood variation among households through remittances of labor force working in other places in Morocco or internationally. This study indicated that households that receive international migration remittances are open to investment than other households. With regards to the connection between internal migration and development, several studies point out the significance of internal migration as a means to avoid poverty and reduce regional economic disparity. Yet, one may rightly wonder whether it is migration and development or migration and poverty mitigation. Development means growth and evolution whereas poverty mitigation consists in moving ahead from the poverty line. There is no need to say the impact of migration differs depending on the phase of development of the sending region/country, type of migration whether it is internal, circular, or international, and the magnitude of remittances.

 

II.B.2.1. Internal migration

 

Internal migration in Egypt has mostly been:

• from South to North: “South” means the governorates of Middle and Upper Egypt which represent a narrow strip of green land on both sides of the Nile. Holding the role of limited opportunities for either vertical or horizontal agricultural expansion through magnification of the already highly intensive agricultural regime or expansion of cultivation to new areas, there was been a feeling of growing population pressure for the last hundred years. Among the reactions to this pressure appears a strong flow of migration to the north.  The major providers of migrants to the North have been Souhag, Qena, Aswan, and Assiut. Hassan (1969)[178] valued the net loss from the South to the North at nearly one million over the first six decades of the twentieth century. This figure is, of course, far more inferior than the size of internal migration noted in recent decades, but the entire Egyptian population was itself far more inferior in the past; it was only 19 million in 1947. El-Badry (1965)[179], after elaborate calculations, opposes that the four southernmost governorates exported a net 13 percent of their combined population to other regions in Egypt during these same decades. From the 1960s to the 1990s, the similar movements continued, but with some disparities. For instance, Aswan has become more of a population exchanger, having seen a noticeable drop in its net loss.
• from South and North to the Canal Zone: until the 1947 census, this area was divided into two governorates regarding administration: the Canal, including the two cities of Port Said and Ismailia, and Suez. The census resulted in the subdivision of the Canal into two distinct governorates currently known as Port Said Governorate and Ismailia Governorate – with the latter incorporating significant rural areas. The surge of migrants to the three governorates started the opening of the Suez Canal in the 1860s. The two neighboring governorates of Daquhlyya and Damitta accounted for the majority of the provision to Port Said. The majority of the surge to Ismailia was supplied by Sharqyya. Qena, in the deep South, supplied the largest share of the net migration gain of Suez.
• from Egypt’s hinterland to Cairo and Alexandria: the two largest Egyptian cities have been the greatest attraction for migration. In addition to importation of their net population from the South, the two cities attract comparable inflows from the Delta. The capital city of Cairo has been the center of nearly two-thirds of the academic studies on Egyptian migration. Inthe long term, net gain received by Cairo from the South amounted to about 40 percent of its total in-migrants. The balance of 60 percent has been supplied by the Delta governorates during the twentieth century. The majority of this hinterland contribution to Cairo’s population has come from Menoufia, Souhag, Assiut, Gharbia, Daquhlyya, Qualyoubyya and Qena[180]. The momentum of recorded population inflow started to loosen only in very recent years. Cairo is the choice of Egyptian migration students over Alexandria, even though it is the second largest city and exposes many of the same demographic dynamics. Alexandria knew net migration gains since the turn of the century, though at a smaller rate than Cairo. The same as Cairo, Alexandria received most of its migrants from Menoufia in the Delta, and from Souhag, Qena, and Aswan in the South. Other migrants from the Delta have come from Behera, Gharbia, and Kafresheihk.
• from Egypt’s centre to its peripheries: from the late 1930s and beyond, a minor flow of migration took place from the centre to the Red Sea and Sinai areas. (Of course, the flow to Sinai was interrupted during the Israeli occupation years, 1967–84). Even if it seems very small in absolute level, it appears big in relative terms due to the low population of these areas. Qena, Souhag, and Cairo itself were the major providers of migrants to the frontier areas. The development of the coastal resorts of the Red Sea and South Sinai will probably encourage further migration to these developing coasts, causing the tourism industry to emerge from its present idleness. As asserted by several studies, the greatest convergence of migration flows is in the Greater Cairo Region, including Cairo, Giza, and Qualyoubyya governorates[181].

 

• One-Step versus Multi-Step Migration

It is meant by one-step migration the direct movement from the place of origin to the place of settlement, whilst multi-step migration is about transitional stays in a third place before final settlement.

There is no information on the number of steps in the migratory process from Egyptian census data. Yet, few old small sample surveys throw light on this point[182]. The presented evidence shows that the great majority of migrants to Cairo, for instance, have come to it directly from their communities of origin, going around small and medium-sized towns. One-step migrants represented 78 percent of the whole in one sample survey. Another sample survey showed that only 13 percent of the migrants had undertook more than one travel between the point of origin and the destination, the remaining 87 percent having undertaken one-step migration[183]. The spatial distribution of population, transportation, and settlement in Egypt, combined with the long establishment of migration streams most likely represent the lack of a stepwise migratory process in Egypt.

 

• Characteristics of Migrants

Some studies of internal migrants of Egypt demonstrate their features where most of them focus on the statistical age and sex structure whereas a few describe the migrants’ occupational, educational and socioeconomic profiles. The global deductions stipulates the strong dominance of males over females, and of young over old as well as the lack of an obvious “selection process” regarding migrants’ socio-economic features.

Yet, the studies indicate the migrants’ tendency to be of relatively higher educational and occupational background compared to their peers in the origin country, but lower compared to their peers at the land of migration[184].

Among the strongest determinants encouraging internal migration in Egypt is the hope of better work opportunities which enable migrants to escape from poverty. Nevertheless, in spite of the importance of this determinant, only some studies on Egyptian migration appraised in this part have specifically concentrated on it. One of those studies was accomplished by Toth (1999)[185] where he led anthropological investigation on migrant farm laborers in Kafresheihk governorate (in the lower Delta region) in 1980-82.

Toth defined a combined migrant labor pattern out to work sites surrounding the northern Delta region of Egypt. He looked for the reason of poor farm laborers’ migration in order to work in non-agricultural fields. The two main reasons mentioned were seasonal unemployment and the region’s underdevelopment, while Toth’s analysis also integrated a powerful political economy prospect which connected rural migrant workers to a control by the state of labor incomes in the 1960s and 1970s’ public infrastructural and development projects context.

 

• The Decision-Making Process

Decision-making process in migration were the center of some studies where appraising this limited literature, communication, inducement, and facilitation appear to be three key variables explaining the differences in migration forms among rural Egyptians who then look like having the same socioeconomic profiles. Two empirical studies carried out during different periods, Ouda 1974 and Saad 1976, discovered that migrants had first- or second-hand information about the destination where they chose to migrate when they are still at their country of origin. Pre-migration visits to the destination country were commonly practiced and the knowledge of the destination came first from friends, relatives, or the media. Accomplishing army services was a manner to familiarize with urban areas as well. The factors of migration motivation were either influence from relatives and friends, or the need to rival others in the home community. The variable which facilitates migration is the actual or expected help upon migrating to the new community, where relatives, friends, and co-villagers simplify new migrants’ arrival and settlement, for instance in terms of housing and work.

 

• Modes of Adjustment

Janet AbuLughod’s work has been the inspiration of the majority of the studies on migrant adjustment in Egypt. While some researchers have dealt with rural migrant adjustment in urban areas, others have concentrated their work on the adjustment of a specific type of migrant[186]. It was discovered that the common characteristic of the adjustment form among migrants is the looking for help from relatives or friends in the new community concerning the accommodation, and/or employment, and easing the integration within the new community. The new migrants often live with or near older migrants from their original community; this constitutes the reason of the formation of concentrated groups of migrants from closely-related backgrounds in some or other impersonal urban world. These groups help the new comers in finding employment nearby or in places where relatives, friends, and people of similar background work.

 

• Causes of Internal Migration

The following push determinants are cited by most of the studies on Egypt’s internal migration:

• Increasing Demographic Pressure: it is often assumed from the increasing population density and rapid population growth in the twentieth century[187]. Demographic pressure is not in itself considered as a cause of migration; it turns out to be a fundamental determinant when arbitrated over a link with economic resources like employment, income, or land. In Egypt, high population density is presumed to be related most significantly to the extent of cultivable land. With the increase of pressure, a growing population which cannot rely on the land has to move and, in this case, migration plays a “safety-valve” role.
• Declining Economic Opportunities: they are described in the case of rural areas by the increasing number of landless families and the growing division of land-holdings due to legacy, thus bringing about progressive difficulty for a family to meet their needs; and the low salaries that those who can find employment locally have to undergo[188].

Adams (1986) confirmed that, in order to survive, the rural poor in Egypt uses internal migration from rural to urban areas. During the winter, December to March, where agricultural laborers are less in demand, it was noticed that poor farmers temporarily migrate to Cairo in search of unskilled labor. Many of these poor farmers worked temporary as brick-carriers, cement-mixers, laborers, and porters with the recent boom in the building industry in Cairo.

Aldakhil’s (1999)[189] more recent study advocated that low income levels in Egyptian rural governorates motivate people to get to high-income governorates. Hypothetically, migration narrowed inter-governorate wage differentials, but it is hard to check this hypothesis with statistical evidence as it hardly exists. Aldakhil discovered that individual’s decision to migrate is encouraged by the unemployment rate being its major factor. Though the official rating of rural unemployment by the Ministry of Manpower shows 11 percent, this figure may conceal a huge underemployment and veiled inactivity. High level of unemployment at origin certainly encourages migration from rural and urban areas. Migration to urban areas is more receptive to unemployment than migration to rural areas.

• Scarcity of Services and Other Social Amenities: several authors have gathered data to prove the relative deficiency in some areas of Egypt in education and health services terms. The supreme differentials are obviously between rural and urban Egypt. Despite the fact that Cairo and Alexandria are among the urban centers, they have an uneven share of these resources contrary to provincial capitals and smaller towns[190].

Push factors inspire the decision to leave the community of origin while pull factors determine the destination. The majority of studies of Egyptian migration have emphasized the remarkable concentration of production, employment opportunities, services, wealth, and political power in the main urban areas of Egypt, including primarily Cairo and Alexandria. Due to this concentration, Cairo and Alexandria has become unchallenged attractions for the country’s internal migrants from both rural and smaller urban areas.

 

• New Types of Internal Migration

New kind of human movement was created by the increasing difficulties the Egyptian population has to face in finding profitable employment. Youth in rural areas, where agriculture is the base of economy, undergo a different set of employment issue compared to young people in urban areas, where there is a variation in the economic base. This new kind of migration is called “survival migration”[191]. In the Egyptian case, migrating  to  cities is the only way for rural youth, who represent the surplus  of  the  agricultural  sector, to survive,  but  their migration  to  urban  areas  is  rather  unusual compared to  classical  rural-urban  migrations  because of agrarian   systems   and   agricultural   seasonality.   Their   way of migrating   is   circular/pendular   and does not depend on agricultural seasons since at any point of time, extra labor exists.

The major motives for migrating are undoubtedly economic. Cairo and Alexandria provide better wages representing  nearly the  triple of  those  in  rural  Egypt,  rather  more  regular  work  and  thus  more regular income, a more stimulating way of life, and the opportunity to help family members in the origin country.

Circular migration cannot be compared to the definition of migration based on literature, defining it as the permanent or semi-permanent change of habitual residence. It can be typologically classified as “labor circulation” or “circular migration”. Normally, only specialized surveys can detect circular migration. Census data cannot seize it since change in the usual place of residence is not implied in circulation. In the case of labor circulation, an even more precise kind of circular migration concerns a periodical move from permanent residence to seek for wage employment in remote place in order to travel daily[192].  Labor  circulation consists in  not  changing  the  legal  residence  in  the  village  but  working in a different place  for  longer  periods.  This kind of movement can be related with permanent full-time employment at the destination, but generally implies non-permanent labor in the informal sector of the urban economy.

A particular survey was used by Zohry (2002) to seize the phenomenon of “labor circulation” between Cairo and Upper Egypt by interviewing 242 migrants, and discovered that the circular movement is a “survival strategy” used to support the basic needs of migrants’ families still remaining in Upper Egypt. To ensure a decent life for their families, Upper Egyptian workers are bound to live miserably in Cairo. This marginalized group that the capital’s large informal economy partially absorbed has some likenesses with refugees in Cairo regarding living and working situations. Male are the dominant genre in this kind of migration as such migration is not socially suitable for women.

 

II.B.2.2. Rural-Urban migration

 

Table  5 presents an overview  of  inter-governorate  migration  for  urban  and  rural  areas  by  rural/urban  origin  or destination  for  the  last  three  censuses, 1976,  1986,  and  1996.  In  Table  8  as well as in later  tables based  on  census in  this  study,  the way of recording migration  the comparison of present residence with previous residence in another  governorate. No time limit exists on the inter-governorate residential move. Therefore, the move could have happened one year or twenty years before the census date. In the latter case the record may count the similar people as being migrants   through   consecutive   censuses,   excepting the case where they die or move to another governorate frontier. There is then no information on the length of a migrant’s residence in the censuses.

 

Table 8: Urban/Rural Migration by Type of Movement, Egypt, 1976–1996*

 

	Census Year
	1976	1986	1996
Urban–Urban	2, 577,959   (64.3%)	3, 003,054   (72.9%)	2, 535,864   (60.4%)
Rural–Urban	984,469   (24.6%)	540,933   (13.1%)	562,471   (13.4%)
Urban–Rural	260,295   (6.5%)	422,955   (10.3%)	949,489   (22.6%)
Rural–Rural	186,724   (4.7%)	152,296   (3.7%)	147,611   (3.5%)
Total	4, 009,447   (100%)	4, 119,238   (100%)	4, 195,435   (100%)

 

Source: Calculated from the 1976, 1986, and 1996 census data (CAPMAS 1979, 1989 and 1999)[193]

 

*Place of current residence vs. place of previous residence

 

The following argument should arise two further background records in mind. The first one is governorates are divided into ‘urban’ and ‘rural’ areas. In the majority of governorates, the ‘urban’ is made of the governorate capital along with the smaller ‘district’ capital settlements, whereas the ‘rural’ is constituted with villages, dispersed rural settlements, i.e. satellite villages and hamlets, and Bedouin encampments that are located in the frontier governorates only. New Valley, Matrouh, North and South Sinai, and the Red Sea constitute frontier governorates with only nearly one percent of total population of Egypt. Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, and Suez forms the four entirely urban governorates. Secondly, it is important to note the very rough magnitude and uncommon configuration of governorates that is commanded by unique geography and population dispersal of Egypt.

There was a decline in rural to urban  migration showed by the  ratio  of  total  migration  occurring between 1976 and 1986 ranging from 24.6 percent to 13.1  percent. Between 1986 and 1996, the percentages did not really change, but there was a slight growth in the volume of movement while viewing the global Egyptian population increase. In opposite, urban to rural migration grew from 6.5 percent to 10.3 percent of the total inter-governorate streams between 1976 and 1986, then to 23 percent in 1996. Interurban migration is the greatest by changing from 64.3 percent in 1976 to 72.9 percent in 1986 and to 60.4 percent in 1996. Inter-rural migration represented the type of movement with the slightest significance with about 4 percent at each census.

The aggregate data in Table 5 may produce other points like the amazing stability of the total migration recorded in each of the three censuses which is just a little over 4 million. This amazing stability is  partially explained  by  the method used by the census to measure  migration,  whereby  the  same  individual  migrant  keeps on being  recorded  at  every census  as  a  ‘migrant’  never mind the length of  his  or  her stay  there.  On  the  other  hand,  the dispersal of migration kinds, interurban, rural to urban, and so forth, indicates that the nature  of  migration  streams  is  undeniably  evolving.  Total  migration  seems, therefore, to  remain  static, while  the  individual constituents  of  that  movement  are  evolving.  Two  striking  tendencies  can  be underlined, those are the severe drop of rural to urban migration between 1976, to 984,000 representing 25 percent, and 1986 to 541,000 representing  13  percent,  and  the  similarly  severe  increase  of  urban  to  rural  migration  between  1986 to 423,000 representing 10 percent and 1996 to 950,000 representing 23 percent).

 

II.B.3. Labour migration

 

Egyptians are famous to preferring their own soil with only but few are leaving to study or travel; and they always come back … Egyptians do not emigrate[194] and this until the middle of the twentieth century with few exceptions. Just small numbers of Egyptians, notably professionals, had migrated before 1974.  Then, in 1974, the government removed all limitations on labor migration. The change occurred at a time when Arab Gulf states and Libya were  realizing  major  development  programs  with  funds  from  the  quadrupling  of  oil income  in  1973.  The  number  of  Egyptians  working  abroad  in  the  Arab  region  around  1975 hit nearly 370,000 as part of total migrants of around 655,000[195] and by 1980, over one million Egyptians were working abroad. This figure more than doubled by 1986 with calculations showing 2.25 million Egyptians abroad (CAPMAS 1989). The appearance of foreign job occasions eased some of the pressure on local employment. An  important  share  of  many of these  workers’ earnings  were  sent  to  their  families  in  Egypt.  As  early  as  1979,  these remittances  amounted  to  $2  billion which equalized the  country’s  earnings  from at the same time cotton exports, Suez Canal transit fees, and tourism.

The foreign demand for Egyptian labor reached its top in 1983, when a valued 3.28 million Egyptians laborers worked abroad. After 1983, political and economic developments in the Arab oil-producing countries brought about a decline in employment opportunities. With the decline in oil prices during the Iran-Iraq War, the Arab Gulf oil industry had to enter into a recession causing some Egyptians’ loss of jobs. The majority of expatriate workers stayed abroad but new labor migration from Egypt greatly slowed down but this does not prevent the number of Egyptian workers abroad from exceeding2.2 million in the early 1990s.

Most of Egyptian labor migrants are supposed to normally come back home, but thousands abandon their  country  each  year  with  the  purpose  of  permanently  resettling  in  different  Arab  countries, Europe,  or  North  America.  These emigrants are mostly professionals who received higher education, primarily doctors, engineers, and teachers. Iraq was the Arab country willing to host skilled Egyptians as permanent settlers. Iraq, which required   agricultural professionals specialized in techniques of irrigation, encouraged Egyptian farmers to migrate towards the sparsely populated but fertile lands in the south. Apart from the Arab countries, the United States was the favorite destination.

 

II.B.3.1. Temporary Migration

 

Egypt is now undergoing the so-called “permanence of temporary migration”[196]. In the last three decades, streams of provisional migrants to neighboring Arab countries surpassed permanent migration to Europe and North America.  Official seconding through government authorities on the basis of bilateral contracts constitutes one of the main forms of provisional migration, with work chiefly in Egyptian companies’ branches, particularly the construction sector.

According to CAPMAS figures, the total number of Egyptian provisional migrant workers is nearly 1.9 million. Saudi Arabia, Libya, Jordan, and Kuwait are the origin countries of most of the demand for Egyptian work. Those who migrate to these countries include 87.6 percent of the total number of Egyptian migrant workers. In recent years, and following the end of its civil war, Lebanon turned out to be a new destination for uneducated Egyptian migrants who work in construction.

To the end of the 1980s, Egyptians in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries constituted a much smaller ratio of the foreign workforce compared to that in the late 1970s before great construction plans were achieved.  In the 1980s, 40 percent of the total foreign labor in Saudi Arabia was Egyptian laborers with a smaller workforce being in Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE. The variation of the quantity of migrant workers to Iraq and Libya in the last three decades was impacted by political pressures namely the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the political and economic penalties on Libya.

 

Table 9: Temporary Egyptian Migration by Receiving Country, Egypt 2000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Receiving Country	Number of migrants	Percentage
Saudi Arabia	923,600	48.3
Libya	332,600	17.4
Jordan	226,850	11.9
Kuwait	190,550	10.0
UAE	95,000	5.0
Iraq	65,629	3.4
Qatar	25,000	1.3
Yemen	22,000	1.2
Oman	15,000	0.8
Lebanon	12,500	0.7
Bahrain	4,000	0.2
Total	1,912,729	100

Source: CAPMAS (2001)

 

Figure 4:  Percentage Distribution of Temporary Egyptian Migrants by Receiving Country, 2000

 

Other Countries

7%

 

UAE

5%

 

Kuwait

10%

 

Saudi Arabia

49%

 

Jordan

12%

 

 

Libya

17%

 

Contracts  for  Egyptians  to  Work  in  Arab  Countries:  The  total  number  of  yearly contracts shows the stream of migration and its changing aspects.  While tracking the total number of contracts for Egyptians to work in Arab countries from 1991 until the newest available data for 2001, we notice that there is a fluctuation in data sequences. This is possibly connected to the migration and politics close relation.

The total number of contracts increased from a very low level of 589 in 1991 to 39,812 in 1992, after the Gulf War. Contracts reached their top in 1993/94, and then declined abruptly to hit the lowest level in the 1990s in 1999.  Yet, the figure has started to improve in the last few years. The total number of contracts proposed in Table 9 denotes contracts through the Ministry of Manpower and Emigration but do not that of the overall streams of migration from Egypt.

 

Table 10: Number of Contracts for Egyptians to Work in Arab Countries (1991-2001)

 

Year	Number of Contracts
1991	589
1992	39,812
1993	83,464
1994	83,458
1995	49,372
1996	9,601
1997	4,643
1998	7,201
1999	6,586
2000	17,652
2001	14,722
Total	317,100

Source: General Directorate for External Employment, Ministry of Manpower and Emigration.

 

Both educated and uneducated people are comprised in Egyptian provisional migration ranging from scientists and technicians to laborers.  Men are represent at  least  90  percent  of  provisional  labor  migration  to  the  oil-rich  Arab countries  since 1970.

Construction where the sector where most  workers  were employed during  the  earlier  stages  of  substantial  work  movement  in  the  mid-1970s. From then on, there was an increase of the ratio of scientists and technicians and  the  laborers’  share  has  declined  even if  it  still  constitutes  one-third  of  emigrants  in  2002. Uneducated  workers  face  competition  from  new  inflows  of  cheap  labor  from  Southeast  Asia.  The proportion  of  scientists  and  technicians  increased  from  20.4  percent  of  the  total  occupations  in 1985 to 40.2 percent in 1990 and the level for 2002 almost equalized that for 1990. Egyptians usually practice jobs that are rejected or cannot be done by citizens of receiving countries for lack of training. Length of stay abroad differs according to skill level.

 

Table 11: Percentage Distribution of Contracts for Egyptians by Occupation Between 1985 and 2002

 

	Occupation	1985	1990	2002
1	Scientific and technicians	20.4	40.2	41.0
2	Managers	0.3	0.3	2.4
3	Clerical workers	8.8	8.0	1.5
4	Sales and services	18.5	17.3	12.7
5	Agriculture, animal husbandry and fishing	8.9	5.3	8.6
6	Production workers	43.0	28.9	33.8
	Total	100	100	100

Source: Ministry of Manpower and Emigration

 

 

Most highly skilled Egyptian workers are gathered in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Kuwait, UAE, Qatar, Yemen, and Oman with technical and scientific migrants to these countries representing between 69.1 percent in Yemen to 40.5 percent in Saudi Arabia. Lebanon has the top percentage of unskilled migrants where they are around 75 percent of the total number of Egyptian migrants. Iraq and Jordan are at the second place, with unskilled laborers representing 69.2 percent of migrants.  Unskilled laborers constitute some 50 percent of the Egyptian migrants to the UAE.  In other Arab countries, the proportion of unskilled Egyptian workers is between 37.4 percent in Qatar and 7.7 percent in Yemen. Most of the skilled Egyptian workers gathered in the Gulf Cooperating Council (GCC) countries along with Libya whereas Iraq and Jordan and the GCC countries engross mostly the unskilled Egyptian migrants.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 12: Percentage Distribution of Egyptian Migrants by Occupation in Arab countries, Egypt 2002

 

	Country	Occupation						Total
		Scientific and technicians	Managers	Clerical workers	Sales and services	Agriculture, animal husbandry and fishing	Production workers
1	Saudi Arabia	40.5	0.4	0.3	20.6	7.1	31.1	100
2	Libya	57.0	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	34.0	100
3	Jordan	1.4	0.0	2.1	1.7	31.9	62.9	100
4	Kuwait	53.5	1.1	9.6	21.5	0.2	14.1	100
5	UAE	41.1	4.0	1.0	2.9	0.9	50.1	100
6	Iraq	2.6	0.0	0.0	1.5	33.0	62.9	100
7	Qatar	51.5	1.9	2.1	6.1	1.0	37.4	100
8	Yemen	69.1	18.1	4.0	1.1	0.0	7.7	100
9	Oman	52.9	8.1	2.0	4.1	1.4	31.5	100
10	Lebanon	0.0	0.0	2.0	2.3	21.1	74.6	100
11	Bahrain	27.2	5.5	9.3	24.3	0.0	33.7	100
	Total	39.0	2.4	1.5	12.7	8.6	35.8	100

Source: Ministry of Manpower and Emigration

 

 

II.B.3.1. Permanent Migration

 

Political, economic, and social developments from the early 1960s resulted in some Egyptians permanent migration to North America and European countries. According to CAPMAS figures, the total number of permanent Egyptian migrants in non-Arab countries is to some extent over 0.8 million (824,000) where some 80 percent of them are gathered in five countries: USA with 318,000 (38.6 percent), Canada with 110,000 (13.3 percent), Italy with 90,000, Australia with 70,000, and Greece with 60,000. The remaining 20 percent are settled principally in Western European countries like the Netherlands, France, England, Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Spain.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table 13: Estimated Number of Permanent Egyptian Migrants by Country of Destination, Egypt 2000

 

Country of Destination	Number in Thousands	Percent
U.S.A	318	38.6
Canada	110	13.3
Italy	90	10.9
Australia	70	8.5
Greece	60	7.3
Netherlands	40	4.9
France	36	4.4
England	35	4.2
Germany	25	3.0
Switzerland	14	1.7
Austria	14	1.7
Spain	12	1.5
Total	824	100

Source: CAPMAS 2000- ‘The United Evaluation 2000”

 

Figure 5: Percentage Distribution of Permanent Egyptian Migrants by Country of Destination,

2000

Other Countries

12%

 

France

4%

 

 

Netherlands

5%

 

U.S.A

39%

 

Greece

7%

Australia

9%

 

It aly

11%

Canada

13%

 

 

Figure 6: Geographical distribution of Egyptians abroad

 

 

Other Countries;

306,000

 

Italy; 90,000

 

Canada;

110,000

Saudi Arabia

923,600

U.S.A;

318,000

 

 

 

Other Arab countries;

239,129

Libya

332,600

Kuwait;

190,550

Jordan

226,850

 

Source: CAPMAS in IOM (2010a). Data refer to 2000

 

The statistics given by CAPMAS are just figures collected from the reports of Egyptian embassies abroad, records of cross-border streams from the Ministry of Interior, emigration allowances from the Ministry of Manpower, and some other sources which differ from those of the receiving countries.  For instance, the Italian government asserts the number of Egyptians in Italy is nearly 35,000 whereas it is 90,000 for CAPMAS which may require a revision.

The Travel, Migration and Naturalization Department (TMND) of the Ministry of Interior gathers data on Egyptian emigration via forms submitted by Egyptian citizens in Egypt (Form No. 348) or by naturalized Egyptians living abroad (Form No. 349). Yet these data that CAPMAS[197] collected do not include all Egyptians who were established internationally. The total number of permanent migrants amounted to 590 in 2000, including 221 travelled in their capacity as permanent migrants and 369 were naturalized. These figures appear to be obviously excessively low. The number of male migrants amounted to 441, which represents around 75 percent of the total figure. The highest number of migrants is in the USA, 158 migrants, comprising 70 percent of those who started their migration from Egypt. Those who were naturalized are generally in Italy with 113 migrants representing 30 percent of those who were naturalized. Permanent  migrants  were  mostly in  the  age  groups  of  30-39  and  40-49  years old.  There are 185 migrants in these two categories, which represent nearly one-third of the total number of recorded permanent migrants. The first age group gathered younger migrants who started their permanent migration from Egypt, whereas the second age group is constituted with those who were  naturalized  abroad  and are  older. Migrants working at foreign entities with those who have never worked represent a figure of 388, which are nearly two-thirds of the entire migrants.  The total number of migrants having university degrees and postgraduate degrees is 271, which represents 46 percent of the total number for 2000.

 

Table 14: Number of Emigrants and Who Acquired the Nationality of Another Country

While Being Abroad, Egypt 1991-2000

 

 

Year	Emigrants from   Egypt	Acquired another   nationality while being abroad	Total
1991	797	360	1156
1992	765	444	1209
1993	494	337	831
1994	701	371	1072
1995	1395	453	1848
1996	769	484	1253
1997	451	549	1000
1998	381	501	882
1999	258	475	733
2000	221	369	590

Source: CAPMAS (2001): “The Permanent Migration of Egyptians 2000”

 

 

II.B.4. Illegal migration

 

The individuals in less developed countries’ desire to move to a new land, settle down and work in the host country to improve their standards of living and socio-economic conditions and escape poverty in their hometown encourage illegal migration. “Illegal migration is severely criticized by both people and officials who considered it as a negative move that should be abolished”. Despite the  tightened  policy  adopted  by  the  European  community,  mainly  following  the Schengen agreement in 1990 and the Maastricht Treaty (visa requirement, severe boundaries watching, and selective upper limit for work permits imposing), illegal migration amplified along with its networks, mainly from Morocco to Spain across the Straits of Gibraltar and from Tunisia and Libya to the nearby Italian coasts and islands across the Mediterranean. In matter of statistics and  owing  to  the  underground  character  of  this  people’s migration,  it is not easy to give precise  figures  of  the  numbers implicated. Despite the fact that the governments of sending countries established measures to end illegal migration, they cannot completely eliminate it. Likewise, the governments of host countries in Europe cannot manage to prevent the movements of illegal migration.

 

II.B.4.1. Typology of illegal migration and legalization[198]

 

There are various forms of illegal migration or illegal status depending on people’s movement and citizenship. There are cases where migrants could cross international boundaries without suitable documents or at times, they cross boundaries with legal documents but they stay longer in the country of destination than allowed by visas which make them illegal migrants. In some other cases, legal migrants could be qualified as illegal migrants because of changes in legislations in relationship with specific citizenships or the change of the policies on work permits or residence.

See below the list which summarizes the major types of illegal migration:

• Illegal international Borders Crossing: it consists in crossing border illegally from the country of origin to the country of destination, and this is made directly or through a transit country without the right documents that the authorities of the transit country and the country of last destination request, if applied.
• Overstaying Visa: it consists in crossing border illegally from the country of origin to the country of destination, and this is made directly or through a transit country, with the right documents that the authorities of the transit country and the country of last destination request, if applied, but this time, the migrant stay longer than allowed by the issued visa.
• Illegal Work: it consists in crossing border legally from the country of origin to the country of destination, and this is made directly or through a transit country without the right documents that the authorities of the transit country and the country of last destination request, if applied, but once there the migrants work illegally whereas, at the beginning, the visa is meant for other reasons such as tourism, medical treatment, or else that doesn’t allow visa owner to join the country of destination’ labor market.
• Illegal Stay due to Changes of Laws and Regulations: it consists in crossing border legally with legal stay, but the laws that control the stay have changed to impact a fraction of legal migrants and qualify them as illegal, at this usually gives them a deadline to legalize their status or to go back to where they come from.

The ways for an illegal migrant to become a legal resident in the country of destination differ from one country to another according to the legal structure. This legalization could be achieved individually, case by case, or through group legalization programs such as:

• Generally, immigration lawyers are those who are in charge of individual legalization. Even though governments in the destination countries exert rigorous roles in the individual cases regularization process, illegal migrants lean towards other methods to legalization. Among the paths towards legalization is seen marriage with a citizen in the destination country, asylum seeking, and work contract securing.
• Group Legalization: at least 15 legalization programs of illegal immigrants were undertaken by Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece in the last two decades. The key determinants impacting group legalizations[199] are the need for foreign labor and the economic concerns, in addition to political pressures.

 

II.B.4.2. Illegal migration: data and comments[200]

One may wonder why we need a new framework to study illegal migration and if any arrays of multi-disciplinary models that explain human mobility exist. The answer to this question is simple: most of existing migration theories, if not all, supports a free movement of humans. Geography is one of the barriers in the models of migration, let us cite distance and natural barriers, then the other barrier is economy which implies the financial cost of migration.

In addition, current models of migration are more focused on the labor market disparities between origin and destination countries excluding the welfare system and the harsh gap between living conditions in origin and destination countries as determinants that lead people to attempt to infringe legal barriers.

Henceforth, developing a framework is required to direct specialists and researchers to study illegal migration taking into account the fact that this type of migration involves illegal borders crossing of one or two countries that are countries of origin and destination or illegal staying in the country of destination. The framework delivered in this study tries to incorporate both legal/illegal and policy features to the migration system between origin and destination, passing through a transit country, if applied.

People migration from their country to work in other host country is common; it is natural humankind knowledge and will be familiar to all people including European Union. With the understanding that there is a disparity of resources and employment opportunity on national or international level, this phenomenon will remain for a long period of time. Moreover, various reasons lead developed country to receive new migrants. Perpetual seeking for something better is the main aspects of influence on migration flows which control its direction.

In the view of the Euro-Mediterranean partnership agreement and neighbor policies, there is a slight need for cooperation between worker-sending countries and receiving countries concerning the reasons and motivations of migration, not only to get rid of illegal migration but to take a developed procedure for real partnership as well.

As regards to migration issue, the following realities should be highlighted:

• Migration to European countries for work is a main aspect to defuse unemployment and poverty phenomenon not only in Egypt but in Arabian areas as well. When we shed light on Egyptian youth migration to Europe, we can find that we are dealing with European Union which is considered as the most important partners in which thousands of youth are living.
• Migration is a healthy phenomenon and a source of economic, social and cultural prosperity for all parts. Moreover, Egyptian government should manage the process through an integrated curriculum to treat the phenomenon from all dimensions.
• The need for harmonic national policies which comes from integrated coordination among all ministries and involved state institutions clarify the full vision of migration policy.
• Egyptian workers’ rehabilitation is an important case for development motivations. It should be coped with western employment market to achieve collective sake between the two parties.
• Remittance case is one of the most developed dimensions for migration. This case contributes in economic and social development as it is considered as a significant source for foreign exchange.
• The importance of cultural dimension for migration which plays a role in supporting understanding and respect between nations. This requires an intensified dialogue between the two sides, a fight against religion discrimination and contempt, migrants’ rights protection and information tools use to change the misconceptions of migrants.

In the view of the immigration file to European countries, the illegal migration phenomenon increased during the last years. Despite the hardship of migration and its severe impacts, most of youth embark upon escaping from Egypt to unknown .Youth are escaping from tragic situation in their country. So the view of accumulating perishable boats for migrants became a repeated scene as youth take some of these boats to Libya and then to Europe.

According to the present situation, many aspects make the illegal migration a critical phenomenon. Some of these aspects are poverty, unemployment, lack of employment opportunity and the absence of national strategy for fighting these phenomena.

The increasing numbers of drowned Egyptians in the Mediterranean Sea during sneaking into European Union countries opened the file of illegal migration in the view of increasing numbers of victims and the weakness of government to fight the phenomenon.

EOHR describes the dimension of illegal migration through Mediterranean Sea to Europe as reasons and motivations, mechanisms and confrontation, the way to solve the problem and the report includes live hearsay evidence of Egyptian families’ victims.

The percentage of illegal migration is incompatible. The International Labor Organization evaluates the percentage of illegal migration between 10% and 15 % of world migrants which represent 180 million individuals. The percentage of illegal migration in the countries of European Union is 1.5 million individual according to The International Organization For Migration.

UN estimated the numbers of illegal migrants to the developed countries in the last 10 years to 155 million migrants. International statistics estimated the numbers of Egyptian youth who succeeded in entering many countries of the European Union during the last 10 years to 460,000 individuals including 90,000 living illegally in Italy.

Italian security statistics registered that Calabria beach received 14 boats with more than 1,500 illegal migrants; most of them are Egyptians in the first quarter of the following year. The total of the illegal migrants who entered Italy through the sea were 1,419 individuals. Until now, 500 migrants died in the sea in return for 302 migrants during 2006. Statistics showed that the Egyptian youth who   re repatriated from South Africa 2006 were 6,748 individual. There were also 8,000 individual from an Egyptian village who were living in Milan, Italy.

The last three decades of the previous century were considered to be a crucial stage in the Egyptian migration features. This stage registered a wide range of all kinds of migration described as follows:

• The first stage (before 1985): During this stage, European countries were in a short need of migrated workers from the South. European countries manipulated the process of migration through family gathering channels. This stage was distinguished as the southern migrants understood the rules of the game in the northern countries, migrant called for his children right to join governmental school. Besides, most of migrants made the best use of European security inadvertence during this specific stage. European countries didn’t suffer from the number of migrants because there was a vast migration to the gulf countries during this period. Berks and Snikler presented their estimation concerning Egyptian migrants abroad who reached 383,245 migrants which represented 61 percent in 1975. The estimation of the international bank for migration was 353,300 migrants in 1975 and in 1983. A second estimation declared that migration rate in 1980 was 695,650 migrants. This estimation modified the first report and, after the increasing numbers of migrants to Iraq, the estimation changed to 803,000 migrants. In 1987 The Central Institution For Public Mobilization and Statistics estimated the number of Egyptian migrants to almost 1,964 million individuals.
• Second stage (1985-1995): This period is distinguished by the appearance of legal migrants’ contradictions and the crowd of legal migrants among the original natives. This period coincides with the closure of coal mines in France and Belgium which took most of legal migrants during this time. In return to this precautionary situation, migration to the North increased, especially in the light of the end of the oil boom and the emergency of massive economic contraction in oil countries. This stage included a big irony represented in the international treaties issued in 1990 about protecting the rights of migrant workers and their families. These treaties were signed by 9 countries in the South but the irony in the treaties which were refused by all European countries was the matter which clarified that European countries need to treat the issue from a new vision even if it will violate the rights stipulated in the international covenants which guaranteed the right to move and search for better future.
• The third stage (1995 – until now): This stage took a tougher security feature which was adopted by European countries to impose a severe security policy. This policy depended on the implementation of the decisions of “the new law for migration “. This law lied down on restricting family assembly and repatriating the illegal migrants to their countries.

The dream of getting rid of poverty and hardship of life is the weapon which was used by the gangs of illegal migration to attract Egyptian youth who became the victims of market brokers, illegal travel bureaus, migration mediators, administration corruption and organized criminality groups who take almost 30,000 L.E from every individual to travel abroad. These gangs are spreading between Egypt and Libya borders and in some upper Egypt governorates, and after taking money as a pretext of providing employment opportunity, these gangs could escape without being punished and the Egyptian youth journey end with death or repatriation. Young people traveled through perishable boats and die. If any individual succeeded in arriving to Italy, they would be transferred to Egypt as they are considered as violator to the Italian laws. Illegal migrants are being smuggled to Italy and Malta through sneaking into Libya and through Jordan to Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. Fayoum governorate is considered as the most Egyptian governorates rising percentage of migration to Europe. Totoun village is the most famous village in the republic where young people escaped to Italy. Although this village has a population of 40,000 individuals, there are almost 6,000 individuals migrating to Italy and it is said that the name of this village was taken from one of the Italian streets.

The gangs of illegal migration contrive the following new behaviors:

• The marriage with Eastern European girls: in 2004 some of the Egyptian youth who are interested in illegal migration became active to marry Europeans to profit from the legal position to join European Union. Egyptian authorities noticed that many European girls came to marry Egyptians in return for getting 15000-45 000 L.E through mediators related to the Mafia of international migration. This issue was not noticed by the ministry of foreign affairs and security authorities, but it was noticed by the countries’ governments which undertook some procedures to decrease the phenomenon. It changed its laws and legislations after its real adhesion to the European Union in order to cope with the migration and nationality laws with other European countries’ laws and to prevent this kind of deception to fulfill the dream of migrants.
• Tearing passports in transit lounges: One of the deceptive methods of illegal migration is the forgery entrance visa to Latin American countries and some of African countries. When Egyptian youth arrive in the first transit point in Europe, they tear their passports and ask for European protection and not to complete their journey to the destination stated in the visa. These steps are prepared with specialized gangs in forgery, but European authorities in airports noticed these methods and began to repatriate these individuals to their countries of origin.

Illegal migration is an international phenomenon that exists in many countries of the world, but migration to Europe has become one of disturbing cases which got a major concern in the previous years. Economic motivation was the most main reason for the appearance of this phenomenon. This is shown in the level of disparity between developing countries which export migrants and suffer from the shortage of investment and the lack of employment opportunities and proper living levels, and the developed countries which enjoy with the rise of living standards and the shortage of manpower.

Illegal Egyptian migration is considered to be a phenomenon caused by the increasing of poverty and economic deterioration and the lack of employment opportunities. Unemployment percentage was increased in the previous years as it reached 10 percent in 2002, 10 percent in 2003 and 11% in the following year, so we find young people relying on illegal migration.

Government’s policy of depending on the private section led to increase the unemployment catastrophe. The appointment of graduates was canceled from 1984 as for both middle qualifications and higher qualifications. The reports of UN return illegal migration to the increasing number of youth in the developing countries and the lack of employment opportunity and the disparity between rich and poor countries. Traveling abroad became available for all due to the progress of the international communications and traveling methods and the decreasing of legal migration outlets.

 

II.B.5. Impact of Migration on Poverty

1. Data used
2. Modeling and hypotheses
3. Conclusion
4. Comparison between the reality and the hypothesis

 

Conclusion of the second part

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

III. Migration and development tendencies in migration policy

 

Introduction of the third part

 

In order to discuss the link between migration and development, we must first know what is meant by development. In the discussion on the relationship between migration and development, it should be noted that the idea of ​​development is often considered an implicit concept, which involves the assumption of a transition from a less raised to a higher level or better; it is more or less what Walt W. Rostow described there is a little less than half a century[201]. However, a clear explanation of the meaning of “development” is crucial to understand this relationship. Since Rostow, development theory has evolved considerably.

It is not clear to establish a definition of “development”, but it is clear that development as such is not only economic development. Development it is even much more than economic growth. Particularly in relation to the migration, it is important to include in the definition of non-economic factors and less obvious measure, as a growing recognition and respect for human rights and welfare, integration and social cohesion, stability, democracy, security, environment, future, etc..

The picture becomes clearer when one considers the case of some countries heavily dependent on remittances from migrants. While the economic benefits of migration for development are clear, it is important to know the price. A significant change in recent migration structure is its feminization. The change is not so much on the relative proportion of women among migrants but rather on the circumstances in which women migrate. As was also the case in the past, almost half of all migrants is women, including there is a high proportion of Asians, for example. However, the difference is today it is no longer primarily women who follow their husbands. Rights migrants, however, are not guaranteed in all countries. One consequence is that countries of origin benefit from migration through remittances and migrant women working abroad to provide family what it needs to live. However, this also implies often than children without their mother, are raised by another member of the family (usually their grandmother) while their mother, who earns money in another country is used and sometimes abused. If they are raped, women can lose not only their dignity but also their status in society when return to their country. Thus, these economic benefits are often obtained through extremely high social cost.

International organizations and national authorities generally analyze economic growth and the balance of payments to assess the impact of development on migration. However, it should not lose sight of that positive numbers in the balance of payments can hide real social tragedies. In addition to the “economic balance”, it is therefore necessary to develop a “social balance” that would measure also destructive social effects such as those described above, to assess the overall impact of migration issues on the “development” of the country of origin.

In his presentation of the global economic outlook for 2005, the Bank World analyzed which actors benefit from the presence of migrant workers in the international labor market. In general, this situation is rather positive. Indeed, as countries of origin and host benefit. When people leave their country, they often able to find work abroad and send money to their families the country. In addition, migrants may provide an answer to the shortage of labor in the host country. From this point of view, it is clear that each party finds its account. And also at the individual level, as new migrants often improve their standard of living and can build a career. The only losers in the table a point might be economic migrants already settled in some countries destination, those who migrated already there for decades. People living the margins of society are indeed not always able to compete with the new come. They have papers or not, whether qualified or not, one of the main motivations for migrant workers is to increase their income. Indeed, the staff care in many countries may for example increase their monthly income by migrating to another country, depending on the region where they are going, they can earn up to twenty times than in their country of origin[202]. The wage differential can be a major attraction, career opportunities can as well be a good reason to migrate for skilled professionals. At the individual level, this situation seems to be « win-win » migrant workers improve their level of life, make more money and have better opportunities while employers abroad can hire a motivated and relatively cheap.

Moreover, the benefits are not all purely economic. The family remained in country; group or village can enjoy the benefits of migration and funds transferred by migrants. Thus, they can invest in food better, in better housing, in education, in health care, etc.

However, if this can be beneficial on an individual level, the emigration of highly skilled workforce can be a considerable loss to the country of origin, especially for developing countries. This concept is generally called “Brain drain”. The country of origin may have multiple reasons to encourage emigration, depending on their social and economic context. It is true that workers and highly qualified professionals are required to development of a country, but emigration can clearly have its positive side. Diaspora also generates money transfers, savings and investment can help social objectives (a special session is devoted to the diaspora). And in the case of a high unemployment, emigration can even act as a safety valve to reduce unemployment.

This part of our writing studies about the migration and the policies of migration, especially the relationship between migration, migration policies and development.

 

III.A. Links between migration policies and development policies

 

The international community has so far not a UN agency in charge of migration. The International Organization for Migration, who was established in 1951 and employs nearly 5,500 people, does not depend on the United Nations system. We are witnessing a proliferation of initiatives. Migration and development by multilateral organizations without they are still coordinates, or made consistent with other development partners. New field investigation, the subject has indeed led to the emergence of diverse interests and the creation of small programs scale, each working in the dark to identify how to address the issue pragmatically. Parallel migration policies implemented by host countries and of origin of migrants struggle to find a mode of articulation at the international level. A number of regional processes coexist, sometimes animated by States, particularly at European level in the Euro-African migration[203], sometimes animated by multilateral institutions, including the IOM. The United Nations Global Forum on Migration and development established in 2007 after the first high-level dialogue on United Nations[204].

Migration and development attempt to promote dialogue between states on measures towards a further articulation between migration policies and issues development. However, this informal forum, led by states and permanent structure without official coordination, difficulty in finding a modus operandi effective, which would actually states to identify means of taking account of migration in development strategies, approach taken by AFD also present in this cross-intervention framework. This system of global governance including the movement of people as a theme of interest, ensure a more reliable protection. People on the move (to the challenges to come on this subject) and also allow a more specifically on the movement of migrant workers. And exposed a multitude of factors could cause internal migration and international evolve in the coming years from both endogenous and exogenous factors in the country development. The developmental implications of migration presented in this first part, illustrate the relevance of a topic that may be a growing concern among agencies development.

Mobility, domestic and international, will be crucial for developing countries and emerging particularly vulnerable to urbanization as to the capitals to secondary cities and strong population growth. Some factors will continue to generate mobility. Factor could include economic growth lead to a South-South migration, in particular for emerging economies. Developed countries must both manage the aging of their populations and issues of integration of immigrant populations. Factors such as global climate disruption and development of energy resources could affect both the capacities of countries and the whims of departures.

The relationship between migration and development are complex and many are nothing new. However, the international debate has changed over time and policies, including those of the Union European tint to the evolution of this debate. If the research on the effect of migration on development indicators still require be extensive, international mobility is now recognized as a factor development.

Indeed, it seems that in the various communications that have recently been published development course in “migration and development” for the least developed countries. By cons behind the term “migration”, these communications evoke “the management of migration flows” in the sense of limiting South-North migration and selective opening of access to European territory categories of migrants to meet the needs North. It must also be considered that migration raises more complex issues of identity, equity, social justice and the universality of human rights, therefore, the mobility management

International should lead to the establishment of policies to maximize the positive impact of the migration on development and minimize the negative effects as the original in the host.

 

III.A.1. Migration management and development[205]

 

Management of migration flows has become an important aspect in the context of cooperation between industrialized and developing countries. But if one tries to look at what measures taken in the framework of this cooperation, as understood in developing countries least developed, one may wonder if they really help. The outsourcing of asylum, border control, through the logic of buffer states represents a regression in terms of respect of human rights and adds a social burden that countries must take.

Conditioning the Official Development Aid, for signature by the member countries of readmission of their nationals found illegally on EU territory, impede the development of these countries, to the extent these are priority sectors (health, education) will suffer the most. In addition, this measure would really effect some countries derive more benefits of migrant remittances than ODA.

Similarly we can question the compatibility of Article 13 of the Cotonou Agreement, which implies a negotiation on issues of migration, based on the effectiveness of migration policies in the European Union with the objective sought of this agreement, aimed at reducing poverty and sustainable development.

It is clearly in the current migration policies, a first objective restrictive and secure, and the measures taken in the framework of cooperation with third countries are quite questionable.

Nothing to limit migration has any impact on the development socio-economic country of origin and on the contrary, they have negative effects:

• Increase illegal immigration;
• Increase of illegal work and therefore result in lower wages for workers in the host country;
• Increase in human trafficking;
• Increased risk-taking by migrants;
• Permanent settlement of migrants and their families in the host country because they cannot move;
• Use of illegal channels for remittances;
• Reduction investment opportunities in distance.

It is therefore clear that no means limited to the South-North migration can be seen as a development strategy and therefore the programs put in place for this purpose shall in no event rise funding related to ODA.

It is important to distinguish the management of migration flows and the role of development cooperation in the least developed countries in strengthening the potential of migration on developing countries.

 

III.A.2. Economic migration and development

 

While the primary objective of the current migration policies is safe, and the second by including the target migration policies économiques in gestation, is selective and does not meet the needs of industrialized countries.

Migration is certainly a response to economic and demographic needs of the EU and economic migration is an integral part of discussions on trade liberalization within the WTO, however, political considerations are not considering the free movement of persons.

Programs or projects programs focus primarily on economic migration qualified persons, forgetting somewhat negative effects that the departure of these people cause in the three countries of origin, and provide no compensation for lost investment for the country in terms of education.

If speech is mentioned in the increasing need for labor in certain sectors neglected by native workers (such as catering or construction) or emerging (such as care home for the elderly …), we wonder why we do not recognize that these sectors are already largely covered by migrants, including undocumented persons, and that we do not proceed not their regularization of undocumented workers and that these categories are not included in the planned programs.

Again policies must be developed through a consultation taking into account the needs of both host countries and countries of origin and systematically include measures to ensure the protection of the rights of migrant workers and the portability of their coverage.

If we must consider that migration is a fact that will continue to grow in a world increasingly globalized, human mobility has been and will continue to be a dynamic evolution companies must recognize the new paradigms of contemporary migration.

The binary concept “permanent migration” / “temporary migration” still predominate in language and approach that are planned migration policies. However, the reduction of distances by means of transport, communication technologies mean that migration tends to take a more circular or transnational feature, back and forth, the alternating residence in the country of origin and, if both the host country and therefore maintaining links social, political and economic ties to their communities of origin. These new paradigms represent an important lever for development, and it is therefore appropriate to define migration policies favorable to development.

To do this, it would have to be the result of political dialogue and consultation with the countries of origin, taking into account these new paradigms to establish collaborative win-winner, potentiating the effect of migration on development. It should include:

• articulate migration policies, integration and development in the context of negotiations with the countries of emigration;
• ratify and implement international instruments for the protection and respects migrants’ rights and the rights of migrant workers;
• facilitate the movement of people through the relaxation of the procedure visa. (Allowing, thus, reduce illegal migration and the role of channels traffickers in human beings;
• establish policies bi / multilateral economic migration, promoting the mobility of people;
• labor migration programs flexible to the needs of countries of emigration and immigration status based on rights and duties of individuals and non-contract established by a employer;
• ensure through bilateral agreements and mechanisms portability of coverage or of pension rights;
• Develop a new approach to the notion of citizenship and recognize that the transnationality.

If the approach “more development for less migration” has shown its limitations in the limitation of migration, at least in the short term, it remains no less important to continue efforts to reduce the North-South inequalities and allow everyone to find, if they so wish, in his country, decent living conditions. The role of “development cooperation” remains the same; however it can enrich strengthening the potential of migration on development.

Some aspects of development policy could include are:

• With respect to financial transfers:

• strengthening the implementation of transnational financial system: transparency and reduced transfer costs; expansion of banking networks in the country, including the joint with Micro-finance institutions (MFIs);
• provides diversified products that meet the needs of specific migrants and their families;
• strengthening investment opportunities: implementation of inciting measures, administrative and fiscal facilities; facilitation access to credit; establishment of a guarantee fund for initiatives economics invests; support to families and / or migrants in their economic investment projects; support migrant organizations in their efforts for collective investment (Economic and social);
• integration projects in local development programs in order to reduce the dependence of local communities funds from migrant communities;
• strengthening psychosocial programs emptying to minimize the negative effects of financial transfers to the social level (« easy money », dependence on transfers …)

• With regard to the transfer of skills and social interaction implementation of program / structures facilitating the transfer of skills and movement qualified persons;

• strengthening mechanisms to facilitate linkages between States country of origin and migrant communities;
• facilitating communication between communities of origin and migrant communities;
• facilitating the contribution to the development of people returning to their country of origin.

• Regarding the community development projects supported by the migrant associations:

• strengthening the self-organization of migrant community;
• promoting the participation of migrants in development programs;
• promoting partnerships between migrant communities and development actors in host countries (NGDOs, towns, cities, region, etc.) partnerships between migrant organizations and actors development in countries of origin.

Halfway between Africa and the Mediterranean, Egypt has had to play because of its position one geopolitical role in the governance of migration. At the regional level, it initiated cooperation agreements with Arab countries and the OECD. Crossroads between the Middle East, the Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa, Egypt faces many challenges related to migration, which in addition to a political agenda already surcharged.

In recent years, Egypt has seen its territory a considerable number of refugees and migrants fleeing non-documented many areas of conflicts in the region[206]. Whether Iraqis, Sudanese, Somali and Eritrean, situation is extremely difficult for refugees has not failed to attract the attention of the international community.

The Egyptian government has sought, at least in its official pronouncements, develop relationship problem of emigration with those of economic development and the national interest. The active ministry of Human Forces and Emigration (MME) has consolidated such agreements cooperation with international organizations and Arab and European countries to:

• organize legal migration,
• stimulate demand for Egyptian workers,
• reduce emigration illegally from Egypt to Europe and
• share information related to irregular migration with some countries destination[207].

However, the need to fight against long-term fundamental causes of irregular migration such as unemployment and poverty is a challenge to take up. If Egypt has succeeded in putting in place a complex and highly institutionalized policy framework to meet the challenges of migration, it is not just about immigration. For example, the government demonstrated openness in respect of labor migration, which results in increasing the informal economy, especially in areas requiring low labor qualified as domestic work. Moreover, the absence of a clear legal framework to manage the issue of asylum seekers is increasing precariousness of migrants and refugees therefore present on the territory. In addition, if local associations take many initiatives to improve the plight of refugees in Cairo and its periphery, one might ask if civil society manages actually influence governmental decisions. Today, improving policy Egypt towards refugees is a key issue.

 

III.B. Management of migration and development policies: maximizing the benefits of migration[208]

 

Development practitioners do not disagree anymore about the relationship between migration and development. In countries where the effect of migration on development, and vice versa, is important, it should be featured into development planning. This involves consideration of migration by policy makers at every stage of development planning, from situation analysis to evaluation and monitoring. To demonstrate the effect of migration, the amount of remittances is the example which is a frequently used. The analysis indicates that migration is often generates substantial profits when it comes to alleviate poverty and also in human development for migrants and their families. In a report of IFAD[209] in 2009 on remittances in Africa it was indicated that the 30 million African diasporas who live outside their original countries together contribute about US $ 40 billion in remittances to their families and communities. Official development assistance (ODA) is far exceeded by remittances in the African region while for many countries they also surpass foreign direct investment.

There are negative and positive connections between migration and development. African states must build up a proactive approach instead of a reactive one so as to better strap up the advantages of migration as well as defining strategies and policies that permit the confinement of development opportunities offered by migration and all the aspects in relationship with it. Some African countries are currently making efforts to integrate migration into their planning processes of national development. For example, there are migration references in the Poverty Reduction Strategy documents of Senegal and Benin, mainly relating to tying together the income and potential of its diasporas, including the expatriates who are involving in development measures. Zimbabwe and Kenya are among the countries who have established migration and development and labor migration divisions in their respective governments. Countries have developed multilateral and bilateral partnerships between them across Africa and sometimes with the help of international organizations. Initiatives which engage a wide variety of stakeholders are being applied in many African countries, including the establishment of thematic groups on migration to help governmental and institutional partners in developing complete migration management strategies (Morocco); the enhancement of capacities on the governance of labor migration in Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, and Tunisia;  the reinforcement of national and regional strategies for broadening social security coverage to African migrant workers and their families in Senegal, Mali, Mauritania, Ghana, Ethiopia, South Africa, Uganda, Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Mauritius; the engagement of diasporas qualified in health sector in Somalia; the insurance of language education for children who were sent back home in Burundi; the prospection of the acquisition and recognition of skills before migrants’ departure in Cape Verde; the facilitation of voluntary short-term skill from highly qualified expatriates in the agriculture, engineering, economics, environmental protection, education, and health services sectors, among others in Rwanda; the transfer of migrants expertise in aquaculture and fishery in Egypt; the reinforcement of institutional abilities by arising the consciousness of the diasporas and alleviating the impacts of brain drain in the three coun­tries of the Great Lakes region including Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and; the issuance of diasporas bonds to overpass financing gaps in Ethiopia and Rwanda. African countries and the relevant regional economic communities (RECs) are committed as well in the endorsement of international instruments and initiatives at the regional level, primarily to the fight against human trafficking and to promote respectable work, these two fields contribute to the human development.

At the worldwide level, the Global Migration Group (GMG) and the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) took part in a policy dialogue viewing migration as a development determinant since the first high-level dialogue of the UN in 2006.

Despite all the efforts that has been undertaken, there is still much to do in order to seize the advantageous impacts that migration has on development in Africa. It requires more complete data collection and analysis to understand the migration and development nexus in order to build up the suitable and rational responses at all phases of the processes in the policy making. There is a relationship between migration policies and all facets of development primarily concerning the economy, the financial sector, the institutions and public services, the human rights, the social and cultural sector, the demography, the labor markets, the recognition of experience, the forced dislocation of people, gender concerns, the migrants’ efficiency at work, the contribution that the migrant brings to his/her origin country and host countries, the cohesion and integration of migrants in societies, etc. These crossing points engross all sectors in an interconnected way and concern as well all aspects of the migration process and manage intra-country and inter-country movement of people. If we consider only, for example, the economic aspect, there are many determinants that influence the reason of people’s migration like relative deprivation, poverty, loss of source of revenue, pursuance of economic or business openings, search for better salary, etc. Sending as well as receiving countries may profit economically from migration. For example, the fact that labor markets will naturally adapt to a situation of stability but, actually, they can possibly be prevented from doing so by immigration regulations can be a subject of argument. However, the loss of labor and skills caused by considerable emigration to another labor market can result in a fall in productivity and further impact the GDP of the sending country. What is positive in the situation is that the money remitted by migrants can, amongst others, provide a growth of foreign exchange earnings of a country, a decline of credit limitation that hold back private investments and entrepreneurial opening and, through this, an indirect impact on the supply side of la­bor markets. Remittances also motivate local consumption and contribute in the improvement of human capital by financing education, health, as well as access to clean wa­ter/electricity/housing. Some migrants also help public infrastructures and productive activities in their origin countries through dispersed cooperation and international networks of professionals.

In order to tie together the potential of migration, integrating migration into national and local development strategies needs an approach based on evidence and inter-ministerial. Appropriate policies that develop awareness and an assessment of the intrinsic advantages and risks of migration-development nexus of a country are required to profit from opportunities provided by migration or to alleviate its negative impacts.

What are needed for policymakers’ inter­ventions in developing such policies are the following: a draw of the nature of the migration inside and from their country, a study of the circumstance in which migration is occurring, a detection of manners to harness the beneficial impacts of migration, an approach to alleviate its negative conse­quences, an appropriate data and indicators system on migration, a harmonized and synergized structure of migration mainstreaming efforts, an elaboration of safe migration and development plan, an incorporation of the different stages of development planning (local, national and regional), and an identification of migration relationships with the strategies of policy development, implementation and assessment.

African countries must deal with the basis and most important phase of harnessing profits of integrating migration to processes of development via national development strategies. The integration of migration into national development strategy can only add value to current national migration plans. Yet, this should be about long-term visioning and not exclusively about short-term planning. This is a serious, timely and policy pertinent subject for challenges facing the continent today.

 

III.B.1. Policies and programs for migration and development

 

Despite the growing recognition of the importance of the link between migration and development in both the sphere of migration and sphere of development, there are still significant gaps in policy, research and information at different levels that need to be addressed if we want to realize the full potential of migration for development.

 

• Policies coherence

On the occasion of the International Dialogue on Migration which took place during the Council IOM in December 2005, the participants emphasized the urgent need to integrate migration issues in development agendas, both nationally internationally. Policy coherence is a necessary condition to take advantage of the potential benefits of migration to development if we are to avoid direct and indirect adverse effects of a possible mismatch between orders day on migration, development, trade, employment, health, safety and well-being.

As was emphasized at the IOM Council, start by sweeping his doorstep. For this, it must meet the departments whose jurisdiction covers various aspects of the immigration issue in order to avoid inconsistencies and to develop common goals. Thus, policies to control migration and those aimed at facilitating should be complementary and not contradictory. But consistency cannot be reduced simply to avoid inconsistencies; it presupposes active pursuit of synergies between policies and programs in areas related. This approach has the potential to exert a ruggedized handset while promoting political objectives for each area.

Work towards greater policy coherence implies ensure that migration is integrated into the agendas of national development developing countries and donor countries and those in developing internationally. One aspect of this business that is too often overlooked is that gender policies designed to provide targeted support to migrant women and their families, who must also have the effect of contribute to the achievement of gender development.

Currently, most of the strategic development frameworks, such as Millennium development and most policies governmental organizations in the field, such as Poverty Reduction Strategy to reduce (PRSPs), do not include systematic considerations migration. Some countries have begun to take concrete steps in this direction, and IOM was approached by a number of governments seeking assistance to integrate migration issues into PRSPs. As for the impact analysis on the environment, migration considerations must be registered automatically in the development plans. Striving for coherence also means to ensure that migration policies are more “attentive development” and have a more assertive in this regard.

 

• Improve understanding of the effects of migration on development

Successful integration of migration into national agendas, regional and international development, and the development of policies and programs effective for development requires a thorough understanding of the relations complexes that bind the two phenomena. Data and statistics on migration, especially when they interest development needed to be improved. It is particularly important to obtain better data on remittances on migrants and their networks, and labor markets countries of destination and origin.

Also of note in this regard a lack of information concerning the knowledge growth effects produced by migration policies on development. Develop policies “careful development” requires an understanding the impact of different policies on the development process and criteria to evaluate the results of these policies. Yet, research in this area has not been very systematic. To fill this gap, the IOM partnered with the World Bank to produce a study entitled “Development-Friendly” Migration Policies: A survey of innovative practices in countries of origin and destination (Migration Policies “careful development” a study of innovative practices in countries of origin and destination). It is necessary to develop better indicators for measuring the impact of migration on development in order to provide decision makers with instruments for the development of migration policies and to integrate migration into development policy frameworks such as the Millennium development and PRSPs. It is also important to develop methods and appropriate instruments for this purpose.

 

• Respect and protection of migrant

When examining the links between migration and economic development and social, it is vital to consider the “human dimension” of migration. The human rights of all migrants are an essential element of good migration management and sound development strategies.

It is a well established principle of state sovereignty that they have broad authority for all matters relating to the granting of nationality, admission conditions of residence and expulsion of non-nationals. In addition, the State has the authority it to take measures to protect its national security. Sovereignty of the state, however, also assumes responsibilities and the authority to manage migration must be carried out in full respect of human rights as nationals. In the current international environment, characterized by a repetition efforts against terrorism and a more efficient management of border, it is vital to strike a balance between the protection of human rights migrants and the need for governments to address concerns expressed legitimate safety.

It does not exist at the international level, comprehensive single instrument governing different facets of migration purporting to regulate the conduct of all players this scene. However, there are a number of instruments that protect human rights of migrants. When approaching the seven essential tools governing human provide answers to a variety of challenges faced by migrants, regular and irregular, including four non-discrimination and protection against racism and xenophobia, the rights of which a person may avail himself when in immigration status (eg: conditions under which expulsion may be made, the procedural protections and conditions of detention), as well as economic, social and cultural non-citizens. Moreover, the additional protocols to the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, relating to the smuggling of migrants and Trafficking in persons is a part of the fight against irregular shapes of the migration and define, for states, specific preventive measures and protection. Various other instruments provide protection to categories determined people involved in the process migratory.

Dissemination and increased efforts to raise awareness of the amount standards and international instruments governing migration in all stakeholders in the migration process is an important step in the work to uphold and protect the human rights of all migrants. In March 2006, IOM launched a database on migration law, accessible to everyone, which is a compilation complete all standards at the international migration and regional levels, what will be added gradually legislation national. She has also undertaken the publication of a series of pamphlets dealing international migration law, the last volume focuses on standards and the principles of law governing the human rights of migrants, biometrics and international migration. The Organization has also published a “Glossary of migration” in several languages to guide the user through the maze of terms and migration of domain concepts, on the basis of definitions recognized at the international, where they exist. In addition, IOM is currently finalizing the International Migration Law: Developing Paradigms and Key Challenges (International Migration Law: Developing a theoretical framework and main challenges encountered), which will prepare a summary of developments in the field of law governing migration international. It should educate policy makers and those responsible for enforcing national legislation concerning the rights and obligations of the State concerning the management of migration and promote the Sun as an essential part of a framework comprehensive migration management.

To this end, IOM provides training and capacity potential centered on the Sun, as well as technical assistance to governments focused on the development of migration legislation compliant international. Thus, IOM assists States parties to the International Convention on the Protection of Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of their Families in Focus point of national legislation with the Convention. It has also led or attended a number of training courses and workshops covering various aspects of Latin America, Asia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Africa and the Middle East. In September 2005, the Organization has established a training four days devoted to the Sun for about 50 representatives government in all regions of the world, in collaboration with the Institute of Humanitarian Law in San Remo. His intention is to organize annual courses similar training for interested governments. IOM also ensures a formation on the Sun to its staff, believes that respect and protection of migrants’ human rights are an integral part of its projects and its programs.

Added to this is the need to disseminate objective at migrants concerning their rights and obligations, as well as before departure for their migration. Recognizing this need, IOM, in cooperation with governments, international organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), leads in different countries and regions information campaigns and provides education on the provisions of national, regional and inter- national migration specifying the rights and obligations of migrants.

Another way to improve the protection of human rights of migrants is to enhance the effectiveness of consular protection and assistance to migrants abroad, especially when they are in custody. Practice recommendations such as that adopted by Asian countries of origin, placing in various foreign countries attached specialists working conditions, deserves as an example. IOM has developed a curriculum for these attached and provides for their training.

Finally, it is important to recognize the crucial role that civil society has to play in so that migration is a positive experience for all players involved. For example, civil society is well positioned to help migrants to integrate into their new environment and assist communities in destination countries acceptance of migrants, including by combating racism and xenophobia and ensuring dispel misconceptions about migrants. In fact, the civil society it, particularly through NGOs is often mandated by governments central and regional to conduct such activities.

Each of the measures described above helps to ensure that the rights of migrants are more than mere rhetoric but a reality.

 

III.B.2. Migration working for the poor

 

Migration can contribute positively in the reduction of poverty and the development. Yet, this is capable of weakening in a significant manner when governments neglect migration, and when migration plans miss the determinants that provide profits and reduce risks.

 

• Migration management

When regimes of migration are well-managed, it can help developing countries take advantage of potential profits from migration and lessen a part of the risks. International Labour Organisation (ILO) Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration is among several sources of advice and guidance offered to countries which give non-connecting supervision concentrated on helping countries build up their labor migration plans which depends on their precise requirements and circumstances. A range of major policy concerns such as trade, security, environment, health and development[210] have a strong connection with migration. National and regional decision-makers, with international support if needed, should focus on developing rational migration plans and work to the mutual profit of migrants, society and governments, including the management of migration to cope with their economic and social requirements, promotion of growth, to prevent and handle wisely with irregular and illegal migration, and accept repatriated nationals that have travelled through irregular itineraries.

Here are some of the main concerns of poverty reduction and development that require focuses:

• nationally managing migration and planning for domestic mobility;
• opportunities for legal migration;
• supporting the circulation of high-skilled migrants; and
• dealing with the migrants’ rights.

 

• Planning for domestic mobility

There is a change in domestic migration’s outlines. For poor people, the most significant form of migration is undoubtedly the movement within national boundaries, both in terms of degree and potential effect on poverty decrease. In many poor countries, labor migration by men from one rural area to another remains the most ordinary kind of migration. Yet, more women are migrating and doing so independently of their families. For instance, it was found in a study of migrant population of Addis Ababa in 2000 that female migrants exceeded the number of male migrants, they were on average younger than their male peers and an uncommonly high percentage of the female migrants were divorced or unmarried and it is the same case in East and South East Asia where the majority of female migrants are young and unmarried. Temporary migration is more and more frequent. For instance, seasonal migration accounted nearly 20 million people each year in India whereas people in West Africa migrate for seasonal employment from the northern regions of countries such as Ghana, Togo, Mali and Burkina Faso to the South. The reason for people to migrate is as well to enhance their income and assets rather than for survival.

The fact that rural-to-rural migration is still the most frequent type of movement proves that rural areas will keep on being a significant part of development efforts. Nearly 62% of all movements in India were rural-rural migration in 1999-2000[211]. In the places where there is a growth in non-farm activities, new forms of infrastructure will be required in rural areas, such as efficient waste management. It is very important to ensure that people can manage to make a living, to guarantee that families who stay or move into rural areas have the appropriate homes and protections, mainly land rights and entitlements for women.

In some countries, there is as well an increase of migration from rural areas to towns and cities. The urban populations of Africa, Asia and Latin America are expected to double to about 4 billion people within three decades. At the same time, rural populations will also keep on growing with a slower growth which will reach 3 billion over the same period. By 2020, most of Asians will be living in towns and cities. And by 2030, the same will be true for the majority of Africans. The most palpable form of rural-urban migration is long-distance to larger cities, but numerous migrants, primarily the poor, migrate to smaller towns. What mostly attract rural migrants to urban areas are higher, or at least more regular, wages and a bigger variety of non-farm jobs.

The benefits of domestic migration for poor men and women and for economic growth are not well acknowledged. National strategies most of the time pay no attention to or confine domestic migration instead of expecting and planning for it. In Africa, there is a variety of obstacles to confine migration such as permits, fees, fines, roadblocks and harassment. In China and Vietnam limitations on migration still existed until very recently. The reduction of migration is most of the time the aim of development programs in India and this kind of approach results in troubles. If there is no planning for domestic migration, towns and cities are not capable of coping with the needs of increasing populations such as the supplying of public services like health and education. Moreover, the migrant’s areas of origin may undergo problems since it is the most vulnerable people, frequently the old ones, the disabled and children, who are left behind. In India DFID has dedicated over £200 million for programs in three states to develop urban management and governance.

In growing urban areas, lack of appropriate housing constitutes as well a main problem. Estimates indicate the existence of current 900 million hovel occupants worldwide. If existing tendency continue, this estimated numbers is expected to reach 1.5 billion hovel occupants by 2020.

 

• Opportunities for legal migration

The profits of migrating can be significantely increased by the occasion to travel via authorized channels. On the other hand, moving in an irregular way causes great increase in migration and this is done through channels that are neither recognized nor authorized. Several governments are now trying to make sure that the legal options concerning the proposition to people who wish to migrate is in shape with national labor market requirements, meaning greatly that a stress is put on attracting highly skilled and semi-skilled people. Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and the United States have, for instance, immigration regimes that focus on selecting migrants having particular education skills and levels. The same approach will be established in the United Kingdom via the Points Based System.

In developing countries with a great number of people with a very low level of education, internal and international migration into low-skilled jobs could result in great poverty reduction and development profits. For over 25 years, the government of the Philippines has backed the international export of short-term labor as an a clear and significant part of its economic development. There has been a diversification of migrants occupations to comprise professionals, factory workers and domestic workers, whereas the custom of migrant Filipino construction workers, sailors and nurses stays strong[212]. Filipino migration has raised revenues for millions of workers as well as their families and motivated investment in education and training.

 

• Addressing the rights of migrants

One of the important characteristics of migration is the difficulty that migrants may meet in applying their rights. Most of the time, they do not know their rights, or unable to apply the full variety of rights that are given to them. The denial of migrants’ rights can seriously weaken the potential benefits of movement for individual migrants and their communities of origin. Migrants need protection in order for them to avoid harassment, violence, debt and increased poverty. The migrants using irregular channels are the most vulnerable of all and feel powerless to complain to the authorities about abuses, or assert their rights because of their status.

Some basic human rights are given to all migrants everywhere, not considering their official status, including freedom from slavery and from torture. Migrants usually benefit from the human rights that are established in the international human rights treaties to which the pertinent state is a party, in accordance of being within the jurisdiction of that state. For example, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, having 152 state parties, has a wide range of rights, including freedom from forced labor and from cruel or humiliating treatment. The majority of the rights in this agreement apply to both regular and irregular migrants. Yet, some rights like the right to vote are limited to citizens. The 151 states that are party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights are also dedicated to “little by little implementing”, or working towards these rights inside their existing resources. Migrants are normally given rights to access primary education for children or emergency healthcare, on a non-discriminatory basis.

Nevertheless, developing countries can exclude non-citizens from the right to economic rights, namely the right to work. The complete variety of rights given to migrants will differ depending on the legal setting inside each country. Over and above human rights established in international law and pertinent treaties, migrants may be given specific rights established in national constitutions and laws. Workers who moved via legal channels can acquire or increase entitlement to additional rights, for instance the right to contributory or insurance based pensions or other social security profits, to which irregular migrants cannot possibly profit from.

A few international tools focus particularly on the migrants’ rights across international boundaries, like the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) conventions 97 (Migration for Employment) and 143 (Migrant Workers), and the UN Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families.

The ILO’s 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work is an significant instrument for the protection of the migrant workers’ rights. The Declaration establishes the ILO fundamental labor models which cover freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, the abolition of forced labor and child labor, and the ending of job discrimination. Though they have not approved the related ILO conventions, member states are bound to respect, to promote and to implement these principles. Civil society, comprising trade unions, plays a key part in helping migrant workers to understand and claim their rights.

 

III.C. Issues around migration in the coming decades

 

In the era of globalization, economic migration or labor is on the rise. Due to the lack of jobs in developing countries and the increased demands of low-wage workers in developed countries, young women and men are looking for work in other countries in order to survive and support their families at home.

The International Labour Organization (ILO) estimates that approximately 175 million migrants from around the world, half of them are workers. Emigrant workers not only contribute to the economies of their host countries, they send back payments that increase the economies of their countries of origin. The ILO reports curve payments abroad to 223 billion dollars in 2005, more than twice the level of international aid. Emigrant workers contribute to increasing diasporas, scattered communities abroad who have links with the countries of origin and receptions but a large membership in one or the other[213].

Despite encouraging economic aspects, economic international migration is not strictly regulated and ill-treatment of several emigrant workers is common. Emigrant workers are vulnerable to harassment, exploitation and human trafficking. Part of this reason is that emigrant workers do not have full citizenship in the countries in which they settle.

In the Philippines[214], the local economy is thriving export of labor, especially women as home workers. Of workers of the Philippines, migrant domestic workers are employed in more than 130 countries and provide care for children and the elderly in the family, or sex work and the company for rich men in Western and Asian countries. Male migrants working in harsh production work or construction are mainly in the Middle East and parts of Asia.

In Europe, immigration policies have not always benefitted the migrant workers and there are significant racial and ethnic tensions. But human trafficking and illegal solicitation of young workers are hidden in a number of regions. Cooperation between states is necessary to prevent violations of human rights, trafficking and other illegal practices.

Workers skilled migrants are less vulnerable to exploitation, but their departure has deprived some countries in developing their expertise required for their own economies. Many of these workers are educated and skilled young people, who make up approximately 30% of the world’s emigrants. This phenomenon is known as ‘brain drain’, where a significant portion of skilled workers from their home countries for better opportunities in other countries.

The migration experts have identified multiple factors that lead people to leave their country to settle abroad, but they have difficulty predicting how these factors change over time, affecting future migration trends.

The first scenario is characterized by severe political instability and high levels of violence, high economic growth, but erratic and uneven, due to a boom in mining in the region and environmental degradation on a large scale. These factors should lead to a steady stream of refugees, a high rate of urban migration and an increase in the number of people migrating to the Gulf countries, Europe, North America, China and India. Due to the growing inequality, the poorest families may be excluded from migration abroad.

The second scenario is characterized by peace and stability as well as economic growth slow but steady and reducing income inequality. These conditions should result in the return of a large number of refugees, the area became a destination for asylum seekers. However, increased educational opportunities and improved access to telecommunications technologies and transport undoubtedly encourage many young people to migrate to Europe, the Gulf, North Africa and China enjoy a better life and better opportunities.

Both scenarios are very different from each other, shown that “migration is far from disappearing”, and that “governments should manage rather than simply to react as if it were some kind of disease”[215].

 

III.D. Conclusion and recommendations

 

Egyptian migrants can create the exchange with most host countries of the EU. However, these effects exist only for certain products and countries. In particular, migration increase trade between Egypt and the EU through both network effects and preference effects but with a predominant role of the first one, as, indeed, in most studies South-North. The type of trade favored by Egyptian migrants differs, however, between exports and imports, with trade creation for exports of homogeneous and differentiated between Egypt and the EU (preference effect), while for imports the trade creation for homogeneous products and prices (network effects and market opportunity). This also shows that the current migration can also be seen as a development tool.

The aim of this previous policy study is to increase the understanding of the consequences of migration for development, particularly in the light of globalization and regional integration. It addresses the question of how the development benefits of international migration can be maximized, and offers a series of concrete recommendations to countries in the region on how to achieve this objective.

The policy implications of international migration for development continue to rank high on the international agenda. The United Nations General Assembly as well as the European Union is dealing with this issue, and several international agencies have recently commissioned a major study on this topic. There is today a growing consensus that international migration needs to be better understood and managed in view of maximizing its advantages and minimizing its negative impacts. The benefits of international migration for both the sending and receiving country, as well as for the migrants themselves, need to be acknowledged.

Studies of the migration-development context confirm that countries derive considerable benefits from international migration. While abroad, migrants acquire different forms of capital which they can transfer to their country. Financial capital in the form of remittances is the most easily quantifiable and thus visible contribution of migrants. But human and social capital which are acquired by migrants, especially by the highly skilled, also have a positive impact on the development of the sending country.

It is argued that governments need to consolidate some of the past efforts, while paying more careful attention to placing these into the broader policy framework of development intervention. This allows building on what has been done so far, and helps create useful synergies between this kind of initiatives and more global development policies. The regional consultation process on migration suggests that there is now a growing awareness that a better co-operation and collaboration is needed at the national, regional and international level. This represents a step forward because unilateral interventions are neither effective, nor sustainable. Migration needs to be managed in the interest and with the participation of all those who are involved, not least to fight trafficking and smuggling of migrants and to protect migrants by promoting their rights.

Also, the benefits derived from international migration can be amplified, if comprehensive and coherent national migration policies are elaborated. These need to be developed in accordance with regional treaties and international laws and regulations regarding the protection of migrants and their families. However, emphasis is placed on some risks and dilemmas that need to be borne in mind when developing a comprehensive national migration policy:

• Development should represent an aim in itself and not directly linked, as it was sometimes in the past, to migration targets. Otherwise the risk is that development aid, which has already significantly decreased in recent years, might be tied to migration or even used to reduce migration pressures.
• The diaspora can play a very important role in the development of sending countries. Yet, there is a risk that unfair advantage might be taken of this diaspora. Governments in the South need to be careful not to offload their responsibility onto the diaspora or returning migrants. This risk is even greater considering that countries in the South are getting poorer and more indebted and that resources allocated to development are decreasing.
• It is nowadays recognized that migrants can, and have to assume the role of agents of change to help their countries to progress. This represents a step forward since they are finally involved, through their associations and organizations, in the implementation of development initiatives and the elaboration of policies. Their political power has increased over time as a result of having been given the right to vote. Coordinating their contributions and ensuring that these are in line with national development targets and policies is an important challenge.
• Most of the measures adopted within the framework of migration management initiatives are likely to produce, in the short-term and contrary to their final objective, an increase in migratory movements. It is only in the medium and long-term that one can expect that through the reduction of the gap in living standards and the development of the migrants’ areas of origin, a decrease in labor migration may occur.

Building on these more general concerns, several specific recommendations are put forward at the end of the paper. Some practical suggestions are made as to what governments and other stakeholders in the short, medium and long run can do to improve the effectiveness of policies and measures for maximizing development benefits deriving from international migration.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

CONCLUSION

 

It is frequently assumed by the observers who are interested in the questions of migration and remittances in the developing world that it is the young and educated who are those who migrate the most. They also observed that it is those from richer households who tend to migrate and they are primarily international migrants. Yet, the migration model used in this study draw some surprising discoveries.

In this study, predicted income equations are used to assess the effect of international remittances on poverty and income distribution. And by using this framework, the study indicates that international remittances have a small, but positive, effect on poverty as shown in the poverty-line calculations where the number of poor households declines by 9.8 percent when international remittances are included in predicted per capita household income.

These changes in poverty reflect the small, yet proportionate, number of poor households who actually receive remittances. In other words, the ratio of households which receive remittances is similar to that of poor households as it is for the sample as a whole. This can be considered as a key policy discovery to the extent that it indicates that poor households can and do produce international migrants.

The study discovers that land assets constitute a more significant factor of migration than predicted per capita household income while examining the socioeconomic factors of the poor’s international migration. The tendency to migrate among the poor is positively and significantly connected with rented and owned land farm since some land assets are required to match with the financial and opportunity costs of international migration. The poor people’s tendency to migrate has a positive relationship with predicted per capita household income apart from remittances, but this relationship is not considerable. Among the poor, there is only but a slight growth of tendency to migrate with predicted per capita household income.

It is found in this survey that the international remittances have a positive effect on poverty whereas they have a negative impact on income distribution. The Gini coefficient which is a measure of inequality increases when remittances are included in predicted per capita household income.

Here are the reasons for this paradoxical result: the inclusion of remittances results in the lowest income quintile to produce its proportionate share of migrants who are still abroad while the second and third income quintiles do not. In addition, the inclusion of remittances results in the production of a disproportionate share of still-abroad migrant by the two top income quintiles. The reason why remittances have a negative effect on rural income distribution is these differences in the number of migrants generated by different income groups, and not differences in either migrant earnings abroad or marginal tendencies to remittances.

Yet, this result can be avoided. It is clearly indicated in the data that remittances had a negative effect on income distribution since when the survey was carried out, the majority of still-abroad migrants were from the groups with upper-income. Nevertheless, data for the once-abroad category of migrants specify that, previously, poor and lower-middle income households generated just as many migrants as households in the groups with upper-income. It is probable that the impacts of remittances on rural income distribution would also have been more equitable with the distribution of households sending migrants abroad having been as consistently distributed as it was in the past.

It is shown by decomposing the sources of income inequality that remittance income only contributes slightly in overall income inequality. Though there is a great unequal distribution of remittance income itself, there is only a small share of it in total income. As seen in the data, income from agriculture is the main source of the inequality of overall income.

The analysis of the economy uses of remittances can be concluded in three ways. First of all, in opposition to the discoveries of other studies, migrant households do not spend a great amount of their remittance earnings on personal consumption. Lipton’s discovery that “everyday (consumption) needs often absorb 90 percent or more of a village’s remittances” is, for instance, in conflict with the data presented here. Once-abroad migrant households have a propensity to view their remittance earnings as a temporary flow of income rather than using them on consumption, they are not meant to be “wasted” on consumer goods.

Secondly, there are discoveries of other studies concerning the large amount of remittance money that are used in accommodation that are confirmed in this analysis. Domination of expenditures on housing is noticed in the sustainable category and once-abroad migrant households reveal a higher propensity to spend remittances on durables than non migrant households, and frequently on housing. With only one exception, marginal budget shares to durables are higher for ail expenditure quintiles of migrant compared to that of non migrant households. Temporary income flows from abroad are mostly considered by migrant households as an opportunity to undertake one of their most immediate worry that is building more modem red-brick dwellings to replace their crowded and traditional mud brick houses.

And lastly, the empirical results advocate the inaccuracy of the claiming that “migrants do not invest” or that “investment is only the fourth (and last) priority for remittances”. This study clearly proves that not only migrants invest, but they also show a higher tendency to invest compared to their non migrant peers. With the use of expenditure data and controlling for level of expenditure, marginal budget shares to investment for once-abroad migrant quintiles are consistently higher compared to those of non migrants and the majority of this investment are dedicated to land. Land is for the individual migrant a good investment. The value of land is inclined to surpass the rate of inflation and represents the best type of investment accessible for the majority of rural migrants.

Several important policy concerns are raised by the tendency of migrants to invest their remittance earnings. The Egyptian government requires some tangible policy measures if it is worried about channeling the stream of remittance levy into other rural investments than land. In order to motivate migrant to invest in agricultural production, the government must continue its efforts to raise the pursuit of key government.

Lipton’s discoveries are based primarily on international remittances earned by rural to urban migrants. In all likelihood, these international remittance earnings correspond to a much smaller proportion of household income than the international remittance earnings that are analyzed here. However, the trivial budget shares to consume goods for migrant households in this study are still much inferior to the 90 percent stated by Lipton.

Once the private rates of profits on these yields become more positive, rural migrants are likely to start investing much more of their remittance levy in the new agricultural technology elements like high-yielding seeds, fertilizers, and agricultural equipment. Insofar as such investment swells the incomes of rural farmers, it may well provide an economy stimulus for other sectors of the rural, nonfarm economy. The rise in rural farmers’ incomes will result in their ability to spend more on health, service, and transport activities. The development of these and similar locally based activities could well provide a wide economy stimulus for developing rural Egypt from the local round up. The challenge to use international remittances productively is noticeable, but there is still the need to identify and implement the policy instruments for meeting that challenge.

International remittances refer to money and goods that are sent back home by people working away from their origin communities. In many cases, such resource remittances can have a great effect on poverty, income distribution, and economy development in rural areas of the Third World (Stark 1980; Cox and Jimenez 1990). In developing countries, the majority of poor people lives and work in the countryside. As rural incomes is inclined to be lower than incomes earned in either the urban sector or abroad, this disparity between rural incomes and expected incomes elsewhere results in migration of rural residents, either to urban areas or abroad.

As far as poverty and equity are concerned, the most important question regarding international remittances is “Who are those who migrate?”. Concerning economy development, international remittances help provide the required investment to make development possible, or they only foster new pattern of dependency on « status-oriented » consumer goods.

There is still no general agreement about the impacts of worker remittances on Third World rural areas. Although the amount of these remittances is quite significant, like they habitually are for international migrants who work in Europe or the Middle East, no agreement on the effects of these earnings on rural poverty, income distribution, and development exists.

This lack of agreement on remittances is explained by two key methodological problems: the use of local-level data collection techniques that prevent from making unmistakable empirical judgments about the effect of remittances, and then the reluctance or inability to apply predicted income functions estimate income before and after migration in an accurate way.

A framework and techniques for analyzing the first-order effects of remittances on one rural Third World area are proposed by this study in order to try to overcome these methodological problems and problems alike. Official sources, at the time of the study (1986/87), indicated that about 3 million Egyptians (17 percent of the total labor force) were working abroad and mainly in Arab oil-rich countries like Iraq, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

There was an increase of official remittances from Egyptian migrant workers from essentially zero in 1971 to US$3 billion in 1985/86. This figure may underestimate the remarkable rate of increase in international remittances in Egypt, insofar as a large amount of such income (possibly US$1 billion) enters the country in an uncounted manner. During the 1980s, official and unofficial international remittances stood for the only most important source of foreign exchange in Egypt.

In more recent years, and mainly since the 1991 Persian Gulf crisis, news reports have indicated the fall in the number of Egyptians working abroad, especially in Iraq and Kuwait. Yet, since the long process of reconstruction is starting in these two oil-rich countries, the demand for Egyptian migrants may probably attain new historic levels. This situation, combined with the opening of new employment opportunities in Saudi Arabia, may keep Egypt as the next century’s major labor exporter.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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LIST OF TABLES

 

 

Table 1:          Three stage least squares estimations: Dependent variables – poverty and remittances (asian developing countries with remittances to GDP ratio of 5% or above; 1980-2008

 

Table 2:          Three stage least squares estimations: Dependent variables – poverty and remittances (29 countries; 1980-2008) – countries with remittances as a ratio of GDP as 5% or more

 

Table 3:          OLS estimates of the effects of international migration on poverty, estimated using per capita GDP

 

Table 4:          OLS estimates of the effect of international migration on poverty, estimated using survey mean income

 

Table 5:          OLS estimates of the effects of official international remittances on poverty, estimated using per capita GDP

 

Table 6:          OLS estimates of the effect of official international remittances on poverty, estimated using survey mean income

 

Table 7:          Number of Work Permits Issued for Foreigners in Egypt by Type of Permit and Main Nationality Groups (2002)

 

Table 8:          Urban/Rural Migration by Type of Movement, Egypt, 1976–1996

 

Table 9:          Temporary Egyptian Migration by Receiving Country, Egypt 2000 

 

Table 10:        Number of Contracts for Egyptians to Work in Arab Countries (1991-2001)

 

Table 11:        Percentage Distribution of Contracts for Egyptians by Occupation Between 1985 and 2002

 

Table 12:        Percentage Distribution of Egyptian Migrants by Occupation in Arab countries, Egypt 2002

 

Table 13:        Estimated Number of Permanent Egyptian Migrants by Country of Destination, Egypt 2000

 

Table 14:        Number of Emigrants and Who Acquired the Nationality of Another Country

While Being Abroad, Egypt 1991-2000

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LIST OF FIGURES

 

Figure 1:         Trends in global migration and development region 1960-2005

 

Figure 2:         The contemporary migration flows

 

Figure 3:        Remittances (US$), Income per Capita in Host Countries (USS), and Number of Workers Abroad (Normalized Series)

 

Figure 4:        Percentage Distribution of Temporary Egyptian Migrants by Receiving Country, 2000

 

Figure 5:         Percentage Distribution of Permanent Egyptian Migrants by Country of Destination, 2000

 

Figure 6:         Geographical distribution of Egyptians abroad

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

LIST OF CHARTS

 

ADB:               African Development Bank

ADF:               Augmented Dickey-Fuller

CAPMAS:       Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics

CNP:

ENR:               EU Neighbouring Region

FDI:

GAMM:          Global Approach to Migration and Mobility

GCC:               Gulf Co-operation Council

GDP:               Gross Domestic Product

GFMD:           Global Forum on Migration and Development

GMG:              Global Migration Group

GMM:             Generalized Method of Moments

HDI:                Human Development Index

HPI:                 Human Poverty Index

IFAD:              International Fund for Agricultural Development

ILO:                International Labour Organisation

IMF:                International Monetary Fund

IOM:               International Organization of Migration

MFI:                Micro Finance Institutions

NGO:              Non-Governmental Organizations

NBI:

ODA:              Official Development Assistance

OECD:            Organization and Development

OLS:

PRSP:              Poverty Reduction Strategy to reduce

PSF:

SOFICOM:

SPS:                Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures

SSA:                Sub-Saharian Africa

SWIFT:           Society for Wordwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication

UN:                 United Nations

UNDP:

UNHCR:         United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

USAID:           United States Agency for International Development

USD:

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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